Subscriber OnlyOpinion

Disinterest in Northern Ireland makes Varadkar the perfect figure to reset protocol message

It is undeniable the protocol is a response to threats of violence by republicans, with the appearance of being a reward

Leo Varadkar has no great interest in Northern Ireland, a fact that escapes his more excitable unionist critics. In his address to last month’s Fine Gael Ardfheis, cueing up his return as Taoiseach, Varadkar did not mention the Northern Ireland protocol, a united Ireland or even the Government’s Shared Island policy. His only reference to the North was a brief platitude about restoring devolution.

This was rehashed in a platform piece for the Belfast Telegraph last week, in which Varadkar reintroduced himself for “the second half of Ireland’s historic partnership Government”.

He added some platitudes about the protocol, “positive engagement” with Britain and his commitment to the Shared Island policy.

Sam McBride, the Belfast Telegraph’s Northern Ireland editor, correctly summed up the piece as “cautious and bland”, yet it provoked much unionist hostility. There was particular annoyance at the Taoiseach’s description of the protocol as “a good-faith effort, negotiated carefully”.

READ MORE

Many unionists believe the protocol was negotiated in bad faith, by exploiting an exaggerated risk of republican violence. Varadkar has come to be unfairly blamed for this, having cited the risk at an EU summit in October 2018. Blame has taken a sinister turn, with threats to the Taoiseach appearing on posters in loyalist areas.

Varadkar was merely repeating concerns in 2018 shared by police and intelligence services on both sides of the Border, including Garda Commissioner Drew Harris, appointed the month before. Unlike claims about protecting the Belfast Agreement or the Northern Ireland economy, which have often been made in bad faith, the security assessment was genuine. But the solution has still created a significant moral hazard – it is undeniable the protocol is a response to violence, with the appearance of a reward.

A relatively low threat from dissident republicans has been met with a profound change to Northern Ireland’s economic and political status. Smuggling and other criminality by republicans has been incentivised, as it adds to the pressure for sea border checks seen as weakening the union. In June, the EU said seizures of guns, drugs and counterfeit goods in the Port of Belfast over the proceeding year proved the protocol is essential to protect the single market. Loyalist threats to Varadkar refer to violence achieving its goals. This dangerous perception must be properly acknowledged and addressed.

In reality, there has been a highly effective crackdown on dissident republicans in the three years since the protocol was signed, albeit as a culmination of longer-term efforts. While most of the work has been done by UK authorities, they have had full Irish co-operation. The protocol may be an approach to crime and violence, but it is not a surrender to it. Other progress against dissident republicans continues and has intensified. Unfortunately, it suits few to highlight this success.

The police and intelligence services are wary of self-congratulation, as it would be provocative and premature. The British and Irish governments do not want to turn security co-operation, a last bastion of their partnership, into another bone of Brexit contention.

The DUP has painted itself into too much of a corner on Brexit to accept any security basis for the protocol, even in parallel to law-and-order solutions.

Sinn Féin cannot celebrate a crackdown on republicans, and loyalists cannot celebrate it with a straight face – they are also under intensifying police pressure, and are involved in crime with dissidents and southern gangs.

A Christmas newspaper article was unlikely to be the place where a returning Taoiseach confronted the moral hazard of the protocol, especially with a new UK-EU deal expected. But Varadkar would be the perfect figure to do so, as the Taoiseach who agreed the protocol and as a lightning rod for unionist objections. He could have almost three years in office after a final UK-EU deal to cut down on the dubious platitudes and give more weight to realistic and evolving security assessments. This is a good news story, after all.

Fine Gael describes itself as “the party of law and order”, and Varadkar is positioning himself against Sinn Féin as the leader to protect Irish politics from paramilitary and criminal associations. A new message might have more strategic appeal to him than explaining the protocol to ungrateful unionists. Greater emphasis could be placed on it as a means to manage a threat from organised crime and paramilitarism, common to North and South, while the threat is reduced through policing. This work could be better resourced and recognised.

However, there is obviously little motivation for Varadkar to do this while he can present the protocol as confining Brexit’s problems to North of the Border, where unionists deserve them and everyone in the Republic can safely ignore them.

The Taoiseach is hardly alone in having no great interest in Northern Ireland.