President Clinton has introduced no new element into the debate about NATO enlargement by making it an issue of his foreign policy in the US presidential campaign. The objective of enlargement, the target date of 1999, the insistence that Russia should not have a veto on the matter, the danger of a security vacuum in eastern Europe, these are all part of current thinking and discussion; so is the absence of precision in listing the first possible new entrants to the alliance. At one level, enlarging NATO is a cheap and easy policy commitment, suggesting determined forward movement under US leadership without needing to be too specific about it, and with broad appeal to sections of the ethnic electorate.
But if the aim was to project the president in a statesmanlike role for domestic consumption, it could have the opposite effect internationally. American efforts to play down the sensitivities of Russia, arguing that the Kremlin has come round to acceptance of at least the central European states as NATO members, may not accord with reality; certainly the Russians are not yet prepared to say it in public. Doubts in Bonn and Paris about forcing the pace have not been altogether allayed, and may be reinforced by the suspicions of the Americans laying claim to hegemony, despite the general welcome with which Mr Clinton's remarks have been received in central Europe - and in Britain. What Mr Clinton did not mention, when setting out "America's goal", is that the process of consultation and joint decision involves other interests and considerations that have still to be resolved. There is already general agreement on how and when this should be done.
Any suggestion of a return to bipolarity in international relations would be detrimental to the long term relaxation of tension. Mr Clinton went to some trouble to reassure Russia that the expansion of NATO had no predetermined enemy in mind and effectively would be non directional. "By reducing rivalry and fear, NATO will promote greater stability in Europe, and Russia will be one of the beneficiaries", he declared. But given the current state of unpredictability in Russian politics, such arguments, accompanied by a reminder of NATO's fundamental role in collective security, are likely to fall short of being convincing.
By using the rhetoric of an historic opportunity that must not be let slip - of not allowing "the Iron Curtain to be replaced by a veil of indifference" Mr Clinton does not do justice to the legitimate concerns which have been aired in order to ensure that there is no return to the armed stand off of the Cold War era. NATO enlargement must not become a cheap alternative to EU enlargement; alternative security possibilities in some areas need to be considered; there is also a serious risk of destabilising the status quo in eastern Europe by acting precipitately.
None of these considerations exactly leaped off the page of Mr Clinton's policy speech: indeed, the virtual cafe blanche for wholesale enlargement, up to and including the Baltic states, could be misconstrued in Moscow as well as in the three Baltic capitals in spite of the absence of any time frame or definite commitment. Exciting fears and expectations in the region is an occupational hazard that President Clinton would probably have been wiser to avoid.