At the time of writing the arms inspectors have just made their report to the UN Security Council, but the outcome of the subsequent secret session of that body is unknown. Thus in this article it is possible only to draw tentative and conditional conclusions about the next stage in this process, writes Garret FitzGerald.
If Iraq persists in its failure to respond and to co-operate fully with the UN, then, given the danger posed by biological and chemical weapons in the hands of someone with Saddam Hussein's record, there could be a case for UN action to disarm him.
But the inspectors have not reported a material breach at this stage, and have sought more time carry their process through to the point where either outstanding issues are positively resolved, or they report that the Iraqi Government's mission represents a material breach of Resolution 1441. When received, such a negative report could, and probably would, lead to a Security Council decision to authorise armed action against Iraq by some member- states, acting on behalf of the UN.
But at this stage American impatience with the pace of the inspection process in Iraq does not seem an adequate justification for invading that country without the authority of the Security Council. And the suggestion from the US and British governments that unless everyone agrees to authorise an invasion now, in advance of such a definitive report by the inspectors, the United Nations will make itself "irrelevant" and "lose its authority" is frankly unconvincing, and will, I am afraid, be widely seen as self-serving. Indeed, it is a Security Council decision to authorise an invasion of Iraq at this stage, without waiting for the inspectors to report definitively, that would seem more likely to cause the UN to lose its authority and to become irrelevant.
The British government has claimed to have the right to ignore "an unreasonable veto" at the UN. Now, it is true that one can envisage a situation where, for example, a single Chinese veto on a European intervention to prevent a massacre in somewhere like Bosnia would appear so unreasonable that a powerful case could be made for the European Union to decide unanimously to ignore the UN veto it for humanitarian reasons. But that consideration would not justify one or two states deciding for themselves to mount a pre-emptive strike in defiance of the Security Council, an action that could undermine the system of international legitimacy that has laboriously been built up during the half century since 1945.
Even if a time comes when the inspectors decide to report failure, there will still be doubts as whether that necessarily justifies war against Iraq. First of all, even leaving aide the important argument about proportionality of actions, Gen Sir Michael Rose, former UN commander in Bosnia, pointed out during the BBC programmes last Wednesday, that there are three other crises the handling of which might logically take precedence over the Iraq problem, viz. combating international terrorism, dealing with nuclear crisis involving North Korea, and resolving the Israeli/Palestinian dispute - for failure to tackle this latter long-running dispute clearly lies behind the recent outbreak of international terrorism.
Next, weight has to be given to the danger that an attack on Iraq could precipitate chaos in the Middle East. It is true that those who currently firmly predict such an outcome have no more grounds for their belief than the US and Britain have for believing that an invasion of Iraq will involve only a brief military action with few casualties on either side, followed by the emergence of a democratic regime there and peace throughout the region.
But there is surely a sufficient possibility of the worst happening in the Middle East after an invasion of Iraq to justify hesitation about armed action.
Finally, it is hard to accept the suggestion that an invasion of Iraq will strike a blow against international terrorism. The evidence of Iraq supporting al-Qaeda is thin, and there seems to be no evidence that this terrorist organisation has been financed or armed by Iraq. By contrast, whether or not it is authorised by the Security Council, an invasion of Iraq is clearly likely to win new recruits to terrorism throughout the Muslim world,
Tony Blair's rather desperate efforts to shift British public opinion in favour of a war even without UN backing has, instead, seemed to solidify British opinion against such a war - not just on the left of British politics but right across the political spectrum.
Senior Tory politicians in both houses of parliament - some of whom have spent much of their lives supporting a close relationship with the US - have been brought by these events to express, privately at least, total opposition to war in these circumstances. The House of Commons may be whipped by both party leaders into producing a somewhat artificial majority supporting an early attack on Iraq, but a vote in the House of Lords on this issue could spring a surprise!
Meanwhile these events are making something of a joke of the idea of a common European foreign policy, and disagreement over Iraq could threaten European cohesion on other issues. The support on Iraq that the US has won from all the applicant countries of central and eastern Europe reflects the greater importance many of them at this stage attach to NATO than to the EU, and that is not creating the best climate for next year's enlargement of the community. In the foreign policy area our own Government is right to be concerned not just with vindicating our ideals, but also with protecting our material interests - and this certainly includes maintaining a good relationship with the US as a source of investments that have created the recent prosperity of our country, and also as an important source of support in seeking a resolution of the Northern Ireland problem. Those who want to ignore these considerations completely, and who advocate a populist foreign policy of pure starry-eyed idealism, do their country poor service.
The case for a last-resort invasion of Iraq if and when authorised by the Security Council is strong, even if not compelling. A failure on Ireland's part to endorse such a decision would involve a departure from Irish support for the UN as an institution, as well as unnecessarily doing serious damage to our valuable relationship with the US.
On the other hand, a US/British invasion of Iraq without Security Council authorisation would pose a serious dilemma for our Government, which would then be faced with as direct conflict between out interests and our ideals. I can understand some members of the Government being tempted in such circumstances to put our interests first. But, given the importance that Ireland has always attached to the role of the UN as our best hope in preserving world peace, the case for neither endorsing nor assisting armed action against Iraq, taken effectively in defiance of the Security Council, is, I believe, the stronger one.