The Taliban suicide bombing attack on Kabul's best known luxury hotel, in which several foreign and local people were killed on Monday, has underlined just how precarious is the current Nato operation in Afghanistan. It is not going well militarily for this overstretched force, while politically President Hamid Karzai's government is struggling to maintain even a semblance of political unity and national reach.
Several other recent developments have painted a similar picture. More troops are required for the 40,000 strong Nato force, according to its commanders, but there has been a great reluctance by European governments to provide them. The war against the Taliban is increasingly unpopular among their electorates. This has pushed the military burden back mainly on the US, British, Canadian and Dutch contingents. On this occasion the US government is set to provide another 3,200 marines, amid growing resentment in Washington about the refusal of other Nato states to do so.
Already there are some 27,000 US troops in Afghanistan, half of them with Nato, the others still engaged in independent operations against al-Qaeda and the Taliban - following the post 9/11 invasion - and training the Afghan army. Their aggressive conduct of the war has antagonised other Nato contingents. So has US opposition to efforts by British, United Nations and European Union diplomats to promote a dialogue with dissident, local and lower level Taliban elements, as a way to broaden the government in Kabul. Over Christmas two UN and EU officials were expelled by President Karzai for pursuing such a dialogue, as he came under factional pressure within his existing coalition to oppose it.
But most of those familiar with Afghanistan believe it is essential that those who currently support the Taliban be encouraged into such negotiations. The military campaign is essentially at a stalemate and not well placed to withstand a spring offensive. Although the Taliban contains extreme groups who want to reimpose fundamentalist Islamic rule, many of its supporters are local nationalists opposed to the foreign presence who reflect the country's fragmented social and tribal structure. Nor can its affairs be separated from those of neighbouring unstable Pakistan.
The Taliban is not in a position to win this war, but nor will it be defeated. Therefore it makes sense to isolate its leaders, undermine their support, and keep negotiating, fighting and training the Afghan army with the aim of reducing the Taliban to a nuisance group rather than a real threat to the country's stability.