So President Yeltsin is staying on in office to see out his term. Or so he said yesterday. The trouble with pronouncements from Mr Yeltsin is that, nowadays, he is not greatly gifted with continuance of thought. What is decided on today can be ditched tomorrow - on a whim. However, if Mr Yeltsin does remain on until 2000, he will be virtually incapable of interfering significantly with government policy because his credibility, his authority, and most importantly, his popularity have evaporated. He is a hasbeen who, if he moved to dismiss another government, would himself be the first out the door.
Mr Yeltsin will try to create the impression that he still matters; hence his sacking yesterday of Mr Anatoly Chubais, the champion of radical reform and the man who negotiated with the IMF (very successfully) for a $23 billion aid package. Mr Chubais's sacking came about however, only because it was clear that the new government did not want him and Mr Yeltsin needs now to curry favour wherever and whenever he can.
Deciding who to leave out of the government will not be difficult for the Prime Minister-designate, Mr Viktor Chernomyrdin. Far more difficult, will be deciding who he wants in and then, in some cases, persuading them to climb aboard. In his previous term as Prime Minister, Mr Chernomyrdin was every bit as stubborn as Mr Yeltsin in blithely ignoring the wishes of parliament when it came to government personnel and policy. This time it's different. It is vital that parliament confirms his appointment promptly. Earlier this year it took Mr Kiriyenko over a month to get confirmed and at that stage Mr Yeltsin still had clout.
The political problem therefore takes precedence over the economy. Mr Chernomyrdin must agree to form a broadly-based government, perhaps including communists, and then agree on how the economy can be saved. Mr Chernomyrdin will dearly wish that his two great rivals for the presidency, the mayor of Moscow, Mr Yuri Luzhkov and the popular and charismatic governor of Krasnoyarsk, Mr Alexander Lebed, would join his government. Then, if the economy deteriorates further they can share the blame. Mr Chernomyrdin will need all his powers of persuasion to get them to join.
But regardless of who is in the government, the task of restoring the economy to an even keel will be beyond it. Mr Chernomyrdin is in office because powerful business people, known as the oligarchs, put him there. He will not countenance measures which are anathema to them; particularly on bank reform and tax collection. Neither, now that he must submit to the communists, can he continue with market-led reforms.
Already, the failed policies of the past are being dusted down for another try. There is talk of currency and price controls, of greater central planning and a new emphasis on State-ownership; none of which addresses the fundamental problem of the crisis in the public finances. This is not exactly music to the ears of the IMF and the countries most exposed to the Russian economy, especially Germany. There will be an understandable temptation to cut the cord and not throw good money after bad. But a complete collapse in Russia could greatly harm the world economy and threaten the weaker, emerging economies with meltdown. Once again, most reluctantly, Russia's creditors will be drawn to the negotiating table.