"The truth of the matter is there was almost a loyalist ceasefire before the IRA called its ceasefire," says David Ervine.
The push for an end to the UVF and UDA campaigns was driven, not so much by what the IRA did, but by simple logic, he claims.
"I can't explain how loyalists and republicans separately were looking at similar things," he admits. "It's always confounded me, but I think I've come up with a answer. Who in their right mind would want to throw another generation into a futile battle?"
On that basis loyalists were putting together ideas of a ceasefire as early as April 1994. But IRA actions in advance of its cessation in August that year made things more difficult for the loyalist paramilitaries, he says.
He points to the killings of influential loyalists Joe Bratty, Ray Smallwoods, Trevor King and others. "Some people suggested republicans were tidying up unfinished business knowing they were heading towards ceasefire themselves. It was deeply, deeply cynical stuff."
And the reason? Ervine has few doubts. "There are those of us who know for sure that as far as republicans were concerned, loyalists were not meant to be part of the peace process. Loyalism was meant to kill Catholics as Gerry Adams swanned the stage as a peacemaker. That's what was meant to happen and we had to force our way into the frame when we knew that the IRA ceasefire was coming."
Ervine claims more help was offered from Dublin than from London as loyalists began feeling their way out of conflict.
"There was Fergus Finlay, Chris Hudson, a trade unionist in Dublin, Father Gerry Reynolds, Father Alex Reid, Robin Eames, Rev Roy Magee. All of these people were shuttling about the place, acting as touchstones," he claims.
The term "touchstone" is important and deliberately chosen in preference to "intermediary".
"There was no intermediary process - they were trying to understand what the thoughts of republicans were. Quite a number of people were very helpful in terms of assessment and analysis of where we were." The touchstones provided "atmosphere and attitude". They gave a sense of where others in the emerging peace process were. "Sometimes that's all you need," he says.
"The suggestion that you go into a room and you get this massive amount of detail from somebody is a load of crap, quite frankly. It just didn't happen like that." However Ervine concludes it "wasn't possible" to have a loyalist ceasefire first.
"Some people thought it was a good idea because it would have caused republicans annoyance. I didn't see it in those terms. The concept of a loyalist ceasefire was good in itself."
"The rumblings of ceasefire came from as far back as the Downing Street declaration of 1993. I remember Albert [ Reynolds] advising everyone to be calm and cautious and to give the IRA time to think. They waited eight months.
"The IRA called a ceasefire, then the world and his dog started barking at us: why aren't you calling a ceasefire too? I remember saying, "Hold on a minute, the Provos took eight months to call a ceasefire. Take your time, we'll get there."
Were there hawks and doves? Was there a pro-ceasefire lobby in opposition to those in favour or escalating the campaign to bring matters to a head? "The real question was, what happens next," he claims.
"I thought the vast majority of loyalists were against ceasefire on the basis they were unsure about what was going to come after it. They feared secret, surreptitious deals between the [ British] government and the IRA - that was the big one."
Ervine's antipathy to the large established unionist parties was born of a conviction that Ian Paisley and James Molyneaux used the loyalist paramilitary campaigns for their own ends. They conjured up false images of the loyalist paramilitaries as unthinking hard men devoid of political analysis, he believes.
Of the unionist population's trauma following the Anglo-Irish Agreement of 1985, he says: "The view of the UVF at that time was 'let's escalate this war to end it'." To counter such a move and to focus loyalist political thinking, a "kitchen cabinet" was formed. It comprised the UVF leadership, Ervine himself and other influential figures such as loyalist icon Gusty Spence.
This was followed by the formation of the Combined Loyalist Military Command (CLMC). This umbrella structure for the various paramilitary groups was to prove crucial to the peace process, he claims, and the push to call a ceasefire.
However they knew that, unlike republicans, there was little tradition of political activism in the loyalist heartlands.
"When people say SF were more adept at political representation, I think that's totally acceptable. I won't make excuses for loyalism when I say that we had an awful lot to do "
He continues: "You've got to remember the mood within unionism after the IRA ceasefire. Unionism was in dismay, the Rolls Royce of terrorist machines in Europe had laid down its weapons and sued for peace and the community most vulnerable to it was in dismay. We had to build confidence - if we couldn't get unionists to acquiesce in an IRA ceasefire how the hell were loyalist paramilitaries going to follow?"
He says every British prime minister is regarded by the unionist population "as a betrayer"... "It's quite interesting that we then demand that the betrayer look after our interests. It's again a difference between the loyalist attitude and the unionist attitude. We believe that the best way to deal with the issue was to take responsibility on to yourself.
Force your way into the frame - you couldn't do that without a ceasefire or an organised political voice - to be heard."
He says he really got confident about a loyalist ceasefire "maybe six or seven days before it was called". It was never in the bag in advance of the IRA cessation - a direct contradiction of claims made during the summer by Albert Reynolds.
"When you get something like a ceasefire everyone tries to claim a piece of it. I really don't mind that so long as they don't do damage. Albert Reynolds's claims recently did serious damage to me and to others who were invested with responsibility it caused major damage. People should be cautious about their piece of history and the claim on history."
It is now only a matter of time before the current impasse is broken and the Stormont institutions are restored, he believes.
He boldly predicts that February will witness the ending of direct rule. But then the real work needs to begin.
"We need a generic, very deep and serious discussion about what the hell happened to us [ over 30 years of conflict]. There are countries, regions around the world, which have not taken the first steps in democratisation and peace and are watching Northern Ireland with great interest. While we mustn't fail for our own sake we mustn't fail for theirs either - there's a lot we can offer."