With the capture of Sulaimaniyah by forces of the Kurdistan Democratic Party, backed by the Iraqi leader, Saddam Hussein, an important episode in the Kurdish civil war is concluded. The outcome undoubtedly gives a boost to the traqi leader in his confrontation with the US administration, insofar as be is responsible for the victory of the Kurdistan Democratic Panty over its rival, the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan. The extent to which he is so responsible now looks likely to determine not only regional and worldwide attitudes towards Saddam Hussein's intervention, but also to affect President Clinton's chances of winning the US presidential election.
The facts of Kurdish factionalism and division cannot be denied now that the full extent of their civil war has been exposed by the events of the last twos weeks. They make it all the more difficult for any but the most romantic advocates of Kurdish statehood to press their case. Not only do the Kurds have few real friends without their ranks, but they display precious little unity within them. Perhaps, indeed, the best conclusion to draw from these events is that separatist statehood is incompatible with the diverse political and cultural nationalisms espoused by the various factions within their common Kurdish ethnic identity.
From the point of view of the various sovereign states in which the estimated 24 million people of Kurdish nationality are to be found most notably Turkey, Iraq, Iran and Syria this is decidedly the case. The policies of these states towards the Kurds have oscillated between ferocious opposition to their separatism in the name of the protection of sovereignty and a sullen acceptance of the autonomous status quo which is a consequence of their regional demographic concentration. The latest Iraqi intervention in Kurdish affairs has to be judged in this light and so does the US response to it.
The decision to set up a "safe haven" for the Iraqi Kurdish population in April 1991 was understandable and justified in the light of the flight of nearly one million refugees to the mountainous area between Turkey and Iraq after the end of the Gulf War. The action saved many lives and eventually enabled them to return home and a rough stability to be imposed in the northern Iraq region. Time eroded this stability, as Kurdish factions competed more and more for control of continuing aid flows, eventually drawing in Iranian and Iraqi support to pursue their struggles. Iraqi national sovereignty once more became a preoccupation for Saddam Hussein and surrounding Arab states, just as regional stability has been for the Western powers.
In these circumstances President Clinton's intervention should be interpreted not as a sign of strength but of weakness. It was directed against air control targets in the south, far away from the safe haven, and has proved ineffective as a deterrent to Saddam Hussein's support for the Kurdistan Democratic Party. For it to be renewed would only compound the problem. It would be better to develop a different, more engaged strategy in which condemnation of Iraqi repression against the Kurds would be balanced by support for an easing of restrictions against the Iraqi population, if and only if respect for Kurdish rights, notably those of the latest refugees, is observed by the Sad dam Hussein regime.