With the expiry of Mr Tony Blair's deadline almost to hand it is still not certain that the negotiations on the linked issues of decommissioning and Northern Ireland's proposed executive can be brought to a successful conclusion. In an atmosphere of intensive lobbying and spinning it becomes increasingly difficult to identify the reality of movement from the appearance. And it remains true, as it has from the emergence of this impasse, that without some retreat from both extremes of the argument there will be collapse.
Nonetheless, there are grounds for some optimism with the shape of a possible compromise emerging over the past 36 hours. A marked softening of language from the First Minister and unionist leader, Mr Trimble, suggests that a firm commitment to full decommissioning by May of next year might be an acceptable substitute for an immediate and verifiable start. This would be subject to an acceptance by Sinn Fein/IRA of General de Chastelain's authority in determining the modalities and timing of the process in the meantime. And in the event that full decommissioning were not to take place by the May deadline, the executive would be collapsed. This is effectively the device proposed by the Deputy First Minister, Mr Seamus Mallon, when he addressed the SDLP conference last year.
Whether Mr Trimble could sell this formula to his assembly party has yet to be determined. But if Sinn Fein's and the IRA's answers to General de Chastelain's questionnaire, due to be released later today, do not amount to a commitment to full disarmament by the May deadline, the question will be academic. If the IRA clings to the declared position - "not a round or ammunition, not an ounce of semtex" - then the entire Belfast Agreement is headed for the rocks. It is not sufficient for Sinn Fein to say it is in favour of decommissioning but cannot secure it, while it repeats the line that it is a political party and has no guns. That may be so. But it is on the most intimate terms with some of those who do.
There has been a steady yielding of ground to Sinn Fein on the decommissioning of arms by successive governments, both Irish and British. Mr Blair and Mr Ahern have departed earlier positions which, in turn, represented the abandonment of what were once supposedly fixed principles. The issue is now down to bedrock and the republican movement has to decide whether it wants into government, at the price of full disarmament by next May, or whether it will seek to advance its programmes through other means. General de Chastelain will not fudge and it is certain that Mr Blair will not hesitate to activate the "cast-iron and fail-safe devices" to collapse the executive next year if the IRA makes a promise and fails to deliver on it.
It may be, in declining to take any of the earlier and easier routes out of this bind, that the republicans have backed themselves into something of a cul-de-sac. A share of power would appear to be theirs for the asking. But if they take it up and if the IRA fails to disarm by next May, that power will be snatched away from them. If they choose not to buy into these realities, and if the Belfast Agreement falls as a result, it will be because they still balk at taking the wholly democratic path and because they see alternative and more promising strategies for advancing their agenda. This would not necessarily imply a return to full-scale violence. But it would certainly mean subverting the will of the people of all of Ireland, clearly declared last year in the referendums.