B of I directors hide behind the figures

With Institute of Directors president Paddy Galvin on its remuneration committee, it was probably no surprise that Bank of Ireland…

With Institute of Directors president Paddy Galvin on its remuneration committee, it was probably no surprise that Bank of Ireland, decidedly Canutelike, continued aggregating directors' remuneration in this year's annual report.

All the blandishments from the IAIM and this column, not to mention the threat of legislation from Mary Harney, would persuade the bank to give an individual breakdown of how much each director is paid.

As with every Irish plc, with the honourable exception of Irish Life, shareholders have been short-changed in the information they are getting from their directors and all the pretty pictures and slogans like "investing in the future" together with its aah. . . touchy-feely picture of mother and child, won't change that.

Paddy Galvin is one of only five directors on the remuneration committee who persisted with the aggregation policy when it comes to directors' pay. The others are Howard Kilroy, Tony Barry, Ray MacSharry and Niall Fitzgerald. Maybe the members of the committee might feel like telling the Bank of Ireland annual court next month of their feelings towards legislation compelling adequate disclosure of remuneration.

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If Bank of Ireland and the rest of the companies on the stock market want to be dragged kicking and screaming into full disclosure, then so be it. The sooner Mary Harney brings in her legislation to compel such disclosure the better.

That said, it is fair to say that the amounts paid to the three directors - Maurice Keane, Pat McDowell and John Burke - are not excessive at an average of £390,000 (€495,200) each, compared to a £358,000 average the previous year.

But then, considering Mr McDowell made a profit of more than £1.8 million and Maurice Keane in excess of £574,000 on share options they exercised and sold into the market last year, modest salaries (at least by the standards of directors) don't seem all that much out of place.

Current Account also notices from the annual report that the annual court will include a proposal to introduce a long-term incentive plan for "selected key group employees in order to further align the interests of these key group personnel with those of the stockholders".

No problem with that, but just as shareholders should know how much the men and women at the boardroom table are paid, they should also know who these "key" employees are and what they are going to have to achieve to benefit under the long-term incentive plan.