Our public administration has an extraordinary and enviable tradition of service that transcends party politics. That tradition was established in most difficult circumstances two-thirds of a century ago, when a government came to power by the democratic decision of the people just eight years after its leaders had been released from post-Civil War internment.
That new Fianna Fail government showed great wisdom in placing full confidence in the personnel of the Civil Service established by its Cumann na nGaedheal predecessors during the Civil War, and that confidence was amply repaid.
As the decades passed, however, the vitality of the Civil Service waned because of the widespread practice of promotion by seniority, and within the Home Civil Service because of a lack of mobility between Departments.
Within the Home Civil Service these problems were tackled in the mid-1980s at my request by John Boland, as minister of the public service, through the establishment of the TLAC promotional system for secretaries and assistant secretaries. The mobility issue had to be handled differently, of course, in the Department of Foreign Affairs, which had always recruited some of its personnel from other Departments but which, because so many of its staff were posted abroad, could not be brought into a general mobility structure at the top. A dozen years earlier as minister for foreign affairs I had found that in the 1960s the seniority promotion problem in that Department had been most skilfully and humanely tackled by a remarkable secretary, Hugh McCann. With the authority of successive ministers, Frank Aiken and Paddy Hillery, and taking care wherever possible to find ways of looking after those who lacked the necessary capacity, or who despite seniority were not yet ready for posts of higher responsibility, he had brought forward to counsellor some of the more brilliant of the younger diplomats.
I was, in fact, the first major beneficiary of this process, as a result of which some remarkably able diplomats still in their 30s were available for promotion to ambassador/assistant secretary rank.
Of course, this change of promotional regime had not pleased everyone: early on in my period as minister one of the older ambassadors asked for a return to the traditional seniority system. The practice of weekly meetings of senior staff already existed, and I joined these meetings halfway through in order to discuss policy issues, after the secretary and assistant secretaries had had a chance to discuss matters among themselves.
But while there were no doubt discussions about postings and promotions at these sessions, in the much smaller Department of that period these decisions were ultimately taken by the secretary. Hugh McCann and his successors during my period as minister had the practice of discussing these postings and promotions with me informally but in great detail, as presumably had been done with my ministerial predecessors.
And because before my appointment I had already come to know a good proportion of the senior staff, I think I was able, without ever seeking to impose a view of my own, to be helpful to him in this process, one which in a foreign service, where so many considerations have to be taken into account, is extraordinarily complex. A major complicating factor, in addition to the delicate issue of promotions, is the closely-linked matter of postings abroad and at home. For time spent at home and abroad has to be shared reasonably equitably. A diplomat can't be allowed to spend most of a career abroad: apart from anything else, he or she would lose touch with the reality of Irish life. Nor can he or she be kept permanently at home: everyone must obviously take a share of foreign postings, for that's the career they have chosen. For career development it is desirable that young diplomats gain experience of as many aspects of the Department's work as possible. Account has to be taken of the different stages in a diplomatic career: early experience has to be gained both at home and abroad, and thereafter there should be a reasonable alternation between the two.
From a family point of view, diplomacy is a tough career: it is particularly hard on children whose upbringing is interrupted by frequent moves from country to country, and who are often separated from parents who may wish their offspring to have most of their education in their own country. A humane posting and promotion system, of the kind successive secretaries and ministers have sought to operate, tries to take account of these family considerations, endeavouring to post diplomats at home for part at least of the time their children are of school-going age.
Another human problem is that of spouses with work commitments. Since the abolition of the absurd rule that required women civil servants to retire on marriage, this has become more of a problem. Is there, perhaps, a posting available where a spouse might be able to continue his or her career?
As for promotions, if we are to maintain a diplomatic service of the quality we need, and to which we have become accustomed, the employment of merit as the main principle must be maintained. But, as Hugh McCann developed it, this approach was combined with a constant reappraisal of those who have been left behind, with a view to seeing whether their personal development, and/or the emergence of new openings with somewhat less stringent requirements, may make it possible to retrieve their promotional blockage.
It is fair to add that there is a particularly serious promotional blockage problem in this Department arising from its sudden expansion in the mid-1970s, over which I presided.
The emergence of the Northern Ireland crisis and our entry into the European Community, the presidency of which we were to assume in January 1975, found the Department totally understaffed. In 1974 I had to secure government approval for the recruitment of almost 30 additional third secretaries. This unavoidable decision has created a huge problem ever since: when I last checked it out in detail several years ago, while one or two of this cohort had by then reached ambassador rank, about half of them, well into their 50s, were still two grades lower as first secretaries.
It is possible that the scale of recruitment in 1974 may have brought in a few people lacking some of the qualities required for promotion. But, from what I know of that group, many of them are well qualified, and if the posts had been available, would long since have been raised to counsellor grade.
Finally, the interaction between promotions and postings in the Foreign Service is extremely complex. Grades and postings have to be matched both abroad and at home, for diplomats have to be appointed to posts appropriate to their grade. Thus, if a particular post is upgraded - as David Andrews has secured for each of the consulates in the United States - in fairness to others the occupant of that post cannot be promoted just because he or she happens to be there at that time. Even a single vacancy can be used to advance the careers of many others by promotions and postings. Against this background, it can be seen that the operation of the Department's posting and promotional system is enormously difficult. And the preservation of the high morale that has been such a remarkable feature of the Foreign Service, and has contributed so notably to our success as a State in the external forum, has depended upon this process being operated delicately and with humanity.
With a staff of almost 250 diplomats, twice the number I inherited in 1973, all this can no longer be done by the secretary, in informal consultation with his minister. Inevitably it has become a structured process, organised by and through the senior staff.
It may be possible for a minister to make suggestions during this process, but any subsequent attempt to overturn or significantly modify the outcome, ignoring the collective wisdom of the Department's senior officials, can only cause chaos and destroy the crucially important morale of the Department. Such damage cannot easily be undone, and its impact on the performance of this key Department is incalculable.
In the interests of the State it is incumbent on the Taoiseach to intervene to resolve this totally unnecessary crisis.