The security framework outlined in the Lisbon Treaty could enhance African Union peace efforts, writes Tony Kinsella
OPPONENTS OF the Lisbon Treaty argue that its provisions for security and defence co-operation undermine Irish (though not Austrian, Cypriot, Finnish, Maltese or Swedish) neutrality. Its non-compulsory security framework actually opens possibilities for greater peace efforts.
A glance across the Mediterranean suggests one such possibility. Sixty per cent of global war fatalities since 1945 have occurred in Africa - about 12 million people.
That is on average more than 3,600 every week for the last 63 years, overwhelmingly in civil wars.
These wars find some of their roots in the arbitrary frontiers that African states inherited - borders that were fixed by European colonial officials with little regard for local realities.
Three regions of Africa where the colonial powers invested little and imposed rushed political structures account for some 75 per cent of these fatalities.
Britain administered Sudan as two separate entities until it shoe-horned them into an independent state in 1956. Almost three million have died in Sudan's subsequent internal conflicts.
Somalia was formed by merging British and Italian Somaliland in 1960. About 500,000 Somalis have perished in the chaos of that failed state.
Belgium's King Leopold II conned the world into accepting his seizure of almost 2.4 million square kilometres along the River Congo from 1870 onwards.
Neighbouring Rwanda and Burundi, formerly German territories, became Belgian mandates after the first World War.
Belgium precipitously withdrew from this vast territory and its 250-odd ethnic groups in 1960. Combat fatalities in today's Democratic Republic of Congo, Rwanda and Burundi since independence are estimated at nearly five million.
African states understandably agreed not to open the Pandora's box of renegotiating their inherited frontiers. On one level this principle has worked remarkably well, as the continent has only experienced three overt African inter-state wars.
The internal level has proved more problematic. Weak national administrations, regional rivalries (often boosted by coveted natural resources), and discriminatory central governments have all acted as midwives to a series of brutal conflicts.
The African Union (AU), established in 2002, has accepted its continental challenge. Article 4 (h) of its constituent act asserts "the right of the Union to intervene in a Member State pursuant to a decision of the Assembly in respect of grave circumstances, namely war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity".
The AU's Peace and Security Council succeeded in persuading the Sudanese government to accept the AU mission in Sudan in 2005, eventually deploying some 12,000 peacekeepers in Darfur by the end of 2006. These peacekeepers were the only external actors in Darfur, and despite their limited mandate, they have made an impact. The BBC's Adam Mynott commended "the effectiveness of African Union peace monitoring troops . . . in Darfur".
Since January of this year the joint AU-UN Unamid force of 26,000 is slowly deploying in Darfur, in parallel with the equally slow EUfor deployment in Chad.
In 2007 the AU approved the deployment of an 8,000 strong force to Somalia. The 2,200 troops from Uganda and Burundi who have actually deployed keep war-torn Mogadishu's port open for the UN relief supplies which are all that stand between millions of Somalis and famine.
At the AU's request Nato warships, first French and now Danish, escort this vital food from the Kenyan port of Mombasa.
Assembling effective multinational forces is no easier for the AU than it is for the EU, or the UN.
African forces face additional hurdles in terms of training, finance and equipment.
African armies tend to be small, lightly-equipped and largely configured for internal security duties. Many African currencies are not easily convertible, obliging contributing nations to spend scarce foreign exchange to pay their peacekeepers. African forces are also desperately short of vital equipment such as helicopters and armoured vehicles.
The Recamp (Reinforcement of African Peacekeeping Capacities) programme provides training for African personnel at centres in the Ivory Coast and Mali - although it suffers from its French origins.
The CCCPA in Cairo, the KAIPTC in Ghana, the South African Development Community's RPTC in Harare (with Danish funding) and Kenya's PSTC also provide peacekeeper training.
Helicopters are vital peacekeeping tools, providing reconnaissance, transport, evacuation and combat support.
They are also expensive both to purchase and operate. An old chopper costs about €1 million, with minimum operating costs of €700 an hour. Modern machines clock in closer to €6 million, and cost about €1,800 an hour to operate.
In desert conditions each machine can need a support crew of more than 20 skilled technicians - valuable personnel who, like their machines, must be protected. Nations with few aircraft or trained mechanics are loath to expose either on peacekeeping missions.
Peacekeepers need assurance and an ability to impress. An armoured vehicle is not only much more impressive than six guys sitting in the back of a pick-up, it also offers those troops some security.
There is a clear need for EU assistance to African Union peacekeeping. The EU could help finance AU training while underwriting deployment and equipment costs.
African acceptance would be enhanced if trainers from the former colonial powers took a back seat while Finnish, Greek, Irish, Slovakian, Polish and similar personnel played the leading roles.
This is an essential role for the EU, one that neither its member states, nor any other power, is capable of discharging.
In 1960 Ireland sent troops in bull's wool kits with hobnail boots and bolt action rifles on her first peacekeeping mission to the newly independent Congo.
When we enter our 2008 referendum polling booths we could do worse than spare a thought for the 26 Irish troops who died in the Congo, the 3,600 Africans killed every week, and vote to allow the EU to step up to the plate.