Global anti-war protests have strengthened Arab citizens' resentment against their regimes, writes Michael Jansen.
All the governments of the Middle East are well aware of the risks posed by a US war on Iraq, but none has taken the definitive stand against war adopted by Germany, France and Belgium.
The Arabs remain frozen by the lights of an oncoming US tank in the middle of the road to war, unable to get out of the way, unwilling to act to halt the advance.
Arab disarray during last weekend's foreign ministers' meeting exposed the fundamental divide between the three Arab states hosting the US military build-up in the Gulf - Kuwait, Qatar and Bahrain - and the rest. A final statement, circulated by Syria shortly before the meeting ended, urged the 22 Arab League members to "deny any military assistance" for an attack on Iraq.
If acted upon, this instruction would have required Doha, Manama and Kuwait to halt the US build-up and deny the US the right to launch a campaign from their territory, thereby preventing war.
Due to objections from Kuwait and Qatar, this statement was revised to merely urge members to "refrain from offering any assistance or facilities to any military operation that might threaten the security, safety and territorial integrity of Iraq." Kuwait refused to subscribe to this toned-down formulation. Seventy thousand of the 150,000 US troops in the Gulf are deployed in the emirate, expected to be the main launchpad of a ground offensive.
The Arabs also squabbled over advancing the summit originally scheduled for the end of March, finally settling on March 1st. The summit is viewed by Arab analysts as a means to place responsibility for the coming war squarely on the shoulders of Iraqi President Saddam Hussein and to exculpate the Bush administration. This contrasts sharply with last year's summit, which warned that "an attack on Iraq would be viewed as an attack on all Arabs."
Commentators argue that instead of taking collective action to halt the march towards war, the Arabs will publicly urge the Iraqi leader to meet the disarmament requirements of Resolution 1441 while insinuating that he should resign. Egypt is spearheading this approach in the belief that there is "nothing the Arabs can do" and the "solution is in Iraq's hands alone," to quote the semi-official Cairo daily, al-Ahram.
Abdelmalik Salman, an Egyptian commentator writing in Beirut's Daily Star, accused the Arabs of abdicating responsibility for ensuring the stability of the region, failing to back European efforts to avert war and "submitting to American pressure" by washing "their hands of the Iraq question".
One reason Arab rulers may think they can get away with this policy is that the "Arab street" did not join the February 15th protests against the war, which prompted 10 million people to pour into the streets of 1,000 cities across the face of the globe.
Sizeable protests took place only in Beirut and Damascus, where the governments strongly reject war. Elsewhere the populace did not challenge the security forces. In Cairo a couple of hundred protesters were swamped by more than 3,000 police. The size of the worldwide turnout humiliated Arab citizens and strengthened their deep feelings of resentment against their repressive regimes. The chant of the Egyptian protesters summed up Arab anger: "We won't bow, we won't bow, we're sick of the quiet voice . . . tomorrow the revolution will come and leave no one."
Arab leaders believe they can either collaborate with the Bush administration or mount an empty show of opposition to war because they have made themselves "coup proof" by co-opting their armed forces and establishing intelligence agencies bound to those in power by shared interests.
Arab countries are no longer unsettled by the seemingly endless chain of army coups which afflicted the region from 1941 to 1970. Between 1961 and 1969 alone there were 27 successful or attempted military takeovers in nine Arab countries. The last coup was mounted in November 1970 by the late Hafez al-Assad of Syria. The regimes have used the carrot-and- stick approach with armed forces and security agencies, making them submissive through pampering while purging individuals with an independent mind-set.
Most countries have multiple security agencies so rulers can play them off against each other. Saudi Arabia's two regular military formations, the army and national guard, are commanded by competing factions of the ruling family. In Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states the armed forces are so spoilt they are unfit for combat. Hundreds of billions of dollars worth of high-tech weaponry bought by the regime is stored in dumps for use by US forces to protect the rulers.
The marriage of convenience between rulers and soldiers has also proved to be a powerful deterrent to the rise of "people power" for more than three decades, enabling aging monarchs and presidents to remain in power and effect smooth, seamless transfers to chosen heirs. This has happened so far in Jordan, Morocco, Syria and Saudi Arabia; Egypt is expected to follow their example.
However, while perpetuating themselves, these regimes have also become rigid, corrupt and prone to mismanagement. Over the past two decades the Arab world has suffered from negative growth rates, de-development and falling educational, health and welfare standards. Although there have been attempts by some regimes to broaden their narrow base by creating consultative bodies, their powers are strictly limited.
Consequently, the Arab people are deeply disaffected. Over the past two years their alienation has been exacerbated by Israel's repression of the Palestinian independence movement and the US drive to wage war on Iraq. Blinded by narrow individual interests, Arab rulers fail to recognise that their subjects adopt a pan-Arab approach to Arab issues and regard Iraq to be as much their homeland as the countries in which they live. Pan-Arab sentiment is certain to be given a strong charge when they see satellite television coverage of bombs falling on Baghdad.
Thus, war at this critical juncture could lead to widespread popular unrest which the regimes cannot contain. "People power" overthrew "coup-proof" pro-US regimes in the Philippines and Indonesia. Younger officers could break the bond with their rulers and join the people, initiating a fresh round of coups and counter-coups and plunging the region into political turmoil.
Indeed, this is precisely what many ordinary Arabs hope will happen.