World affairs in 2001 are indelibly associated with the events of September 11th, when a spectacular terrorist atrocity killed some 4,000 people in New York and Washington. Suddenly the United States seemed invulnerable no more to its citizens and invincible no more to those who supported the attacks or blamed them on US and western policies in the Middle East, central Asia and towards Islam. It is too soon to draw definitive conclusions on the intervening three and a half months. But if these terrible deeds were designed to pitch the west into outright confrontation with the Islamic world they have failed. Rather have they provoked a realignment in support of the US among major regional powers to defend civilised values in what was recognised as a crime against humanity. This was symbolised in the series of resolutions at the United Nations Security Council supporting military action by the US against the perpetrators, based on the right of self-defence.
September 11th created new international realities and reinforced existing trends in a divided and unequal world. That is why the events of that day merit special attention. In responding to the crisis the US government had to work with existing allies and create new partnerships where President Bush's incoming administration had at first been more inclined to act unilaterally whenever possible. By reacting slowly and cooperatively rather than immediately and precipitously the US garnered more support and legitimacy for the military campaign launched against the Taliban regime in Afghanistan, which harboured the chief suspect, Osama bin Laden and his al-Qaeda organisation. A war conducted in the name of self-defence and civilised values must be judged by the benchmarks of proportionality, necessity and effectiveness laid down in international law.
Argument continues vigorously on the extent to which these norms were in fact adhered to; the evidence is not yet in on which to base a definitive judgment - and the chief suspects are still at large. But at year's end most people are satisfied they were roughly applied - and relieved the war against the Taliban regime is over so soon and that a new Afghan government is in place to redevelop the country. More long term assessments of September 11th require an evaluation of the trends in world affairs they revealed or reinforced. Such an atrocity must be judged not only in terms of its dreadful effects but also in relation to the organisations which planned it and the conditions giving rise to their appeal.
Islamic fundamentalism is to be found where structural poverty in the Muslim world meets the projection of western power and wealth. It appeals to those who are frustrated by political, economic and social backwardness and enraged by the perceived arrogance with which American and European power is projected. That the appeal is still limited is shown by the way Middle Eastern and central Asian leaders rallied to the international coalition. That it is a potent and dangerous threat is seen in their frequent protestations that there is no alternative to their autocratic rule if fundamentalist movements are to be contained.
To recognise such realities is not to accept the validity of fundamentalists' arguments or to overlook their malevolence. The world has moved on from such simplistic labelling in the name of uncritical support for US policy. A prudent and more sophisticated western response must encompass three major political initiatives and avoid one major trap. A much more even-handed approach to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is central. The spectre of Mr Ariel Sharon running amok against the Palestinian people and their leaders in recent weeks, seemingly endorsed by President Bush, offers daily confirmation of the fundamentalist case. European leaders possess the resources to apply leverage on Israel and the US, but lack the necessary will to do so. Unless the issue is tackled urgently, success in Afghanistan will be eclipsed by a deeper Middle East crisis.
The second major initiative would recognise the gulf between leaders and led in so many north African, Middle Eastern and central Asian states revealed by this crisis and equally the growing gulf between their levels of development and those of Europe and the United States. It would concentrate more on political and economic reform and be ready to provide the resources and markets to fund it. It would seek to encourage reformers in these societies rather than remain bewitched by the often repressive and corrupt existing leaderships. If this problem is not properly tackled the security of the most developed states could soon be threatened by more state collapses and mass migrations.
The third initiative is closely bound up with this. It would see a more determined international development strategy aimed at tackling primary poverty and the injustice associated with it, channelled by a reformed United Nations. This is the most effective means of heading off extreme fundamentalism. An immediate test will be in Afghanistan, which requires massive funds to repair the damage inflicted by three decades of civil war and outside intervention. These are political initiatives, not primarily military ones. Those who believe such movements are best defeated by US armed might are now tempted to apply it against other states. That would be a mistake of historic proportions and would fall into the trap set by the fundamentalists' mindset. It will be up to the US's partners and allies, especially in Europe, to dissuade it and convince its leaders that a more multi-polar world and more multilateral coalitions are the means to achieve peace, justice and security.