What did participants in our deliberative forums – managed discussion on a topic – say about the existing Southern and Northern models of government formation? And about the three compromise models we put before them? What did they like and, more importantly, what did they dislike?
The status quo models
When comparing the Irish model of cabinet formation and the Belfast Agreement model in the North our participants focused on stability and functionality; fairness; and how to address the need to include unionists.
Stability and functionality
The stability of the Irish model and its ability reliably to provide a government were its most cited advantages compared to the Northern model.
While acknowledging its imperfections, participants from many backgrounds praised the Irish model for delivering stable government: “I think, […] the stability is the biggest positive, you know?” (A female Southern participant from Dublin).
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This stability was directly contrasted with the North, often without a functioning executive.
Regarding the Irish model, one young male Northern Protestant participant observed it has “never failed before [in] forming a government, which is obviously good because we hadn’t had a government for a couple of years so that’s quite good”.
Many feared that using the Northern model in a possible united Ireland would lead to an unstable and dysfunctional executive.
The lack of “safety net”, equivalent to that provided by London when Stormont collapses, was raised by participants in the South and North (from both Catholic and Protestant backgrounds).
One strongly nationalist young Catholic male in the North said: “We’d have periods of time where there is no government. Because in our cases, when our government stopped working it was the British who took over and ruled.
[ Voters in North and South split on special powers for unionistsOpens in new window ]
“But then if that happens for an Irish government who is going to take over for them? So, you’re left with a vacuum of power.”
Participants were especially wary of key vulnerabilities in the Northern model. Namely, two joint prime ministers and the capacity of either prime minister designate to block the formation of the government, or to cause its collapse when in office, thereby triggering fresh elections.
They thought this set-up gave too much wrecking power to the joint prime ministers: “No one individual should have any right to suspend the whole thing,” said a male Dublin participant.
Most unpopular with Southerners and some Northern nationalists was the possible ability of the prime minister from the British bloc to veto proposed legislation which might harm a fundamental interest or right of people who identify as British or unionist on the island.
One Dublin Fianna Fáil supporter said: “I think there shouldn’t be a veto. It’s too easy an option for somebody who has a bee in their bonnet to say: ‘Hang on, I’m just going to stop this process now because I don’t like it, or we, as a group, don’t like it.’”
Concerns were expressed about the stipulation that the government could override this veto if the Supreme Court invalidated a veto. This rule would tweak the current arrangements in the North to minimise the overuse or abuse of veto power – as has occurred with the “petition of concern”.
Allowing claims to be assessed by the Supreme Court could prevent effective legislating and lead to an overburdened court: “You’d spend more time in court than you’d spend governing,” said a Northern Catholic Sinn Féin voter.
The instability of the Northern model was the common theme in both Belfast and Athlone, where the formums were held.
Familiarity with it did not encourage any additional support from those in Northern Ireland.
Having been more directly affected by collapses, some Northern participants were scornful.
One male Catholic Northerner, who identifies as neither unionist nor nationalist, provided a damning overview: “We know that it’s going to collapse everything. It’s just horrendous.”
Fairness
Many saw future provision for two prime ministers with equal powers as unbalanced.
The British-unionist minority would be relatively small in a united Ireland, so having a prime minister with equal powers would be disproportionate. Support for their parties could fall, yet they would still be guaranteed a co-premier.
These worries were mentioned by those from the South and non-unionists from the North.
The “British unionist minority will have a joint prime minister, no matter how many seats they have. They might only have one seat … It doesn’t seem fair,” said a female Dublin participant.
This provision would make less sense in a united Ireland than in the North where the nationalist and unionist blocs are currently evenly matched: “You know, the vetoes at the moment in the parties are roughly 50/50. You’re talking that the unionist party is going to be less than 10 per cent in there when they’re bringing down the government. It’s totally inappropriate. You know, it’s absolutely ridiculous,” said a Northern Protestant male.
In comparison, the existing model in the South was generally perceived as fair and democratic, especially by Southerners.
Indeed, there was some resistance to having special provisions for British and unionist people at all after any vote for unification: “That is democracy … that’s fair,” said one Belfast male Catholic.
Inclusion of unionists
But the Southern model was widely recognised as providing no guarantees to British unionists who would find themselves a minority in a united Ireland. As expected, this sentiment was expressed by unionists.
Lamenting the absence of guaranteed unionist inclusion in the existing southern model, one female Northern Protestant noted: “You’d want at least one there representing the unionists.”
This problem was also raised by non-unionists in Northern Ireland, and those from the South.
Many displayed the ability to empathise with people from backgrounds different from their own and their capacity to judge the different models.
Alienation could be caused by the potential exclusion of unionists from the cabinet. According to one Dublin Sinn Féin voter, simply continuing the current Irish model “wouldn’t be for the British unionists’ side of it. Are they getting a look in there at all?”
While the possible application of the Northern model was unpopular across the board, some – typically Northern unionist participants – observed that this option offers a reasonable level of assurance to unionists: “Protecting the ones who are British. You know, someone has to fight for you,” said one male Northern Protestant.
Others agreed.
“I can see from a unionist standpoint, you are protecting your thing,” said a male Dublin Sinn Féin voter.
But the provision for two prime ministers was generally seen as divisive and as failing to realise the ambition or purpose of unification.
The direct application of the Northern model would over-represent unionists in power and, most significantly, could not guarantee stable and functioning government.
Yet most participants acknowledged that for a united Ireland to work unionists must feel included.
Therefore, neither of the two status quo models emerged as the most acceptable model to the three main groups in the deliberative forums (Southerners, Northern Protestants and Northern Catholics), though the existing Southern model was strongly judged better than that in the North.
