It is a great paradox that the Treaty of Amsterdam, billed by political leaders as a radical citizen-friendly document, should apparently be so little known to the Irish electorate. Some 67 per cent of them have not heard of it, according to research carried out for the Referendum Commission when there was only a couple of months to go to the referendum. In another poll 83 per cent of the Irish electorate did not know they would vote.
This is all the more surprising - and galling - given that Ireland played an important role in drafting the Treaty during its EU presidency in the latter half of 1996. Great efforts were put into ensuring that it would address popular concerns - an aim expressed memorably by John Bruton's summary of its objectives as follows: "A peaceful Europe, secure jobs, sound money and safe streets".
He also insisted that these issues should be simplified "into concepts that are capable of being communicated politically". Irish officials put much store by accessible drafting and their work was widely commended by their EU colleagues. The Government's White Paper on the Treaty published last January provides one of the very clearest commentaries on its provisions and deserves a wide readership during the referendum campaign.
This supplement launches The Irish Times's coverage of the campaign. It attempts to explain and summarise the treaty's contents; to analyse selected aspects, and to provide a platform for some of those advocating a "yes" and "no" position on the referendum. It is neither exhaustive nor definitive - nor can it be a substitute for close attention to the campaign proper, but is intended to provide a guide that should come in useful throughout if kept for reference.
Readers are referred to this newspaper's coverage between now and voting day on May 22nd and to its website for continuing and detailed information, including the Treaty text. The Referendum Commission will be issuing guides to its contents and the arguments for and against. Political parties and campaign groups will issue their own material. A book published by the Institute of European Affairs offers expert commentary (Amsterdam, What the Treaty Means, edited by Ben Tonra, Dublin: IEA, 1998).
It must be born in mind that this is a Treaty directed entirely to amending previous ones, and is therefore necessarily expressed in technical, legal language. As long as the European Union remains an association of member states changing its rules by inter-governmental negotiations on a consensus basis, this is likely to remain the case.
There is a growing line of argument that such constitution-changing exercises should in future be brought more in line with democratic practice at national level if popular engagement is to be more solidly guaranteed. A process that seeks endorsement only by a final Yes or No at the end of such a complex negotiation leaves a lot to be desired. But these are the current rules of the game. They mean that every citizen has to balance the positive and negative features of the Treaty in deciding how to vote.
So far, there has been a failure to convey the contents of the treaty politically to the Irish electorate (which has not been helped by a largely indifferent and unaware media). Although it lacks a clear singular focus compared to its predecessors - the Treaty of Amsterdam, which launched EMU, and the Single European Act, passed by referendum in 1987, launching the Single Market - this treaty definitely deserves the closest attention from citizens, who will find in it much that is addressed to their concerns.
That it lacks such a focus is partly because its main objective, to prepare the EU's institutions and decision-making apparatus for a continental enlargement which will eventually double its membership to 30 or so states, was deferred for another four or five years. At Amsterdam it was not possible to agree on the sensitive and difficult changes involved. As a result the prospective member states will be negotiating entry partly in the dark about their future levels of representation. There was also a failure to agree an ambitious extension of qualified majority voting. But strict rules to cover flexibility, or closer co-operation among groups of member states, were agreed, which could be called into play more fully in coming years.
In several respects these failures suit this State's short term interests, because its representation is preserved for another period. But this still leaves a significant amount meriting close attention in what is a more modest document than was originally envisaged.
Thus fundamental rights, employment, crime, the environment, social exclusion and non-discrimination, are dealt with in ways that will allow EU institutions to address them more effectively. During the campaign there will be much discussion as to whether enough has been achieved, with some saying progress is token at best, others arguing that too much sovereignty has been pooled and that there is insufficient provision for democratic accountability.
On most of these provisions the five leading parties in the Oireachtas, all of which were involved in the Inter-governmental Conference from March 1996 to June 1997, will argue in favour of what has been agreed. Because of the unanimity rule it is simply not possible to get your way on all the agenda; inevitably there are bargains, trade-offs, fudges and deferrals.
For example, there is reference to a "high" rather than a "full" level of employment. The mechanism for monitoring employment policies is mutual surveillance rather than substantive expenditure. The ICTU leadership argues in favour of what has been achieved, while IBEC commends a renewed emphasis on labour market flexibility and competitiveness.
The political balance between these positions will be affected by the outcome of the German parliamentary elections next September; should the Social Democrats and Greens form a government they would join the Blair and Jospin governments in Britain and France, forming a trio that would be expected to give employment policy greater priority than it has enjoyed with Dr Kohl still in power. Similarly employment policy will be affected by the outcome of debate on the degree to which EMU requires a quasi-governmental system of political guidance.
This is the nature of the emerging EU system of internationalised governance. It is only a partly formed polity, as Brigid Laffan argues in these pages, but one that is definitely consolidated by this Treaty. So far it privileges executive and bureaucratic networking and rule over democratic methods; but this is changing, as the European Parliament gains powers in this Treaty, greater provision is made for interaction between national parliaments and the Commission president is strengthened. This negotiation was noteworthy for attracting a much greater input from NGOs and lobby groups on behalf of a host of interests representing an emerging cross-national European civil society.
Two important sets of provisions will define the boundaries of the emerging EU political and governmental system. An ambitious and comprehensive programme of work over the next five years is initiated on external border controls, immigration, asylum, fighting crime, drug trafficking and free movement of people within EU borders. Co-operation in justice and home affairs between national police forces and courts will be strengthened. This State and Britain will not participate in the Schengen process of co-operation on internal border controls because of British reservations about changing their system, but this State retains the right to opt in. An overall rubric title is given to this process - "the progressive establishment of an area of freedom, security and justice".
The EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy is, secondly, strengthened and streamlined. Provision is made for common strategies in foreign policy to be applied by majority voting, although with a veto built in. In the defence area the commitment to the framing of a common policy is reaffirmed and rephrased. Peacekeeping, crisis management and peacekeeping tasks are included for the first time.
The precise meaning of the changes are explained in more detail in these pages and their implication for Irish neutrality will be a major focus in the campaign.
A clear distinction should be drawn during the campaign between sceptical and critical approaches towards the EU, Ireland's role within it 25 years since we joined and towards the terms of the Treaty of Amsterdam. Scepticism has been most strongly expressed in Britain and concerns mainly reservations about pooling sovereignty through building supranational institutions. Some of the same objections can be seen among opponents of integration in this State. It has surfaced over EMU, even though this treaty referendum has nothing to do with that decision, which has now been taken irrevocably by the summit meeting in Brussels last Saturday. It also feeds strongly into the debate over neutrality (not to mention over Articles 2 and 3 in the other referendum).
But Ireland has gained materially, politically and in terms of national identity by sharing sovereignty over the last 25 years.
Critical attitudes acknowledge this, while leaving open the possibility of vigorously rejecting this that or the other piece of integration contained within this treaty. What voters must decide is whether the balance of their scepticism or criticism leads them to reject the package as a whole.