World View: There were several signs this week that post-war international politics is adjusting to the military victory of the US-led coalition in Iraq. writes Paul Gillespie.
France and then Russia modified their demands that United Nations sanctions against Iraq not be lifted until its arms inspectors are satisfied that weapons of mass destruction have been dealt with.
Both countries were warned by US representatives that their interests would suffer for having opposed the war. French officials are astonished at the Bush administration's vindictiveness, which could have serious economic consequences.
Those who hoped for or expected a political confrontation on the subject have had to adjust their sights to these realities of power. Neither oil nor financial aid to reconstruct Iraq can flow legally until sanctions are lifted, which President Bush called for last week. The French policy modification allowed some funds to be released; but it leaves outstanding the question of what is to follow.
The US made it clear it will conduct its own search for weapons of mass destruction, without the help of Hans Blix. It looks as if it will not agree to UN verification of whatever is found.
In a sure sign of this, the British Defence Secretary, Geoff Hoon, told the BBC that while he would prefer the UN to verify, he would also be prepared to accept another third party to do it - perhaps someone like John de Chastelain?
Hoon admitted it would be easier to justify the war if such weapons were found, but he denied this was the justification for military action. Tony Blair is to try to persuade the Russians to co-operate next week, after they adjusted their line on sanctions towards the French position, by agreeing to suspend some sanctions.
Such cynicism should not surprise the seasoned student of power politics; but it leaves those who believe in due international legal process through the UN at a loss to see where they should turn for support. Such a sidelining of the UN would represent a substantial political victory for the neo-conservative right, who currently have the edge in determining US foreign policy.
Where is the "vital role" for the UN spoken about by Blair and Bush at Hillsborough, or the "central" one affirmed by the EU summit, if it is not able to verify the presence or absence of such weapons in Iraq? Where is the principled political role claimed by Blair in modifying US power?
What leverage is there available from individual states, as distinct from a regional grouping like the European Union, or an alliance of convenience such as the French-German-Russian troika that resisted the Anglo-American drive to war?
Another sign of adjustment came from the Israeli-Palestinian peace process. Yasser Arafat agreed to accept the cabinet nominated by Mahmoud Abbas, the Palestinian Authority prime minister he appointed to assemble one, including a security chief who has pledged to crack down on those advocating violent resistance to Israeli occupation.
This followed huge pressure from the US, but also from other members of the "Quartet" which drew up the road map for a renewed peace process, the EU, the UN and Russia. Abbas is reported to be deeply unpopular among the Palestinian public, seen as an imposition by the US under the influence of Sharon's Israel.
But the wider calculation is that a new peace process will create its own dynamic, which will test the Bush administration's commitment to create a Palestinian state by 2005. Bush has reason to make it work, since this would ease a major source of hostility towards the US in the region while US troops remain in Iraq.
But many are doubtful about that coming into a presidential election year and given the pro-Likud cast of so many in its ranks. It may succeed only through an emasculation of the road map, which provides for a series of steps to be implemented according to a defined timetable, including a cessation of violent resistance and Israeli settlements.
There are many sceptics as to whether the US will mount such pressure on Sharon and about his own commitment to the road map, which he has sought to amend in detail before it is published.
Suggestions that the US might extend its military campaign to take on Syria and Iran are now discounted; but political pressure on them not to resist the US presence in Iraq must be seen in the light of the search for a wider Middle East settlement in which Israel would be accepted as a permanent state in the region.
Co-operation between those members of the Quartet which want to see rapid progress in the Israeli-Palestinian peace process is more likely that a continuation of the Franco-German-Russian tactical alliance against the war. The French are pursuing a more "pragmatic" line towards Washington, the Russians are anxious to rescue their contracts under the Iraqi oil-for-food programme and the Germans want to repair their own US relations.
It will therefore fall to them to exert countervailing pressure on the US through the UN and the EU. Neither body is well prepared for the role, but that should not blind those who believe it is necessary from seeing they should be adapted and developed to fulfil it.
That calls for a combination of political will and institutional change. Without the will to work more closely within the EU, Britain and France will not be able to exert a countervailing political infuence on the US in the Middle East as a whole. Without the development of more coherent foreign policy and defence structures the EU will not have the means to do so.
That is why the work of the Convention on the Future of Europe assumes much greater significance in the light of these international political realities.