Deaglán de Bréadún assesses the political implications of the latest military developments in the Iraqi conflict
If superior technology, dominance in the air and heavier weapons are enough to win wars these days, then the Coalition forces will overcome Iraqi resistance. But the question of the moment is, at what cost?
The favourite expression of the Allied commander, Gen Tommy Franks is said to be the Prussian strategist Von Moltke's dictum that: "No plan survives contact with the enemy." On that basis, he can hardly be surprised that the conflict is deviating from the script. But the extent of that deviation has come as a shock to those who believed the advance propaganda.
Coalition military leaders may claim they saw it all coming, but there has clearly been some underestimation of the degree of attachment of the Iraqis to their homeland.
Coalition spokesmen and women, both civil and military, continue to speak of Iraqi military "disguising" themselves as ordinary civilians but their protestations are wearing thin. We have heard this before in other countries and other wars.
Whether or not they revere Saddam Hussein, the ordinary Iraqi, like most other ordinary folk, has a deep attachment to his or her country of origin. The Allied message that they are not being invaded but, rather, liberated from an oppressive dictator, does not seem to have come across to them as yet.
Take the example of Basra. Prior to the conflict, the clear implication of Allied strategy was that this city in the mainly Shia Muslim part of Iraq would fall like a house of cards before the advancing Coalition forces, who would be welcomed with open arms by a grateful populace. Instead the Allies find themselves declaring the city a legitimate military target and Kofi Annan is warning of a humanitarian disaster. The forecast re-enactment of Paris 1944 has not yet materialised. The Shia Muslims may have difficulties with the Sunnis but they are all Iraqis at the end of the day, it seems.
The damaging consequences, for the Allies, of Turkey's refusal to permit US troops to enter Iraq from the north are being seen already. Coalition forces are massing to the south and east of Baghdad but the last figure for the number of US forces in the north was only 200.
This is surely an underestimate, but the total is obviously quite low. There are hints, to put it no stronger, that the Coalition may be tempted to recruit Kurdish guerrillas into active service against Saddam, with potentially grave implications for US-Turkish relations. The Kurds have long been looking for their own homeland, part of which traditionally includes a swathe of what is currently Turkish territory
The speed of the Allied advance towards Baghdad has been the subject of some self-congratulation, but this means that the supply lines are long, thin and potentially vulnerable.
The advance has been made through bypassing population centres and sticking with desert terrain. The real test is coming further up the road in the form of the Medina Division of Iraq's Republican Guard. The B-52s are softening up Saddam's elite troops at the moment. How much remains and what kind of fight they will put up remains to be seen. More interesting is whether the civilian population of Baghdad joins the fight.
From the beginning the Iraqi regime's strategy has been to delay the Allied takeover of the country and inflict as many casualties as possible. Western countries may have superior technology but their culture cannot cope with a large number of bodybags.
To be fair, President Bush warned at the start of hostilities that it would not be as easy as some expected. He should have given this message to some of his supporters earlier in the game, when they were predicting victory in three days or so.
It is also evident that there was overconfidence in the military benefits of "shock and awe" bombing. Those with long memories will recall that large-scale bombing in the second World War did not have the effect of breaking the will of enemy countries, except where the ultimate sanction of atomic weapons was used. But Iraq is not meant to be an enemy country. The propaganda "spin" has been that an unpopular regime would implode due to a combination of internal contradictions and military force. But despite his appalling human rights record, it appears that Saddam may still have a significant level of popular support.
In addition, while few Iraqis may have heard the maxim, "My country, right or wrong", an indeterminate number are acting in that spirit at the moment. The mass exodus of refugees predicted by some has not occurred, but there are reports of some Iraqis coming home to fight. Looking ahead to the possible outcome, the balance of probability must remain that the Allies can, as it were, crunch their way through to victory. But the glad confident morning of a liberated Iraq may prove a pipedream. Instead it looks more like we will have a sullen, subdued population, resentful of the foreigners' presence and unimpressed by their protestations of good intent.
To an Irish journalist, especially one who has covered the Northern Troubles, the most depressing twist in the tale over recent days is the recurring references to urban warfare in Belfast during the Troubles and the alleged superior skills of the British forces as against the Americans in this department, thanks to their Northern Ireland training. These skills were not always obvious at the time and there was no mention of FIBUA (Fighting In Built-Up Areas) in the pre-war propaganda.
The chest-beating on both sides means there is little room at this stage for a compromise that would forestall the possibility of a bloodbath in the cities and towns of Iraq and still leave the Coalition with its dignity and self-esteem.
The hope that some of his own would turn against Saddam, as the military screw tightened, currently looks over-optimistic.
• Deaglán de Breádún is Foreign Affairs Correspondent of The Irish Times