Sir, – You are to be commended for commenting editorially on the role of the Ulster Covenant as the trigger for introducing the gun into the Home Rule political process (September 29th). It is a pity Fintan O’Toole in his feature (Weekend Review, September 29th) did not develop this aspect. Increasingly evidence is emerging that the Larne and Howth gun-runnings, both from Germany, were actually master-minded by the Imperial General Staff, as a means of deceiving Germany into thinking the British would not enter the war if they went for France via Belgium.
In this deception they were successful; the European press was awash with references to British concern with the impending Irish Civil War. The Liberal and Tory leadership were co-operating with the Imperial General Staff and Sir Henry Wilson in the deception, and were able to bring Carson and Redmond onside in support of the August 3rd Commons debate, where the decision to go to war over Belgium (“in defence of small nations”) was cheered; they would take the Germans by surprise, and the British Expeditionary Force (which Wilson had at the ready) would be “home for Christmas”. (Unfortunately for Wilson and the British Expeditionary Force the German war machine turned out to be stronger than expected, and the “home for Christmas” aspiration somewhat over-optimistic!)
Erskine Childers was outside on the Houses of Parliament terrace, explaining the reason for the audible cheer to his wife. This was about a week after the Howth gun-running, which was designed to be the confirming signal to the Germans, and was subsequent to Sarajevo. Childers had been acting for Asquith.
The motivation for this deception was rooted in the Imperial General Staff view of the German threat to British hegemony in Africa. Wilson had been planning how to deal with the German imperial threat for the previous decade.
I had picked up the fact that the Germans were deceived from my father Joe Johnston decades ago, but have only recently, after reading some reputable academic studies of the origins of the first World War, put the rest of the above summary together. It suggests the need for serious critical assessment of the various coming centenary events. For example, were the gun-runnings intentionally introduced with a view also to weakening the independence-oriented politics of the Home Rule process by provoking insurrection, so as to kill off the republican leadership? I have heard this suggested, but not seen the evidence.
The ratio also is significant; of the order of 20,000 guns via Larne, 2,000 via Howth. Larne rendered Partition inevitable, despite the lobbying efforts of my father and others, at the 1917 Convention, which incidentally Childers, acting for Asquith’s successor Lloyd George, chaired.
It is interesting to speculate how Pearse and Connolly would have developed a republican opposition to Redmond’s imperial support position in a Home Rule Parliament. Would the nascent Protestant support for all-Ireland Home Rule have rallied?
My father’s 1913 book Civil War in Ulster? was his response to the Covenant and in it he attempted to portray Home Rule as an opportunity rather than a threat for Protestants. He produced it in time for the November 1913 rally of Protestant Home Rule supporters in Ballymoney. I am indebted to UCD Press for bringing out a re-issue in 1998, in its historic reprint series.
I am indebted also to the Irish Association and the Institute of British-Irish Studies in UCD for the opportunity to absorb some historical analysis of the Covenant on September 22nd at the Linen Hall Library in Belfast. I understand the papers presented will be accessible eventually via the IBIS website. I look forward to much critical re-thinking of the nature of Irish nationhood and its politics in the context of the analysis of the coming centenaries. – Yours, etc,