The IRA's guns may have remained silent but they have still managed to lose a battle. Throughout the course of the peace process a public-relations campaign has been waged. Its purpose was to paint the unionists as inflexible, unreasonable and obstructive.
Occasionally, the unionists seemed to be determined to play into the republicans' hands. At other times the strategy was simply well implemented. Either way, as far as the people of Ireland, particularly in the South, were concerned the delays in the process were the fault of David Trimble and the unionists.
Until now. What has happened over the last few weeks is that the blame for the prevarication has shifted. The public now believes it lies with the IRA.
The reason behind this shift in public opinion is the word games the IRA insists on playing. Its statement this week used words and phrases like "constructively" and "in good faith". It talks of movement and evidence, and seems designed to deliver none of those things.
It is not only the public that has reached the point where no further sophistry will be tolerated. In order for the peace process, and more specifically, the Good Friday agreement to remain viable some clarification of stance will be necessary.
Having achieved a few extra days' manoeuvring room, the Taoiseach and the British Prime Minister are taking a hands-on approach to the discussions. Behind the scenes teams of officials work intensively with each of the political parties. What has to be achieved is a complex set of agreements, accommodations and concessions.
First, David Trimble's precarious position needs to be strengthened. Quite apart from the enormous pressure from unionists outside his party, many of his members are growing increasingly disillusioned with everyone's inability to pin down the decommissioning issue. On top of that his post-dated letter of resignation has already passed its due date. Shortly he will have to decide whether he takes it out of storage and uses it or throws it out.
Should it remain in storage for more than a few days it will begin to actively harm his credibility.
At the same time a statement of greater clarity will have to be extracted from the IRA via Sinn Fein. This is no small undertaking. Already this week Danny Morrison, who penned the less than reassuring "ballot box in one hand, Armalite in the other" line, has referred to the need to hold the IRA together. He seemed to be saying that significant portions of the IRA were not willing to decommission so much as a bullet. At the same time the republicans certainly won't make their position any clearer without receiving guarantees regarding the maintenance of the political institutions and Sinn Fein's continued participation in them.
A further complicating factor to be considered is a nationalist statement indicating that any agreement on decommissioning will have to be linked with the rest of the weapons in the six counties. They see any irrevocable move towards decommissioning as the equivalent of the end of their military campaign. It will be the final step from cessation to a full stop. But if they take that step they will want to see a wider demilitarisation of Northern Ireland. This means disarming or removing not just the other paramilitary groups but the British army and, in the case of the RUC, a full implementation of the Patten report.
One further complication is that a simple statement to the effect that the IRA is going to decommission its weapons will no longer suffice. A specific date is likely to be necessary. It would not be surprising to find that the sort of date the IRA was considering probably took into account the 19-month delay in setting up the political institutions. Saying we'll start handing in guns some time in the middle of 2002 won't wash. So, they will have to shift their mindset on this area as well.
The next 48 hours will be crucial. Nobody can be certain at this point that a solution can be found in time. The obstacles to achieving an agreement are enormous. But it should be understood that those obstacles are surmountable. And it is the character of Bertie Ahern and Tony Blair that gives most hope for success.
The British Prime Minister is not accustomed to failure. It would be difficult to believe he would have agreed to the extra week being added to the deadline unless he was convinced there was a good chance of being able to point to another good decision by next weekend.
At the same time Bertie Ahern, as I have said before, is almost obsessive when it comes to achieving consensus. He is an excellent negotiator, extremely clever when it comes to finding common ground and building agreements that allow both sides to point to their victories.
Both men will be monitoring the reports coming back from the teams they have dispatched to work with each party. They'll be hunting for opportunities to cajole, pressure or persuade. And, in their favour, they have some time to play with. Not much, but probably enough to allow room for manoeuvre and perhaps a spot of posturing while ensuring that neither side loses sight of the fact that no further extensions are possible.
One final factor in their favour is that failure at this stage would be disastrous. The amount of damage done in terms of lost faith, trust betrayed and promises broken would be terminal to the Good Friday agreement. The prospect of having to go right back to the start and begin the peace process from scratch is too awful to contemplate.