The famine tragedy unfolding in North Korea is not like others that have been portrayed more dramatically, accompanied by regime collapse and intrusive coverage from the international media. It is hidden behind the hermetic facade of one of the world's most secretive set of rulers and has been reported only sporadically by occasional official visitors.
But the very readiness of the ruling party to negotiate on food aid, nuclear power and military forces is a token of how seriously the crisis has penetrated its leading ranks. This is matched by the conviction of surrounding states and the larger powers that North Korea should be given the opportunity of a soft landing, rather than provoking the possibility of precipitate collapse in the midst of widespread hunger, which could overwhelm resources and prove highly destabilising in the region. The fear is well-founded and the response to it rational.
Talks are set to continue later this week between South and North Korea on precisely how food aid should be supplied to the North. There is an understandable worry that aid could be diverted away from those who need it most. But there is a limit to what can be done short of jeopardising the soft landing scenario. A strict application of the principle of sovereignty is one of North Korea's defining characteristics. Were it to be pushed too far there is the standing possibility that the regime might decide to opt for a war to avoid internal disintegration, as has been revealed in statements by a leading defector.
There is a long history of food shortage cycles in North Korea, based on climatic factors and its highly mountainous terrain, which leaves less than 20 per cent of its land arable. It has had to import food on a regular basis, despite ambitious attempts to reduce such a dependency by irrigation, mechanisation and reclamation programmes. There have also been some changes recently in the rules governing production incentives for farmers, which has been described by on-lookers as a process of reform by stealth. The recent floods have forced the pace of reform, as well as galvanising the regime to deal more openly with the issues.
A soft landing policy will also require a more explicit and positive attitude towards the possibility of Korean unification on the part of surrounding states and by the American administration. This would be a signal that regional stability should take precedence over the reluctance of Japan and China to contemplate the loss of influence to a Korean peninsula that would be stronger in the medium to long term. The United States needs to clarify its own policy in this area by supporting the idea that unification might be achieved by negotiation and over a prolonged period. It would be accompanied by agreement from the Chinese, Japanese and Russians not to become involved militarily and by American undertakings to withdraw in tandem with inter-Korean agreement.
It will be essential, if such a scenario is to unfold, that food aid be provided rapidly and effectively for those suffering in the North Korean famine. There is ample evidence that it is urgently required, despite severe restrictions on media reportage. It would be neither politically nor morally acceptable for aid to be made immediately conditional on political reforms. Such changes are better pursued by an intelligent approach towards the medium-term negotiation of a soft landing for the ailing regime in the north.