The elections in Iraq have justified the political expectations of those who demanded they be held to establish democratic legitimacy for the transition to self-rule from the US-led coalition which invaded and occupied the country in March 2003.
Turnout in the Shia and Kurdish areas was comparatively high, reflecting the enthusiasm of these communities to rule themselves. But, as expected, participation was much lower in the Sunni areas, which are principally behind the violent insurrection. This means their destructive revolt will continue unless major efforts are made to draw them into a power-sharing coalition and involvement in the constitutional process, which is the main business facing the 275-member national assembly.
Politics has therefore been reasserted by these elections, however flawed they were by severe security constraints and deep-seated administrative failings by the interim government and the occupation authorities. This will raise popular expectations for an improvement in political and socio-economic conditions and everyday security, as well as fuelling demands for much greater Iraqi control over immediate events and a perspective for full sovereignty over Iraq's future. Disillusionment will surely follow if progress is not made on meeting these objectives over coming months.
Most of those who voted were clear about one thing: the desire to regain control over their own political destiny. This applies to the historic shift of power from the Sunni towards the Shia community within Iraq (and thus in the wider Middle East region) and in the northern Kurdish regions towards substantial autonomy. It also applies to the desire to see an end to military and political occupation. Iraqis must now decide on the political shape of their state, whether Islamist or secular, federal or centralised. They must find ways to hold open participation in government and constitutionalisation to their Sunni compatriots. And they must be satisfied that progress in both these major domestic tasks is reciprocated by the readiness of the United States and its coalition partners to agree a calendar for withdrawal and the restoration of full Iraqi sovereignty.
These are gargantuan tasks for such a young and inexperienced polity. Their achievement requires reserves of wisdom and goodwill which have been sorely missing over the last 22 months. But there are some grounds to believe they could be marshalled now, if only to avoid a much more dangerous civil conflict. Thus Shia leaders such as Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani showed admirable constraint in encouraging his followers to vote. He wants an Islamic state, but not a theocratic one like Iran's. Places could be held open for Sunnis in government and the constituent assembly. And mounting debates in the US and Britain about setting a timetable for withdrawal from Iraq could feed into its decisions on self-rule over the next year. It is a tall order, but not an impossible one. It deserves sympathetic international engagement.