Tony Blair says that he and Bertie Ahern are marching in step. This is as it ought to be: in the contest between the promoters and opponents of paramilitary violence, the governments must stand together.
But good intentions are not enough. The governments will be judged on results. They must deal directly and effectively with the `Real IRA', the group that Mr Ahern has promised to suppress and crush.
And they must urge all the Northern parties to meet all the terms of the Belfast Agreement in full. Because the targets of the bombers are the people and parties of Northern Ireland; and it's among them that a resolution will be found.
If the governments fail to live up to their promises, or the parties renege on the spirit of the agreement, then the visit to Cong and much else will be written off as attempts to look busy.
Particular obligations fall on Sinn Fein and the Ulster Unionist Party. They could help to promote the co-operative essence of the agreement in two ways.
Sinn Fein could do it by declaring, on behalf of the republican movement, that its war is over and the Provisional IRA is prepared to co-operate with the international commission on decommissioning.
The UUP could announce simultaneously that it's prepared to talk to Sinn Fein and, pending a favourable report from the commission, promise co-operation with all parties in the new executive.
The urgency of some such agreement grows as the resumption of the new Northern Ireland Assembly approaches and people, comforted by their common humanity in time of tragedy, turn again to politics and public life. There is a political alternative to violence, and the parties must prove it.
There is no doubt about the reactions of the great majority of people in this country, North and South, to the bombing of Omagh.
The deep, debilitating wounds inflicted by the `Real IRA' reopened morning after morning in the days that followed the event as people woke to the reality that it had not, after all, been a nightmare.
AND, as grief gave way to anger, the `Real IRA' recognised the need to change tack, if only for the sake of appearances, and called a halt to its campaign, for the time being at least.
But the internal argument about the need for a ceasefire is likely to have had as much to do with the prospect of tougher laws, more vigorous policing and retribution by the Provisional IRA as with public outrage.
Leaders of the `Real IRA', like their former colleagues in the Provisionals, know how anger wanes, especially in the Republic; and how, in the North, it often depends on where you're from.
Even in the days after Omagh, and even in Tyrone, there were different reactions to the bomb; different explanations as to why so many died and different views as to what should happen now.
Three days after Omagh, Carrickmore's reaction was described by Rory Carroll in the Guardian. He'd gone there because Carrickmore is strongly nationalist; and two of its young people were among the dead.
The town, he reported, was unanimous: the bomb was appalling, but it did not justify internment, which was wrong and doomed to fail. Ian Paisley and other unionists who called for an end to the peace process were greater pariahs than the `Real IRA'.
"One retailer, who asked not to be named, said: `Look, they [the bombers] are bastards, worse than that, much worse, but they're our bastards'.
"Another man said he knew both the victims but could not bring himself to go along with anything Mr Paisley said. Others compared the attack to an accidental catastrophe like a plane crash. Most felt casualties were not intended."
In other words, what was wrong with the bombing of Omagh was that it gave terrorism a bad name. Neither group may say so, but it's a response that both the Provisionals and the `Real IRA' rely on.
They have their differences, bitter and potentially deadly. The `Real IRA' accuses the Provisionals of betraying republicanism.
Mitchel McLaughlin of Sinn Fein describes the `Real IRA' as "the militaristic tendency" and Pat Doherty accuses its members of blindness, arrogance, ignorance and pride.
But they would no doubt agree with each other on several points already raised by Sinn Fein spokesmen and some commentators.
One is that internment or other harsh measures won't work, certainly not in Northern Ireland.
Some argue, as Martin McGuinness has done, that repressive measures have never worked. Others say they are bound to be counterproductive, likely to increase support for those interned or imprisoned.
But these claims are as questionable as the estimates made by politicians about the numbers involved, how well armed they are and how amenable to political persuasion.
THE claims are contradicted by Jim Cusack's reports in this newspaper and by bitter experience, not only in Omagh but over many months in both Northern Ireland and the Republic.
Many members of the Provisional IRA in the Republic and a smaller number in Northern Ireland - but including the powerful Provos of south Armagh - are thought to have switched sides.
If this is so, and they are now members or allies of the `Real IRA', the group may be relatively small but, given its access to weapons and the unpredictable reactions of republican supporters, it may not be a small problem.
Omagh was the price paid for the casual attitudes of politicians, policemen and journalists who made light of bomb after bomb - in Moira, Banbridge, Dundalk, Portadown, Armagh, Howth and Dun Laoghaire - 10 in all since the beginning of the year.
The argument that internment has never worked is as foolish as the notion that measures applied in the South are somehow less stringent than those in Northern Ireland.
Internment may not have put an end to the Civil War, but it had a powerful influence on the result. It certainly undermined the morale of those who opposed the Treaty.
Internment and other harsh measures played a significant part in stopping IRA activities, including the bombing campaign in England, during the second World War.
Many who speak or write now with foolish confidence have forgotten - or never knew - what happened to Charlie Kearns, George Plant and the others, a dozen all told, who were hanged, shot or died on hunger-strike.
Internment North and South was one of the factors which contributed to the failure of the 1950s campaign, though the IRA then was smaller, less well equipped and less organised than the Provisionals - or, it may be, the `Real IRA'.
In the 1970s, however, internment not only failed but won support for the cause it was meant to defeat. Its imposition, in shameful, one-sided fashion, merited the international opprobrium it eventually received.
If harsh measures are to succeed, the case for their imposition must be clear.
Those against whom they are applied must be seen to be engaged in violence, in campaigns designed to thwart the wishes of the majority.
In this country, North and South, there is an alternative to violence. If it takes tough action to defend it, so be it.