A WEEK after Canary Wharf one cannot help being impressed by the manner in which the two governments and, indeed, several party leaders such as Bertie Ahern have responded to that atrocity.
On this point I find myself, unusually, in disagreement with Mary Holland's views as expressed on this page on Thursday.
She describes as "inept" the Government's reaction to the IRA's repudiation of its complete cessation of violence - apparently, so far as one can judge from the rest of her article, because of its decision to suspend talks with Sinn Fein at Government level.
She contrasts this stance with the actions of Rabin and De Klerk, and by implication also of Albert Reynolds, who, she suggests, should be given an advisory role in the peace process.
But no valid comparison can be made with the Palestinian and South African situations where the PLO and ANC each represented the vast majority of the populations in the areas in question.
By contrast Sinn Fein has the support of only 9-10 per cent of the people of Northern Ireland and of less than 5 per cent of the people of the island as a whole - on whose behalf the IRA presumes to act.
There is surely an enormous moral difference between the way in which democratically elected governments can permit themselves to negotiate an end to violence; with, on one hand, the political arm of a totally unrepresentative terrorist organisation seeking by such violence to impose its will on 95 per cent of a population; and, on the other, the way an occupying power or a repressive government drawn from a small minority should negotiate with the representatives of the majority in the area they dominate. To lose sight of that distinction is to put at risk democracy itself.
I say that as someone who, like Mary Holland, has from the first moment supported contacts by Government representatives with a Sinn Fein that had begun to seek a peaceful solution contacts which certainly need to be fully maintained at this stage, given the evident concern of the Sinn Fein leadership to restore peace and to move on rapidly to negotiations for an agreed Northern Ireland settlement.
What I reject - and on this all constitutional parties both in this State and in Britain are agreed - is the idea that members of governments should be expected to meet Sinn Fein leaders under conditions of terrorist violence.
Albert Reynolds refused to meet those concerned until and unless violence had ended. Why should this Government be expected at this point to go back on his firm stance - one which, far from inhibiting the success of his effort to bring violence to an end most notably contributed to his success by making such recognition by the Government one of the benefits to be secured from the ending of violence?
(Incidentally, I wonder why in several recent interviews with Albert Reynolds, in which he seemed to advocate going back on his own firm successful stance on this point, the interviewers failed to raise with him this inconsistency?)
I find it puzzling that Mary Holland should describe as having "no coherent strategy" a Government which is pursuing precisely the coherent strategy that its predecessor successfully pursued in this respect - especially since its leader, John Bruton, has explained the rationale of this strategy in the plainest of language.
If in fact this Government had ignored Canary Wharf and continued to direct negotiations with Sinn Fein, this could have had four negative consequences.
First, it would have betrayed one of the most fundamental principles upon which the security of our democratic State has been founded, and in doing so the Government would in my view have lost much of its moral authority.
Second, the Government would have seriously damaged its credibility with the British people, parliament and government - at precisely the time when it most needs to be able to persuade that government, in light of the disastrous failure of its previous stance, to make a major policy shift in relation to the initiation of all party talks at the earliest possible moment after violence has been brought to an end.
Third, to have continued to deal directly with the IRA would have had a most negative effect on the unionist leadership at the precise moment when it needs to be persuaded - and needs to be facilitated in persuading its own supporters - to accept the need to participate in all party talks in the immediate aftermath of any electoral process that might be agreed.
And, fourth, such a move would deprive Sinn Fein of an argument it could use privately with its supporters and the IRA in favour of a return to peace, viz, that only by conclusively ending violence can it hope to get back into the negotiations with governments that alone can offer any hope of progress.
These are the reasons the case for postponing further direct talks by Government with Sinn Fein has in my view been overwhelming.
WE are in a situation where what has appeared as a British government policy of stringing out the peace process more or less indefinitely, in the belief that the IRA would not return to violence, has proved a tragic and embarrassing failure. Rubbing British noses in this, as some people outside Government have been inclined to do, would only make the situation more intractable.
By contrast, an Irish Government which, however strong its private feelings about British handling of this process during the past 18 months, has the wisdom and restraint to take a low key stance on that issue, now has a potentially crucial opportunity to influence British policy in a constructive direction.
In this respect, and also in the possibility that exists of the United States being able to exert a positive influence on Britain, there is some analogy here with the situation that arose in November 1984, following Margaret Thatcher's "Out, out, out" response to a question about the three specified "models" of the New Ireland Forum.
It seems to me, therefore, that the Government is pursuing a concerted strategy - one that gives it the maximum chance of getting a British and, hopefully also, unionist commitment to a firm and reasonably early date for all party talks.
And that is the only development that seems capable of giving Gerry Adams - whose courage and commitment deserve more recognition than some commentators have been willing to accord him - any chance of persuading the IRA to recommit themselves to the peace process.
Even if the British government and unionists are able in this new situation to, move far enough and fast enough to open up such a possibility, many hurdles will remain to be overcome, including that of securing IRA acceptance of the Mitchell six points; and, following its return to violence last week, getting from it a sufficient commitment to the indefinite continuance of any new cessation of violence.
But at least one can now see a possible way forward - one that seems to provide the only hope of a way out of the tragic cul de sac into which we seem to have been driven by forces beyond the control of our Government.
In thus supporting the Government's strategy it would be wrong to fail to pay particular tribute to the valuable contribution made by the leader of Fianna Fail in the Dail last Tuesday and also on this page yesterday.
In a crisis of this kind each party has its own particular role to play - and that of Fianna Fail is of crucial importance. Just as Albert Reynolds was best placed to negotiate with Sinn Fein through intermediaries the initiation of the peace process, so also Fianna Fail at this point has a far better chance than the Government to get key points across to Sinn Fein and the IRA.