Strategy on Iran

ONE YEAR on from its disputed presidential elections, Iran remains at the centre of international concern about its nuclear programme…

ONE YEAR on from its disputed presidential elections, Iran remains at the centre of international concern about its nuclear programme, internal repression and support for regional Islamic movements. Last week’s sanctions resolution at the United Nations Security Council is a definite, if limited, response to its obduracy in co-operating with the international inspection on whether it is building nuclear weapons. The election anniversary finds the vibrant opposition movement against President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad cowed by widespread arrests and ruthless state brutality.

Iran remains nonetheless a key player within its region, around which many other states organise alliances and enmities. Neighbouring Iraq has been brought closer by the US intervention and war. Given how centrally Iran continues to figure in US foreign policy this is a great historical irony. President Barack Obama tried at first to engage Iranian leaders in a possible grand bargain encompassing the nuclear issue, co-operation on Afghanistan and in the Middle East.

That this was not to be has a lot to do with Iran’s perpetual oscillation between engagement and reversal which thoroughly frustrates its interlocutors. Its own internal political dynamics explain much of that cycle. National pride is easily mobilised to resist pressure or dismissive treatment. Last week’s UN vote went ahead despite Iran’s agreement with Turkey, brokered by Brazil, to send half of its uranium there for enrichment and was disregarded by the US-led majority on the security council. Iranian leaders say they are going to go ahead with the plan anyway and that they are not worried by the new sanctions. Behind the bluster is a self-confidence bolstered by support from these other emergent states in a world of changing power relations, despite Chinese and Russian support for the sanctions.

The European Union is seeking a meeting with Iran in an effort to combine engagement with possible supplementary sanctions based on the failure of the Iranians to comply with nuclear inspections. Ireland’s long-standing commitment to nuclear non-proliferation puts it firmly in the camp that takes this issue of global collective security very seriously indeed. But political engagement is also a priority. Iran badly needs to demonstrate a willingness to respond politically as well. The alternative could be a dangerous escalation leading to possible military action. Avoiding that is the principal justification for using sanctions targeted at Iran’s energy sectors and those who run them.