Sir, - Brian P Murphy's latest letter on Kilmichael (September 7th) abandons the argument he made previously that Tom Barry's original report of the ambush is not genuine. He now asserts that the "fundamental question" is not forgery but rather my explanation for why it differs from later accounts.
Yet surely there are only two logical possibilities: either Tom Barry wrote it or he did not. If he didn't, someone else did. Assuming that no one in the IRA would have reason to, then only someone on the government side could have. But, as I hope I have already demonstrated, British intelligence officers had no reason to concoct such a version of events and, in fact, believed the document to be real. It follows, therefore, that Barry must have written it.
How, then, do we account for its omissions and discrepancies? The report lacks Barry's signature and handwriting, but this is entirely consistent with those he wrote in 1921, which can be found in the Richard Mulcahy Papers. Dr Murphy points again to the timing of the ambush, which Barry's report puts at 4.15, although he later stated it was 4.05. A similarly small difference exists with later versions of when the column began its march to the ambush site. In other words, the report is within a few minutes of other accounts, but not identical. This is certainly an acceptable level of accuracy given that people wrote from memory - and given the much wider gap between it and the British "official" version (which presumably a forger would wish to support).
So if the timing issue is not very significant, and if most of the other stated details are accurate - and Dr Murphy does not dispute them - we are left with the question of why Barry would lie about whether or not the ambush was planned. Dr Murphy believes that "the source is either of value in its entirely or not at all".
In fact, most documents are neither. Surely the correct historical approach to an apparently genuine document is to ask why the author wrote as he or she did?
In this case, I believe Barry's omissions and lies form a coherent pattern in that they eliminate the controversial aspects of the event. He didn't have authority to launch a risky ambush outside brigade boundaries, and he hadn't told his superiors, so he claimed it was an accident. Remember, at this point Barry was more or less on probation and had yet to make his name as a commander. Indeed, this was his first ever report. He also failed to mention the killing of wounded and surrendered men because that too might well cause trouble. It was unprecedented and went against the often chivalrous standards in combat set by such commanders as Sean Moylan and Sean MacEoin.
My own reconstruction in The IRA and Its Enemies is, as Dr Murphy points out, based primarily on the testimony of witnesses whose identities I was asked to keep confidential. This was true of interviews I conducted, and also those held by other people, who kindly allowed me to use the tapes and statements they collected (the details are in the book). Nowhere, however, does my book depend on the uncorroborated evidence of my interviews - they are always backed up by other sources, as is the case here. It is worth noting that Meda Ryan's excellent biography of Barry also quotes unnamed sources. In fact, we clearly interviewed the same person in at least one instance, although she does believe there was a "false surrender" (as I do note in my book).
Finally, let me end on a note of agreement and echo Dr Murphy's call for the Bureau of Military History to be opened to researchers. If this debate helps bring new evidence to light, it will represent a victory for everyone. - Yours, etc., Peter Hart,
School of Politics, Queen's University, Belfast.