BY any analysis, this appears a defining moment for John Major and John Bruton. The Tanaiste, Mr Spring, yesterday identified the need to reassert "the primacy of politics" in Northern Ireland.

Some key players at least believe it is for the Taoiseach and the prime minister to secure it - and that, in the face of hopelessness and despair, they still can.

Never mind a meeting of the Inter governmental Conference - a necessary first step though that may be. Several sources yesterday thought only a full prime ministerial summit would seem appropriate to the catastrophe now confronting the people of Northern Ireland and of these islands.

The received wisdom is that the leaders only meet when agreement has been secured in advance negotiation. But the Inter governmental relationship has been shaken to its roots by the events of the past week. A weekend of diplomatic warfare has given the impression of two governments entrenched on either side of the sectarian divide. The people of Northern Ireland, meanwhile, face the dreaded prospect of a full scale return to war.

After all the confident predictions that the communities would not let the prize slip from their grasp, they are rendered powerless as the North hurtles back to its past. And informed sources on the ground fear a new phase of conflict could actually be worse than the last.

Neither sovereign government can bow to such feelings of dire inevitability. But if the ground lost to politics is to be reclaimed, the feeling is that London and Dublin will need to shape and lead a dramatic new initiative.

As the SDLP pulls out of the Forum, and the inter party talks remain rooted in disputes about rules of procedure, the very mention of political initiative may provoke a weary and cynical response. The May elections, after all, were meant to provide a direct route to "all party negotiations". But the IRA had long since resumed its campaign of violence and senior unionists fancy they won't even get to discussing the agenda until September.

After the murder of Garda Jerry McCabe and the Manchester bombing, it was imperative for the two governments to assert that the interparty talks process would proceed. It was, in crude terms, the only show in town.

But there is a discernible lack of belief that those talks are going anywhere. For some time now, unionists and republicans alike have been looking to the conditions which might prevail after general elections in Britain and Ireland. With Mr Major, in particular, running out of time (and Westminster votes), the sense has grown of a lame duck administration and an inevitable political vacuum.

Republicans might imagine the conditions for "pan nationalism" would be enhanced by Mr Ahern's replacement of Mr Bruton. Ulster unionists, meanwhile, hope an election deferred until next April or May will reduce Mr Tony Blair's likely majority and so preserve their influence in the next parliament. So, as the conflict intensifies, there appear compelling arguments on each side for delay. And it may be that ministers are privately resigned to this becoming someone else's problem.

But it need not necessarily be so. Some influential figures certainly believe Mr Major could actually turn the Westminster situation to advantage should he decide to concentrate and conclude the search for a political settlement within the life of the present parliament.

The instinct of ministers and officials in both capitals will probably be to laugh such a concept out of court. But why? Mr Blair and Dr Mo Mowlam have repeatedly warned that no one should procrastinate in the hope they will fare better under Labour. In doing so they reflect the reality that the real political conditions and options will not be altered by a change of government.

Certainly, many think the options - in terms of any package capable of commanding widespread acceptance and support - are unlikely to be much changed as a result of two years of inter party talks at Stormont.

All the Northern Ireland parties know their bottom lines. And British and Irish officials have been constitution drafting for years. The filing cabinets in Iveagh House and the Northern Ireland Office contain every conceivable model - for the internal administration of the North and for cross Border co operation within the framework of the wider Anglo Irish relationship.

The declared Dublin line is that there is no threat to the North's constitutional position as part of the United Kingdom, but a new dispensation must be capable of reconciling northern nationalists to that reality.

It is accepted that a settlement would carry obvious implications for the Republic's constitutional - claim to the North. While much of the detail has yet to be defined, the two governments have already agreed the likely framework. And while London has been discreet on the subject, it is widely accepted that a final package would be put to simultaneous referendums North and South.

But when, if ever, is it going to happen? Sinn Fein is not alone in divining that the present proposed model for negotiation lacks the urgency and dynamic which would come from a designated time frame. And many, unionists included, fear Mr George Mitchell will find himself - in even the most propitious circumstances - presiding over never ending "talks about talks".

SOME players and observers now think the two governments should dramatically revise the timescale and the methodology by which to reach their intended destination.

Given the obstacles and problems raised in its absence, it isn't hard to imagine the scene should Sinn Fein find its way to the conference table. Moreover, a widespread belief is that the Northern parties (for understandable reasons) will never actually sign on the dotted line that they will only travel part of the distance, leaving London and Dublin to make the final call as to where the balance lies.

The question is whether a period of intensive bilateral negotiations could enable them to make that call and present a package of proposals in referendums designed to coincide with the British general election?

Far fetched? Impractical? Why? The reasoning is that such an approach would establish the leadership role of two sovereign governments. It would inject urgency into a situation which many of the participants seem prepared to let drift. It would confront each of the parties with a choice to participate in an attempt to influence the final package or to abstain and campaign for its rejection. It is rooted in the exercise of democracy and it places ultimate responsibility in the hands of the people.

Moreover, it could be carried out with the endorsement of the alternative governments in London and Dublin. It seems likely Mr Major could win the support of Mr Blair and Mr Ashdown for such a stratagem. If the Dail parties similarly backed Mr Bruton, the people and the parties in the North could be offered a powerful challenge and a powerful opportunity.

And if, at the end of the day, the people rejected the proposals, they could hardly face a greater danger than that which now besets them.