World View: The mess made by President Bush in Iraq started as a dream about strengthening the world leadership of the American empire. Now its hegemony is weakened as his high-risk gamble unravels. Militarily, the US is still dominant over rival world powers but it has lost most of its economic superiority, and the key issue for US elites, both Republican and Democrat, is how to maintain their leadership position, writes James Anderson
For much of the rest of the world, however, the key issue is how to save itself from American hegemony. The danger is that as the US weakens economically its militarism could become even more aggressive.
American hegemony is unprecedented. It developed through the 20th century in the world's first mainly informal empire, based largely on the economic dominance of US capital rather than direct colonial control. Like 19th century Britain's informal empire in the independent states of Latin America, 21st century US imperialism relies mainly on the local states to enforce profit-making conditions.
Only now this informal empire encompasses the majority of the world's states, with neo-liberal globalisation making most of them free for global capital while it curtails local freedoms. And where Britain had its navy and naval bases, and could occasionally send a gunboat to get Brazil or Argentina to behave the way it wanted, the US has its aircraft carriers and a world-spanning network of military bases in over half the world's independent countries. This archipelago of military power indirectly guards a mainly economic empire.
US imperialism thus generally avoids direct colonial occupation but it is peculiarly vulnerable in its reliance on other independent states (and those who think the British did it so much better forget a lot and also underestimate the difficulties today's imperialism faces from the advance of nationalism - e.g. Iraqi nationalism).
The central problem facing the US is twofold. Firstly, local states, whether democracies or dictatorships, cannot always be relied on to "behave themselves" as the US wants. Local states and ruling classes have their own interests. The recalcitrant may need "persuading" to enforce the rules of the market, especially if externally-owned capital is the main beneficiary.
Secondly, while the US "persuades" on behalf of capital from other leading powers, they too have their own interests, to the point of challenging US hegemony.
Mostly the US gets its way with economic "carrots and sticks", or threats from the archipelago and the occasional aircraft carrier. Actual military intervention or occupation is very much the exception. But there are exceptions, either to deal with recalcitrant states, to gain advantage over rivals, or because of the geopolitics of oil. All three came together in the invasion of Iraq.
In the 1990s Clinton's deal-making approach to international relations was no longer enough for neo-conservatives in the Republican Party, and indeed militarism was already increasing under the Democrats. US hegemony was being challenged economically, with the European Union approaching it in economic strength and China growing alarmingly. The "neo-cons" saw an opportunity in Iraq to reassert their hegemony and the so-called "war on terror" provided the pretext.
They dreamed of substantial advantages over America's rivals for perhaps another generation. And initially they did gain advantages. The EU, a potential rival for hegemony, was divided politically over the invasion. The archipelago of bases was extended into the oil-rich Asian heartland on the borders of Russia and China, two other major rivals.
Moreover, Iraq and the Middle East is a major source of oil for rivals in Europe and Asia, and control of the region would mean control of their supplies. It also meant more control over world oil prices and would help ensure that oil continued to be priced in US dollars. This supports the US dollar continuing as the world's reserve currency, which in turn enables the US to survive its huge trade and balance of payments deficits. Saddam had already switched to pricing Iraq's oil exports in euro, and if this spread it could spell disaster for the dollar and the US economy.
Making an example of Iraq was an opportunity to demonstrate the "persuasion" effect of overwhelming force, code-named "Shock and Awe" in case other troublesome states didn't get the message. For threats to "persuade" the recalcitrant, they have occasionally to be carried out.
But Iraq and its underestimated national resistance are now a crisis for US hegemony. Military devastation was to become shockingly awful at making the world safe for Halliburton or US capital, never mind capital in general, the Iraqis, or people in general. With far too few troops on the ground, Iraq reveals the economic limits on US occupation compared to its capabilities after the second World War.
It shows that military intervention to deal with disruptions to "normal" profit-making can lead to even more disruptions - including the knock-on effects of rising oil prices. The warning to other states may backfire. The French and Chinese may be encouraged in their bid for a multi-polar world, rather than a unipolar US one, while the EU may be encouraged to deal with China independently of the US because, as in Israel/Palestine, their interests diverge.
Does Bush have an exit strategy? To end the Iraq occupation admits defeat, while staying can hardly bring any meaningful victory, and here the Democratic Party has nothing better to offer. We don't get to vote for the US president - one problem with hegemony is that the rest of the world does not have a say in who "leads" it. But, more importantly, we need to move beyond inherently dangerous hegemony as the way to run the world, whoever the hegemon.
And in saving us from hegemony, whether American, Asian or European, "ordinary" Americans can play a vital role. They made a good start in 1999 when their "Battle of Seattle" launched the "anti-globalisation/anti-capitalism" and now anti-war movement.
James Anderson is professor of political geography and co-director of the Centre for International Borders Research at Queen's University Belfast