On Wednesday I spoke to the Presidents of the US and France, the Chancellor of Germany and other world leaders about the grave situation in Iraq. Following these discussions, and with a heavy heart, I announced the participation of British forces in a substantial US-UK military strike against targets in Iraq.
We have set our forces clear military objectives. First, to degrade the ability of Saddam Hussein to build and use weapons of mass destruction, including command and control and delivery systems. Second, to diminish the threat he poses to his neighbours by weakening his military capability.
I am confident that these objectives are achievable, and that the action we are taking is proportional to the serious dangers Saddam Hussein poses to his immediate neighbours, the Middle East region and more widely.
Following the Gulf War, Iraq agreed in April 1991 to accept the destruction of all its weapons of mass destruction and not to develop such weapons in the future. That was the price they were made to pay for the cessation of hostilities. The capability he had then included a nuclear weapons programme; long-range missiles; a chemical weapons arsenal of huge proportions, which he had already used on the Iranians and his own people; and a biological weapons programme capable of wiping out the population of the globe several times over.
Everybody expected this process to be completed within a few months. But the inspectors have been constantly harassed, threatened, deceived and lied to.
UNSCOM nevertheless carried out its duties conscientiously, often succeeding against the odds. It has managed to destroy more weapons of mass destruction than the Gulf War, including more than 38,000 chemical weapon missiles, 48 Scud missiles and a biological weapons factory designed to produce up to 50,000 litres of anthrax, botulism toxin and other deadly agents. But much remains unaccounted for. For example, over 610 tonnes of precursor chemicals for the nerve gas VX have not been found.
Over the years, Saddam Hussein has ruthlessly pursued one goal: the ability to dominate his people and his neighbours by military force. He wants to retain all the weapons he can, including weapons of mass destruction. He has used them before. Given the opportunity, I have no doubt he would use them again.
The Iraqi authorities began to obstruct UNSCOM in earnest after the full extent of the weapons programme was uncovered in 1996 and early 1997. This led to a series of crises with the Security Council and the international community - first in October 1997, then in February this year. Saddam Hussein backed down in both cases when faced with the credible threat of force, and it was widely recognised by the international community at the time that it was only the threat of force that led to the backdown.
This pattern continued. In August he suspended co-operation with UNSCOM, breaking the agreement he had reached with the UN Secretary-General, Kofi Annan, in February. On October 30th, he ended co-operation altogether. A US-UK strike was averted on November 15th only by Saddam Hussein's 11th-hour offer of full and unconditional co-operation.
We gave Iraq one last chance. At the same time, we and the Americans also gave the clearest possible warning that, should Saddam Hussein break his word once more, there would be no further warnings or diplomatic arguments.
Unfortunately, Saddam Hussein is a man to whom a last chance to do right is just a further opportunity to do wrong. Richard Butler, the UNSCOM chairman, was asked to put in his inspectors immediately, and to report back to the Security Council. He said that he would do so within a month. On Monday, a month later, he did so. The systematic obstruction he described meant that prompt military action was inevitable. That is why I utterly reject the suggestion that the timing was in any way influenced by political events in Washington.
Mr Butler's report was very clear, and damning. He catalogued UNSCOM's experiences: limited co-operation in some areas, but otherwise a pattern of obstruction - over documents, access to Iraqi personnel and surprise inspections of suspect sites. Co-operation has indeed been even worse in some areas even than before.
These circumstances have presented us with a stark but clear choice. Either to let this process continue further: UNSCOM more and more emasculated; Saddam Hussein correspondingly free to build up his arsenal of mass destruction; and this one-sided and unjustified bargaining over sanctions continuing. Or, having gone through all the diplomatic options, to decide that if UNSCOM could not do its work, we should tackle Saddam's remaining capability through direct action of our own. There was really only one responsible course of action.
The decision to take military action against Iraq was taken with great regret. It is a heavy responsibility. There will be casualties in Iraq, despite all our efforts.
What happens once the military action is over depends at least as much on Saddam as it does on us. I hope he will finally come to his senses and recognise that the only way to find support in the international community and light at the end of the tunnel is full compliance with the Security Council's requirements.
Although I know there are very different views expressed on this, I am encouraged by the international reaction. There has been a good deal of support and understanding. That is not surprising, given how much we have all invested in agreements that involved Saddam Hussein keeping his word. He has never once kept his word. The risk he poses is real, not theoretical.
We have acted because we must act to counter a real and present danger from a tyrant who has never hesitated to use whatever weapons come to hand.