Which compromise model was most preferred?
When participants discussed the advantages and disadvantages of the compromise models, they generally focused on the need to balance the inclusion of unionists with the need to respect the principles of fairness and democracy. The inclusive model was perceived, overall, as best placed to balance these sometimes-competing needs.
The inclusive model
Many participants thought the inclusive coalition model would achieve representation in government for all large and medium-sized parties because all parties receiving at least 7 per cent of seats would be proportionally included in the coalition government and entitled to at least one cabinet ministry.
People from a range of backgrounds and viewpoints thought that a wide variety of voices would be heard at the highest level. This point was emphasised by both nationalists and unionists in the North and supporters of medium-sized and smaller parties in the South.
As one Northern female Protestant said, the inclusive model “is probably just giving everybody ... representation”.
The lack of a veto, and the inability of unionist parties to collapse the government was seen as an advantage, particularly among Southern participants.
Some unionists, in contrast, were concerned that the absence of a veto mechanism would undermine their representation. In the words of one young female Northern Protestant: “Without a veto, to me that‘s [being] without a voice. If you’re not allowed to question, then what’s the point of being there?”
Other unionists were unconvinced by the 7 per cent threshold: it was not certain that there would be a British unionist party in the coalition government.
One young Northern female (from neither a Catholic nor Protestant background) felt that unionist presence in the cabinet was “highly likely, but not guaranteed. So, I think that might upset some people, that, yes, we might not get representation.”
The quota model
The quota model would guarantee two unionist cabinet ministers. It was seen as offering much stronger protection for unionists, including a veto.
It provided reassurance to some: “Being inclusive and being respectful to the backgrounds of people and adapting the criteria to meet everybody” was how one young Northern female put it.
People from diverse backgrounds thought that ensuring that everyone, including unionists, would be heard was vital.
Non-unionists from the North argued everyone needed their voice to be heard.
Southerners saw the quota model’s main advantage as providing unionists with the necessary reassurance to stabilise a united Ireland. One Dublin Sinn Féin voter said: “So that’s the only positive, and that’s the only way you could bring them in, I think, because, like, the reality, when this is happening, they will have to be brought in ... [because otherwise] ... as I said, “Ulster says No ...”
Guaranteeing two cabinet ministers for unionists, however, was viewed by some as unfair.
One Northern male Catholic said: “Potentially you could have two unionist ministers coming from parties with less votes than another party in the South, and they may feel that that’s not fair or democratic.”
Some were concerned that special treatment for unionists might be resented by other groups – immigrants, minority religions, and Irish Travellers – who might demand similar special provisions.
These concerns were mainly raised by those from the South and by non-unionists in the North. But unionists also mentioned them, including one female unionist from mid-Ulster who was concerned that if another minority group had “so many more people than the British unionists”, then they too might demand guaranteed political representation.
The inclusion of the veto in the quota model was a downside for those from different backgrounds, who were concerned it could be overused.
The government’s ability to override the veto if the Supreme Court found the claim of rights violation to be invalid was seen as undermining functioning government – and slowing down the legislative process.
One Northern Catholic bitingly observed: “You may as well just do away with the MPs and make the Supreme Court in charge.”
The territorial model
Some participants from the South liked the territorial model, under which four of the cabinet ministers would be from constituencies in the Northern six counties.
They thought it moved away from focusing solely on unionist representation and could allow the North to be effectively represented.
One male Dubliner said: “I agree, I like the idea of taking just, like, unionism out of it. I mean, if it’s Northern Ireland … so they should be represented for everything they are, not just this one portion of the population there.”
[ How the North and South deliberative forums workedOpens in new window ]
But the very fact that these ministers could be from any background was a concern for many unionists: “If you don’t have the safety net of the British unionists there, it’s going to be a turn off,” said a middle-aged male Protestant.
Those from other backgrounds agreed.
How the ministers from the six counties would be chosen would be central to the success of this model. Exactly whom they would represent, or seek to represent, was raised.
There was a fear that these ministers might focus on their own constituency rather than the wider six counties.
Number of parties in government and opposition
So, the inclusive model was viewed by many as the best way of ensuring that unionists are likely to be represented in cabinet while being fair to other parties and voters.
Nevertheless, there were concerns that the 7 per cent threshold would allow too many parties into cabinet, making it difficult to govern: “You could end up with lots of little parties [in] government, [and] then ... you struggle to get things done,” said a female Northern Catholic.
Concerns were raised that the inclusive model would prevent a strong opposition, capable of holding the government to account, because so many parties would have the opportunity to be in the government.
One Northern female participant concluded that “you’d end up with the people who are in opposition would be mostly independents or very small parties so your quality of debate might be lost a bit.”
Others worried about the potential of the 7 per cent threshold to marginalise smaller parties and independents, despite it being potentially “fairer” than the quota model.
This concern was raised in both the Belfast and Athlone forums, with slightly different emphases on who might be excluded.
Southerners mentioned the exclusion of Independents, while those from the North focused on smaller parties that might fall short of the cut-off, such as Alliance.
General conclusions in plenary
Many participants agreed no system was perfect, and suggested that elements of the different models could be combined to balance the need for unionist representation with concerns over fairness, stability and effective government.
One Fianna Fáil voter from Munster suggested: “They’re probably going to have to mix and match some of those options further.”
Several participants thought that many of the arrangements focused on inclusion could and should be “transitional”.
They expressed a preference for the inclusive or the quota model, but for a period, to encourage unionists to accept and adapt to a united Ireland.
As time went on, they hoped the need for special arrangements for British unionists would be less necessary.
