GERMANY’S UNDERSTANDING of itself is of interest not only for its own citizens but for all who deal with this most populous, industrious and influential member of the European Union. Twenty years on from its reunification, it is in a most favourable position – at peace with all its neighbours, developing better relations with Russia, and enjoying a huge competitive advantage in relation to its economic partners the world over. Yet a strange lack of self-awareness accompanies this good fortune: what do Germans want to do with it and how should others interpret their intentions?
Compared to the clear strategic purpose which guided German policy when the Berlin Wall came down in 1989 and in the following year when its European partners agreed favourable terms for the German Democratic Republic to unite with the Federal Republic at a summit in Dublin, the reactive pragmatism of today’s German leaders is puzzlingly opaque.
Many say this should not surprise. Is it not a natural result of normalisation following more than 100 years of political trauma? Are not Germans just as entitled as other European peoples to defend their interests and project their values? Why should they be treated as exceptional now that they have overcome the historical obstacles of imperial unification and expansion, defeat and humiliation after the first World War, Nazism, partition and the long period of coming to terms with that catastrophe after 1945?
It is difficult to resist or deny such explanations. Germany has successfully established a liberal society, a flourishing federal republic and one of the world’s most competitive industrial economies. The series of reports on its national identity by our German correspondent last week revealed its people combine regional diversity and national unity in a distinctive way, yet characteristic of other comparative latecomers to political unification. Culture and language still loom large in Germany’s national story, but the essentialist reductionism which translated them into racist imperialism is no more.
A gritty individualism resists easy homogenisation even as the commercial realities of a unified national market in a wider European capitalist space continually reinforce it. Ordinary Germans earn, save and spend prudently without excessive risk and believe others should do likewise. And yet other reported characteristics of their national psychology – the need to be right and an associated intolerance of criticism – should give Germans pause to reflect at this fortunate moment in their history. The very success of their escape from historical constraint makes them all the more influential when others are slower or less able to adapt. Their views on where Europe should go and what role Germany should play in it really matter now.
The new generation of political leaders does not debate the German national interest within the wider Europe in sufficient depth to illuminate its desired path. This frustrates partners who have an equal stake in the joint endeavour and need German co-operation to protect it.