Martin Mansergh: During the Troubles, the Irish Government had one reliable partner in Northern Ireland. The SDLP represented a sane and principled nationalism, with which all democratic parties south of the Border identified, notwithstanding occasional differences.
That remains true today.
From a government perspective, John Hume and the needs of the SDLP inspired the Anglo-Irish Agreement 20 years ago, ensuring that no colour of democratic legitimacy was given to the IRA campaign.
Many of its elements are reincorporated in the Good Friday agreement, this time with the consent of the people of Northern Ireland voting in 1998.
The emerging peace process broadened the political canvas. Fianna Fáil had to dig into its history and contemporary republican philosophy to provide models and values that would expedite the passage of Sinn Féin and the IRA from support for the armed campaign to the present position, where, subject to verification, the IRA has decommissioned its arms and ceased activity.
It required enormous dedication of time and a close working relationship between both governments, their officials and advisers and the Northern party leaderships, including Sinn Féin's, to bring the process to its present state of near-completion.
For the first time since 1922, Irish democracy is no longer seriously challenged by any armed group. Paramilitary violence, which cost 80-100 deaths a year, now claims about one-tenth that number, with anger all the greater at the few still taking place. Building trust is proving slow and painful, especially with the institutions down for three years.
Back in 1993-4, discussion of Sinn Féin in government North or South would have been premature. What was on offer from both governments, conditional on a permanent end to paramilitary violence, was that "democratically mandated parties which establish a commitment to exclusively peaceful methods and which have shown that they abide by the democratic process, are free to participate fully in democratic politics and to join in dialogue" (Downing Street Declaration, paragraph 10).
Once the condition is fulfilled, freedom to participate fully in democratic politics must include the opportunity for any party no longer linked to paramilitarism that has won a sufficient mandate to put itself forward for inclusion in government, under the same terms and conditions as other parties.
However, the arrangements for this and the scope of government differ radically North and South of the Border, making a simple read-across difficult.
Northern Ireland is a highly divided society, and therefore the Good Friday agreement and supplementary agreements up to last December provide for mandatory inclusive cross-community coalition. Sinn Féin, at present the largest party on the nationalist side, can be excluded only by having no institutions at all.
Devolved powers are limited, largely confined to some economic and social spending areas, though they could be extended by agreement to justice and elements of security. The Northern Ireland Assembly has correspondingly defined legislative powers, but the Executive has no control of overall public expenditure, tax or social welfare policy. It has no role in foreign policy or defence, and little input into European affairs.
The capacity of any party holding a ministry to cause unilateral damage is slight, and the precautions against it have been reinforced. The Executive worked well, and the two Sinn Féin ministers earned their share of praise.
Restored devolution would help to build confidence, stability and reconciliation in Northern Ireland. Sinn Féin in government in the South prematurely would have the opposite effect, and could reintroduce serious distrust into North-South relations.
Here, no party short of an overall majority has an automatic entitlement to be in government. Compared to its position in the North, Sinn Féin is a comparatively small party.
Ideologically, it is mainly positioned to the left of the Labour Party. It wasted no time in laying claim to the republican traditions of a State that until recently it did not recognise, and posing as a champion of neutrality, which the IRA repeatedly violated and put at risk.
When the Taoiseach Bertie Ahern, unequivocally ruled out coalition between Fianna Fáil and Sinn Féin after the next election on grounds of policy incompatibility, he shot a fox that would have provided a lot of parties (and Sunday newspapers) with happy hunting. Allowing any plausibility to such an outcome would have the capacity to damage Fianna Fáil electorally, even more than the real prospect of the Greens being in a rainbow coalition might damage Fine Gael.
Sinn Féin members have an equally strong interest in maintaining that, regardless of Fianna Fáil denials, they will be involved in post-election discussions. Otherwise, their fear is that irrelevance to government formation would confine them to a protest vote.
The credibility of the scenario matters more than its consummation, which might have serious drawbacks for them.
Experience of the instability of the 1980s and early 1990s underpins the Taoiseach's position. The 1982 Fianna Fáil minority government depended on the support of Tony Gregory, with whom there was a deal, and the Workers' Party, who withdrew their support after four months at the first sign of difficult decisions.
In 1987, there were no deals. On March 10th, Tony Gregory helped put Charles Haughey and Fianna Fáil into government, but gave no support thereafter.
Alan Dukes devised the Tallaght Strategy to institutionalise Fine Gael support for what the government was doing and to prevent accidents leading to an early election.
Since 1989, there have been firm coalition agreements. In 1992, some Fianna Fáil deputies advocated going into opposition as an alternative to government with Labour.
Another consideration compounds wide policy differences with Sinn Féin on taxation and Europe. Negotiations on the peace process have been long drawn out and exhausting. The Taoiseach can have little desire to invite an often relentless hardball and crisis-laden approach to negotiation, with which he is more familiar than anyone, into the heart of government decision-making.
Even supposing an FF-SF coalition or support arrangement were the only means of staying in government in 2007, he should be believed when he states categorically that he would rather lead FF into opposition.