In the end, the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation laboured mightily to produce what the Russian ambassador described derisively as “a mouse”. At its meeting on Wednesday the Alliance declared that it would “not continue with business as usual” in its relations with Moscow. And it set up a joint council with Georgia to help it move to eventual membership – but not to fast-track that membership.
The truth is that many Nato members are heartily relieved that Georgia is not currently a member, despite its ambition and strong support from some member-states, including the US. And they have no intention of changing their position in the foreseeable future.
The reason is simple – Nato’s core binding obligation on members to collective security. As Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty puts it: “The parties agree that an attack on one or more of them… shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree, that if such an armed attack occurs, each of them… will assist the party or parties so attacked by taking forthwith… such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.” The mutual obligation automatically to come to the defence of members under attack is the raison d’etre of Nato and precisely why neutral Ireland confines itself to association with the organisation through Partnership for Peace.
To allow Georgia, and indeed aspirant Ukraine, to join is thus much more than a political gesture of solidarity. In Georgia’s case it could have meant a treaty obligation to have embroiled European armies in a war triggered by what is seen widely by Europeans, although they do not say it, as a reckless provocation by President Saakashvili, Russia’s brutal over-reaction notwithstanding. Georgia’s president gambled that Russia would not respond to his August 7th assault on Tskhinvali, and that, if it did, the West would see it off.
The Georgia crisis has shown the real limits of the US policy of Russia containment through Nato expansion, a policy seen as deeply provocative in Moscow and which has contributed in no small measure to creating a political climate in which Vladimir Putin flourished. Finding a way forward for Georgia in the medium term will require a more pragmatic recognition of regional realities, not least the resolute determination of both Ossetia and Abkhazia to achieve independence, abandoning the new Cold War rhetoric, and engaging Russia diplomatically in the search for lasting peace.