Now that the Treaty of Amsterdam has passed its major hurdles of ratification by referendum in Ireland and Denmark, it seems assured of safe parliamentary passage in the other member-states. The campaigns in both countries have thrown up important issues about the accessibility, transparency and democratic accountability of this latest exercise in European integration, as well as about its acceptability.
It has to be recognised that simply providing more information is no guarantee that the treaty, or the process of which it forms a part, will become more acceptable to the electorate. The Danish referendum commission provided much more material than here; in addition it sponsored debates and provided funding to political parties and pressure groups alike on the basis of their electoral strengths. It did not have the competing pressure of another referendum to contend with. And yet 44.9 per cent voted against, compared to 38.1 per cent in Ireland.
The Danish procedures merit close attention as the Government carries out its review of the McKenna judgment. They are particularly relevant for the substantial proportion of the Irish electorate which voted No in protest against the treaty's incomprehensibility. Not all of them would have voted this way if they were better informed; but their protest is nevertheless a warning signal against the remoteness of the political processes involved. As core political issues such as money, taxation, crime, fundamental rights, security and defence come on to the EU's agenda, there will be an increasing demand that the democratic shortfalls be tackled more honestly and squarely, irrespective of whether particular measures meet with popular approval.
This is first and foremost a matter for national democratic and parliamentary procedures and then for those within the EU itself. Legislatures have been slow to adapt themselves to the loss of formal control involved in European integration. Oireachtas committees are recent and ill-equipped to provide detailed weekly tracking of EU agendas and legislation. Denmark has the most developed EU committee system, which exerts virtual joint control with the government. But in other states procedures are more effective and transparent than here, despite the recent welcome opening up of foreign policy matters and implementation of the Freedom of Information legislation.
Links between national parliaments and the European Parliament are also under-developed. In Ireland, MEPs are insufficiently involved in the Oireachtas, although they do have effective liaison with constituency activists, lobby groups and media. Ensuring good quality representation in the European Parliament will be all the more important as it takes on more powers of co-decision under this treaty. The proposal to allow groups in the Parliament put forward their candidates for Commission President merits sympathetic attention as a means of providing more democratic debate and legitimacy to the process.
On a broader canvas there is room for much more imaginative discussion of how to involve non-governmental organisations and citizens' groups in European integration issues. This has already been done successfully through the many EU programmes associated with the Northern Ireland peace process and at regional and local level. It could be further developed by the operation of the new North-South bodies and by serious regional devolution in this State. In the longer term it is necessary to consider how the quasi-constitutional process of rule-changing within the EU can be made more democratic if the Union is not to lose legitimacy just as embarks on its most ambitious consolidation.