OPINION:Irish troops, along with those of other countries, are abandoning refugees, locals and aid workers to a dictator, writes RAY MURPHY
LAST MONTH the Government decided to withdraw 400-plus peacekeepers from Chad in what was described in United Nations circles as an “untimely” and “unfortunate” decision. The reason given was the lack of certainty about the continuation of the mandate and the approach of the rainy season.
The UN Security Council is likely to change the mandate of the peace operation Minurcat (United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad) this month. The Chadian authorities have told the UN they are ready to assume responsibility for the protection of civilians.
According to the UN high commissioner for refugees, the humanitarian situation in Chad is expected to remain precarious. Increased banditry targeting the local population, refugees, internally displaced persons and humanitarian workers, coupled with a resurgence of armed conflict and inter-ethnic strife, has led the UN to restrict staff movements to and from refugee camps.
Amnesty International has expressed concern about the uncertain security situation the reduced strength of Minurcat will create. It will heighten risks for bodies delivering humanitarian aid into some areas and increase the risk of children being abducted as child soldiers. Although the violence is characterised by clashes between government forces and rebels, the greatest threat to the civilian population, especially refugees and displaced persons, is the widespread banditry and breakdown in law and order.
Chad argues the peacekeeping force has served its purpose and new agreements on border security with neighbouring Sudan mean it is better placed to take over. This self-serving analysis does reflect a changed security environment.
However, the question is whether the decision to downsize the UN operation is justified. Does the UN have any choice when a government withdraws consent to its presence? A resolution adopted under chapter VII of the charter may be sufficient justification for intervention in the internal affairs of a state. However, the political realities in the security council and the military reality on the ground require a more consensual approach. This is essentially what happened in relation to Unamid (the African Union/United Nations hybrid operation in Darfur), where the UN was reliant on the government of Sudan to be able to deploy the peacekeeping force.
Since its initial deployment, Minurcat has struggled to achieve full operational capability. Lack of planning was a major flaw and this was apparent in logistical arrangements. Threat assessment and obtaining accurate intelligence proved problematic. Initially rebel groups and Janjaweed forces were deemed to pose the greatest threat, while on the ground banditry presented the greatest risk.
The key challenge for the security council is reaching agreement that accommodates the Chadian demands while responding to the realities of the security situation. Linked to this is the question of whether the Chadian government possesses the will or capacity to protect civilians given the security challenges in the east where Minurcat troops currently patrol. Humanitarian actors on the ground providing assistance to displaced persons and refugees are also vulnerable and need protection. With no effective international military presence, who will provide security?
A core activity of Minurcat is the commitment to training the Chadian police and reforming the justice sector. A false picture of their training and expertise was presented to make the UN look good. In reality, local police were not up to the task and contained criminal elements responsible for attacks on civilians. Most people did not distinguish between the police and the UN, and consequently the UN was tarnished by unprofessional conduct. Rule of law and judicial reform remain major hurdles that compound the policing deficit and require a secure environment to make progress.
A fundamental problem remains in finding a solution that will allow those displaced return home. However, Minurcat has no mandate to address the underlying political issues that precipitated the crisis. In fact, the absence of any comprehensive regional policy to deal with the interlinked causes of instability is the most significant impediment to achieving a sustainable solution.
Neither Minurcat nor its predecessor, Eufor, had the mandate to deal with the everyday realities of criminality prevalent. Eufor was configured for a more military role in the protection of vulnerable civilians and was not organised for internal security operations. An assessment in 2008 indicated the security situation required an international military presence with the capacity for rapid deployment and the ability to project itself quickly and effectively to deal with the continuing cross-border violence. The strategy involved deterrence, a long-established principle of UN deployment.
Whatever is decided must take account of the needs of displaced persons and refugees. Despite protestations to the contrary, the international community under the guise of the UN is now effectively abandoning vulnerable groups and humanitarian workers to the vagaries of a discredited dictator. Will we ever learn?
Dr Ray Murphy lectures in peacekeeping at the Irish Centre for Human Rights at the school of law in NUI Galway. He is a former Army captain with military and civilian experience in peace operations