MIDDLE EAST: Syria has lost a friendly government in Lebanon but Damascus will not tolerate its "interests" there being flouted, writes Michael Jansen
Syria has major military, political, and economic interests in Lebanon, which are longstanding and essential for the very existence of Syria.
This is why Damascus repeatedly intervened during the 1975-90 Lebanese civil war to prevent one community or the other from seizing control, thereby overthrowing the confessional balance in the country.
This is also why Syria has exercised a considerable degree of control on the Lebanese political front since the war ended. It has done so by keeping troops and security operatives in the country, backing certain politicians, and drawing "red lines" which the Lebanese are not permitted to cross.
When the opposition brought down the government of Omar Karami on Monday it did not breach a red line. Syrian officials said, however, that the opposition would violate a red line if it attempted to oust the president, Emile Lahoud, a close Syrian ally whose term of office was extended by three years under pressure from Damascus.
Sources in Damascus say that Syria will not withdraw its troops and intelligence agents promptly. Damascus would, instead, gradually redeploy its troops eastwards to the border with Syria, where they would remain until it was clear that their absence would not leave a security vacuum.
The opposition would also cross red lines if it tries to abrogate the 1989 Taif accord (which ended the Lebanese civil war) and the 1991 treaty of co-operation between Lebanon and Syria.
Called upon by the Lebanese opposition and Washington to implement the pull-out provisions of the Taif accord, Damascus is certain to insist that Lebanon should honour its own commitments, in particular by abolishing the confessional carve-up of the country's political make-up obtained when Lebanon gained independence from France.
Damascus would also demand that Lebanon should abide by the final paragraph of Taif, which states that it should not "be allowed to become a threat to Syria's security . . . by allowing itself to become a passage or base for any force, state or organisation seeking to undermine its security or Syria's security".
The rulers of Syria still have nightmares about Israel's 1982 occupation of Lebanon, the installation of an Israeli-picked president, and the peace treaty Lebanon signed with Israel in 1983 and which was renounced in 1984.
Damascus can also be expected to insist that Lebanon stick to the terms of the 1991 treaty with Syria which provided for co-operation and co-ordination on political, security, cultural, scientific, agricultural, industrial, economic and financial matters. This treaty bound the signatories to pursue a "common destiny" within the Arab world and created a collection of councils and committees to regulate relations between the two countries.
There is concern in both Damascus and Beirut that the opposition movement, led by the Druze feudal chieftain, Walid Jumblatt, is largely made up of members of the Maronite Christian community, which dominated Lebanese affairs until the civil war. Although the opposition draws support from some Druze and Sunnis, conspicuous by their absence are Shias from the country's largest community. The secular Amal movement, led by Nabih Berri, the parliamentary speaker, and the Islamist Hizbullah movement have kept their distance from the opposition. Senior Sunni politicians, like former premier Selim Hoss, have also refrained from taking a stand in the current tense situation, fearing the country could once again descend into conflict.