OPINION:The fall of the Czech government has consequences for the Lisbon Treaty, writes GAVIN BARRETT
CZECH POLITICS have been thrown into crisis since its government lost a parliamentary vote of confidence last week. The one-vote defeat, which required premier Mirek Topolánek to offer his resignation, came as little surprise. The Czech political system regularly produces weak governments, and this was already the fifth no-confidence motion Topolánek’s minority coalition had been subjected to since 2007. The crisis is of Europe-wide interest for two reasons. First, the Czech government currently holds the rotating six-month EU presidency. Secondly, the Czech parliament has not yet approved the Lisbon Treaty. European Commission President José Barroso has understandably now expressed concerns regarding the Lisbon Treaty falling hostage to entirely domestic Czech problems.
Fears had been expressed long ago as to whether the Czech EU presidency (which followed on the highly praised French one) could be successful. The Czech Republic is a small, relatively inexperienced EU member state outside the euro zone. Given the economic times, its role was always going to involve a great deal of crisis management and – with European Parliament elections occurring in June – little EU legislative activity from March onwards.
The quality of Czech political leadership has also been questionable at times. In January, their pro-European but somewhat gaffe-prone prime minister Topolánek joked to stoney-faced MEPs that he thought the (present) Nice Treaty was actually better than the Lisbon Treaty. Last week eyebrows were raised even further by Topolánek’s alleged description to the European Parliament of President Obama’s stimulus plans as “a way to hell” that will “undermine the stability of the global financial market” – comments that were astonishingly undiplomatic, particularly given that the American president will attend a US-EU summit in Prague next weekend.
Characteristically, Czech president Václav Klaus has added fat to the fire with provocatively undiplomatic statements, using his largely (although not entirely) ceremonial role to air his arch-Eurosceptical free market views at every opportunity. He provoked walk-outs from the European Parliament with a speech in which he questioned its democratic credentials and termed the EU system a "centrally controlled economy". His November visit to Ireland included his presiding over a virtual Eurosceptic mini-summit in the Shelbourne Hotel, and labelling Irish foreign minister Micheál Martin a "hypocrite" for objecting. ( The Irish Times, November 13th, 2008). Klaus has undoubtedly given the Czech EU presidency a public profile quite unlike any previous one.
To be fair, the Czechs have recorded some achievements. For example, the March summit of EU heads of state and government won widespread approval. Does the no-confidence vote mean that the Czech EU presidency is now effectively over, however? It is certainly damaged. What happens next, however, is constitutionally up to Klaus. One possibility is for him simply to let things be. Although Topolánek has offered his resignation, there is no legal time limit on how long he (or his government) can remain in office before being replaced. Choosing this option would mean that there would be no personnel change until after the Czech EU presidency ends at the end of June. The Czech EU presidency would continue with the same ministers handling the same briefs, and dealing with the same issues – one of which is the precise package of assurances to be offered to Ireland relating to the Lisbon Treaty.
This choice now seems unlikely to win acceptance in the Czech parliament, however. An alternative option – a non-aligned “cabinet of experts” now appears more likely. (The Irish Times, April 1st, 2009). Early recourse to this option, however, will negatively impact the Czech EU presidency, since it involves changing ministers in mid-stream – and putting ministers in office with no familiarity with their EU-level responsibilities.
The EU itself is nonetheless well capable of surviving this trial. It has already done so in similar circumstances. Two governments have previously collapsed while presiding over the EU – the Danish government in 1993, and the Italian one in 1996.
What are the implications of the Czech crisis for the Lisbon Treaty? By now, only four of 27 EU states have not ratified. Of these, Ireland is to hold a second referendum – probably next October. Germany has given parliamentary approval and is held back only by its need to await its Constitutional Court’s benediction. Poland’s parliament has also voted for the treaty. (Ratification is controversially being delayed by its Eurosceptical president, Lech Kaczynski, who can, however, do no more than delay signing – which he intends to until after the second Irish referendum result.) This leaves the Czech Republic. Both the lower House of Parliament and the Constitutional Court have already approved the treaty. Two further obstacles remain, however.
One is the requirement of Senate approval of ratification (by three-fifths majority). The Senate includes numerous Eurosceptics – many of them in Topolánek’s conservative ODS party. The latter will now feel liberated from any perceived obligation to vote for the Lisbon Treaty so as to keep the government alive. Counterbalancing this to some extent, however, opposition Social Democrats will (coincidentally) be freer to vote in favour of ratification, because Topolánek’s controversial original plans to link ratification to a vote approving American radar stations will probably be dropped, given apparent reduced American interest in the project.
The Czech Senate is likely to vote on the Lisbon Treaty by June. A Yes vote is possible, but far from guaranteed.
If the Senate votes Yes, a further hurdle to Czech ratification will be President Klaus himself. However, his powers appear limited to delaying ratification – perhaps referring the matter back to the Constitutional Court – rather than vetoing it entirely.
Other EU member states are undoubtedly hoping for early Czech Senate approval for ratification. A race against time is now developing here. A general election in the UK in 2010 will probably see the Conservative Party return to power. David Cameron has already promised that he will reverse UK ratification and hold a referendum if the Lisbon Treaty has not then already been ratified by all EU states. Given the unlikelihood of any UK referendum on the EU succeeding, timely Czech ratification will now be crucial to the survival of the Lisbon Treaty.
Dr Gavin Barrett is a senior lecturer in the school of law, UCD, specialising in EU law