All change for Kosovo? Not really, suggests Aidan Hehir
Kosovo's declaration of independence has been greeted with a mixture of jubilation and concern. The majority ethnic Albanian population have rejoiced at what they see as their political emancipation while many international observers fear the consequences of the "Kosovo precedent".
In reality, Sunday's declaration has not fundamentally altered the distribution of power in Kosovo nor will it precipitate a chain reaction of secession. Beyond the superficialities of flags and diplomatic gestures, recent developments in Kosovo are far less transformative than they have been portrayed.
On what basis is Kosovo now independent? Serbia's authority and jurisdiction have been formally repealed but it is clear that the new "state" will have few of the traditional trappings of sovereignty. In key respects the ruling structure has been reconfigured but the paternalistic relationship between Kosovo's rulers and the Kosovars themselves persists.
Kosovo has for centuries been subject to external governance in various guises. This disjuncture in the relationship between Kosovo's inhabitants and its rulers characterised the period of Yugoslavia's existence but persisted after Nato's intervention in 1999 when the province was governed by the United Nations Mission in Kosovo.
While the UN did establish local political institutions, ultimate authority was exercised by the unelected international administrators. The UN mission wielded extensive power over all aspects of the political system and economy in Kosovo while the local population continued to be subjects of power exercised beyond their control.
By 2004 veterans of the Kosovo Liberation Army described the UN mission as "neo-colonialists", and in March of that year province-wide riots targeted the UN and Nato as well as the local Serb population. While Nato's intervention effectively ended the possibility of Kosovo ever being ruled again from Belgrade, it is clear that Kosovars sought more than new unelected rulers.
The "independence" Kosovo now enjoys, however, constitutes a very similar configuration of power to that exercised since 1999. According to a report by the International Commission on the Balkans, Kosovo has, since its declaration of independence, moved into a period of "guided sovereignty". This involves the transfer of control from the UN to the EU and an accelerated focus on "EU member state building".
The final stage in Kosovo's guided evolution is described as "shared sovereignty", when Kosovo will become a full member of the EU. One might well ask, "At what stage in this evolution is Kosovo just 'sovereign'?" Membership of the EU is not presented as an option to be accepted or rejected by the "independent" state of Kosovo but a requirement determined by the international administrators. No state has ever had so many conditions and constraints imposed upon its independence.
In January 2007 the UN published the Comprehensive Proposal for the Kosovo Status Settlement. According to this seminal proposal, the newly "independent" state will be governed by an international civilian representative, Pieter Feith.
This international administrator will have the power to "take the actions necessary to oversee and ensure successful implementation of the settlement" and may "correct or annul decisions by Kosovo public authorities". This of course significantly compromises Kosovo's independence. The people of Kosovo have no authority to elect or remove the international representative and will be powerless to resist his decisions. This political structure does not equate with the legal definition of sovereignty and clearly compromises any notion of "independence".
In contrast to the many who have rejoiced at Sunday's declaration, others have expressed foreboding. We have been warned in grave tones of the broader implications of Kosovo's independence. It has been suggested that the move will spark unrest in northern Macedonia and Republic Srbska, the Serb enclave in Bosnia. Additionally we are told that farther afield the move will have implications for the Basques, the Kurds, the Chechens and even the Tibetans who are all poised to follow Kosovo's lead. Such predictions are pure fantasy.
In reality Kosovo's independence has done nothing to clarify the process of self-determination and does not constitute a precedent that can be emulated. As detailed in the 1933 Montevideo Convention, under international law a state has four characteristics: a defined territory, a permanent population, a government and the capacity to enter into foreign relations with other states. This fourth criterion - recognition - is by far the most important and also the most subjective.
Take the example of Taiwan; it has fulfilled the first three criteria but because very few states - and crucially none of the major world powers - wish to antagonise China, Taiwan fails the fourth test. International law has no clear guidelines on the requirements necessary for recognition and therefore in practice it is dependent on political expediency. While the US and the majority of EU states have proved willing to recognise Kosovo, they will not consider similar recognition for many other aspiring nations simply because they are located within the territory of allies or powerful foes. Spain, Russia and China need not fear that Kosovo has precipitated a wave of international recognition that will grant statehood to their domestic separatists.
Kosovo has not established a precedent for independence; it has merely highlighted the subjective and highly politicised nature of state recognition.
Recent developments in Kosovo constitute an aberration, born of a unique confluence of factors. The exceptional nature of Kosovo's recognition and the superficiality of its newly acquired independence will likely conspire to generate more problems in the future as other separatist groups decry the international community's hypocrisy and the Kosovars realise that their newly declared "independence" does not mean independence per se.
Dr Aidan Hehir is a senior lecturer in international relations at the University of Westminster, and was formerly attached to the University of Limerick. His book, Humanitarian Intervention after Kosovo, will be published this year