During 25 years of political killing in the North, 3,342 people died at the hands of various organised forces. Not all were slaughtered by the IRA. Many were murdered by loyalist gangs; hundreds more were killed, sometimes culpably, by those entrusted with maintaining security. If by its actions the IRA unleashes another such holocaust, it alone will be responsible for the consequences. Only its most dedicated supporters would find its reasons credible. The grief and suffering of 25 years brought no political gain to anyone; the threat of another 25 years is a threat of more blood and equal futility.
Mr Gerry Adams stands at the crossing point between the democratic way and the nihilistic return to violence. In these pages today, he makes a defence of Sinn Fein's actions. It is, understandably, a strongly partisan argument, much of it already familiar. But nothing he says in any way justifies or renders acceptable the betrayal of trust and breach of faith which took place with the resumption of bombing.
Nowhere in his recitation of the difficulties created for the IRA or Sinn Fein, or in setting out the hurt which they have felt, is there the slightest acknowledgment that others might find real difficulty in accepting the bona fides of those who keep guns and bombs in reserve. As an earlier republican said "It is easy to sleep on another man's wound".
In setting out with eloquence and at length the IRA/Sinn Fein sense of betrayal, why is there no acknowledgment of the sense of betrayal of constitutional nationalists - from Mr John Hume who, almost alone, invented the language of dialogue, to the Taoiseach, Mr Bruton who persuaded so many sceptics to take Sinn Fein on trust when they said the ceasefire would "apply in all circumstances"? This lack of realism extends to the IRA threat: while they say they have the will to fight on for another 25 years, they must not doubt the resolution of the people of this State to resist violence just as strongly. The security forces British and Irish - have held the line for 25 years and if needed they will continue to do so for another 25 years.
From Mr Adams's account emerges the strong impression of a man who still cannot see his own cause or position as others see them. He upbraids Mr Bruton for declaring "there was no nationalist consensus" thus undermining the basis on which the IRA cessation had been built. But if this was the basis of the ceasefire, Mr Adams himself was at fault for persuading the IRA that a strategy could be built on it. There is no nationalist consensus in favour of fascism or violence. Mr Adams repeatedly claims that Sinn Fein speaks for "35 to 40 per cent" of nationalists in the North. The figure is rarely more than 30 per cent, and in the European election in June 1994 it was 25.5 per cent.
Figures are not everything. Sinn Fein represents two important strands of political thought traditional republicanism and the aspirations of many working class voters in Belfast and other parts of the North. As such, its right to participate democratically in negotiations cannot be contested. But when he attempts to exert leverage and to articulate consensus, Mr Adams's analysis fails. A large majority no longer recognises or supports the dialectic he describes in today's article.
Any hope for a return to rationality depends on how the IRA responds to the latest statement by the Combined Loyalist Command. Its language is tough but still conciliatory. Politics can and must survive. If the situation goes over the precipice, the responsibility will be that of the IRA alone. No amount of rhetoric from Mr Adams or anyone else will gainsay that reality.