Most columnists like to remind readers how often they are right. The doyen of political commentators, Dr Conor Cruise O'Brien, on the other hand, excels in conjuring up "quite unlikely" (his words) scenarios, actually a sophisticated attack on political developments he dislikes.
In 1990, writing for the London Times on German unity, he claimed that there could soon be a statue to Hitler in every German town. Only a few monuments to Wilhelm I, the first German emperor, have in fact been restored. In On the Eve of the Millennium, he imagined the Pope in 2000 accepting the Koran, and caling the faithful to the Mosque of St Peter. This was before 9/11.
Repeatedly his articles predicted that conviction of the "Colombia Three" would lead to a rupture with Sinn Féin by an Irish Government succumbing to pressure from a furious President Bush. Awkwardly, they were acquitted. Indeed, it is past time they were sent home.
There were parallel attempts by O'Brien to accredit in the public mind the opposite scenario, repeatedly put forward before the election in 2002, that Fianna Fáil would go into coalition with Sinn Féin.
That it did not happen in 2002 and Fianna Fáil returned to office with the PDs offers the consolation that the articles of the "true prophet" can now be recycled for 2007!
In reality, few people in the Republic expect or wish to see Sinn Féin in government in Dublin after the next election, without prejudice to what may happen later.
The point of the question in Stormont to the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Dermot Ahern, and his reply were not to start destabilising fantasy coalition games, but simply to confirm that there is no a priori exclusion from government North or South for a party like Sinn Féin, once all paramilitary activities have ended. As the Northern Secretary, Paul Murphy, put it, "If they are a party like any other party, they are entitled under the rules of the game to be part of a government".
That proposition seems to be barely accepted by long-term critics of the peace process, who would nonetheless claim to be supporters of the Good Friday Agreement, ratified by 95 per cent of the people of the Republic.
Would all the commentators falling over each other in their rush to express horror at the prospect of Sinn Féin in government in the South care (or dare) to offer the same warnings against "unrepentant killers in government" to the DUP and the UUP? Instead of negative fears being expressed, it will be an enormous gain for democracy on the island of Ireland if the main paramilitary force goes out of existence.
The loyalist organisations will also have to respond to the new situation and to the clear wishes of the unionist people.
The issue of Sinn Féin in government in the South arises, theoretically, in the context of the current intensive talks to secure full restoration of the institutions under the agreement. It has always been difficult to explain clearly and convincingly, notwithstanding major substantial differences in the situation North and South, why we should require of unionists what we would be unwilling to contemplate ourselves.
Dermot Ahern's response was designed to help in that context, and it was wrong to interpret it as referring in practice to any short-term timescale. As the Taoiseach, Bertie Ahern, pointed out, the issue does not even arise until paramilitarism is verifiably out of the way.
Here, constitutional reasons, not just political considerations, are a bar to Sinn Féin participation in government, so long as there is allegiance to a private army. Any Taoiseach standing up to announce a government would be cut to ribbons in the Dáil, if he was not in a position to give an unequivocal answer to the question as to whether all ministers accepted Article 15.2 and 15.6 of Bunreacht na hÉireann that there is only one army and one legislature in the State, to which they give their unqualified support.
The "green book" has to become a historic document. The only republic in existence is this Republic.
The position North and South differs in two ways. The Northern Ireland executive mainly administers the distribution and spending of a block grant from the British government. It does not raise taxes, determine overall spending or conduct European policy, and is not responsible for justice and policing (that may change), nor law-making or defence.
The capacity of any party to inflict serious policy damage on Northern Ireland is highly restricted. The limited nature of executive authority makes the second difference there, mandatory inclusive government, more palatable.
In the normal democracy of this Republic, the only party or parties entitled to be in government are those that can muster a Dáil majority, sometimes needing independent support. Policy compatibility, a pragmatic capacity for speedy decision-making and trust are the key.
Even supposing the premise of a shared republican philosophy, this would hardly bridge the gulf on European and economic policy. The anti-Fianna Fáil tirades of some Southern Sinn Féin orators suggest little compatibility on the ground.
Those who jump immediately to post-election numbers and predicate the likelihood of a coalition or minority arrangement with Sinn Féin overlook one essential point. The electorate requires to know beforehand if that is a real possibility, as it may influence their vote (negatively).
Sinn Féin needs time to decide whether it remains "a revolutionary party", a party of radical protest, or whether it wants to become a party of stable government North and South.
The most intriguing thing about last week's Sunday Independent opinion poll was the apparent popularity of a Fianna Fáil-Labour government. Nevertheless, the reliability and productivity of the present FF/PD arrangement has more to recommend it.