`Strategic' option lost its charm as reality dawned

The Arabs who fought alongside the US against Iraq in the 1991 Gulf War feel particularly cheated by the collapse of the regional…

The Arabs who fought alongside the US against Iraq in the 1991 Gulf War feel particularly cheated by the collapse of the regional peace process. Washington then promised a comprehensive peace in exchange for their support against Baghdad. The Arab states blame the US for failing to deliver Israel more than they blame Israel itself for an uncompromising stance. If the peace process, launched at Madrid in October 1991, had progressed as the Arabs expected, by now the Palestinians would have had control of 90 per cent of the West Bank and all of the Gaza Strip; Israel and Syria would have reached an agreement over the Golan and Israel would have left Lebanon.

Furthermore, negotiations over the final status of the West Bank, Gaza and Jerusalem, borders, refugees and resources would have reached a point where full agreement would be achieved by the May 1999 deadline.

So far the Palestinians have full control of only 60 per cent of Gaza and 4 per cent of the West Bank and exercise partial control over another 24 per cent of the latter. The hardline Likud government has repudiated arrangements made by its Labour predecessor with Syria over the Golan; negotiations have been frozen for two years. Jordan has signed a peace treaty with the Jewish state, but 80 per cent of Jordanians oppose normal relations because of the lack of progress on the other tracks. Israel has offered a conditional withdrawal from south Lebanon which has been rejected. Yesterday the Jordan Times summed up what all the Arabs are thinking when it editorialised: "Israel obviously wants to keep the best part of occupied Arab lands and at the same time play the game of pretending to seek peace with its neighbours, perhaps indefinitely."

The Arabs are no longer going to play Israel's game. So far most Arab rulers have decided to freeze relations with Israel until it begins to implement "signed agreements" with the Palestinians and resumes talks with Syria. Even such staunch pro-Western rulers as King Hassan of Morocco and the Saudi royals have joined the "new rejectionists". Why? Because the 1991 peace process was quite different from earlier US-led attempts at peacemaking. It was different because the US obtained the support of both sides - wary Arabs and grudging Israelis - before convening the international conference at Madrid.

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Furthermore, Israel committed itself to the "land-for-peace" formula posited by Security Council resolution 242 (calling upon Israel to withdraw from territories occupied in 1967). While the Arabs and Israel were meant to work out their own arrangements through negotiation, Washington had pledged to act as sponsor - even, the Arabs believed, guarantor - of the peace process.

Therefore, the Arabs felt the peace process would not be allowed to fail. On this basis the Arabs, even the highly-suspicious Syrians, chose "the strategic option" of peace. By contrast the Rogers Plan of 1969 and the Reagan Plan of 1982 were US proposals put to the two sides long before they had chosen the peace option, or were prepared to sit down and negotiate. Thus, the now defunct 1991 peace process could have produced a long-lasting, comprehensive settlement in the Middle East. But Israel has made it clear it is not prepared to trade the Palestinian territories and the Golan for peace or to pull out of south Lebanon unconditionally. Faced with deadlock, the Arabs cannot make war on Israel, for Israel is the predominant military power in the region. And the Arab government cannot make peace on Israel's terms - "peace for peace" rather than "territory for peace" - because the Arab people would turn against their rulers if they accepted such a deal. So, the Arabs have only one alternative: to shut out Israel and make common cause against the US to frustrate Washington's political and military ambitions.