THE collapse on Friday February 9th of the 18 month long IRA cessation was a tragic development. It need not have happened. It was not inevitable. The reality is that the potential for a negotiated peace settlement created 18 months ago was not grasped.
It was the absence of an effective political means of bringing about the political changes necessary to remove the causes of conflict and to secure a lasting peace - the inability even to bring the British government and the unionists to the negotiating table - which caused the reoccurrence of conflict.
It is important therefore to revisit the basis on which the IRA cessation was achieved 18 months ago to understand clearly how we can recreate the potential and to ensure that if it is recreated it is acted upon.
The IRA decision to call a complete cessation of its military activity was largely based on the assessment given by the Sinn Fe in leadership and our view that an overall political package had been developed which, if acted upon in good faith, had the potential to bring about the political and constitutional changes necessary to resolve the conflict. In effect, an alternative to the IRA campaign.
Over a period of years an intensive and unprecedented dialogue had been developed within Irish nationalist opinion in its broad sense. It was a dialogue which required courage, imagination and a new approach on all sides, not least on the part of the then Taoiseach, Albert Reynolds, and the SDLP leader John Hume, who, despite intense opposition, turned their backs on the failed policy of isolation and took the risk required in the building of the Irish peace process.
An alternative strategy to bring about political and constitutional change was developed in dialogue, initially between myself and John Hume, and then with the Irish government and with key elements of Irish American opinion. This political approach involved a democratic consensus to deal with the causes of conflict in the context of a number of clearly defined democratic principles.
From Sinn Fe in's perspective these principles are:
a) Peace, to be sustained, must be based on a just and lasting negotiated settlement.
b) Partition has failed.
c) Present structures are therefore inadequate to sustain peace and must be changed.
d) An internal settlement is not a solution.
e) Partition and the British jurisdiction breach the principle of national self determination.
The Irish people as a whole have an absolute right to national self determination and must be able to exercise this right freely and without external impediment.
g) The exercise of the right to national self determination is a matter of agreement between the Irish people alone.
h) It is for the Irish and British governments, in consultation with all parties, to co operate to bring this about in the shortest time possible and to legislate accordingly.
i) The unionists can have no veto over the discussions involved in this, nor over the outcome of these discussions. There is a need to engage Northern unionist and Protestant opinion on the democratic principle of national self determination, assure them of full commitment to their civil and religious rights and to persuade them of the need for their participation in building an Irish society based on equality and national reconciliation.
j) A solution - a negotiated settlement - requires change, political and constitutional. The effect of this change would be to bring about the exercise by the Irish people of our right to national self determination.
k) An agreed unitary and independent Ireland is the option desired by us.
l) An agreed Ireland is only achievable and viable if it can earn and enjoy the allegiance of the different traditions on this island by accommodating diversity and providing national reconciliation.
There were and are, of course, well documented differences of opinion on how a number of these principles are interpreted, or on how they would be applied in practical terms. But notwithstanding these differences there was sufficient commonality of view on these political principles to allow us to move forward.
The Irish Government assured us that it would work in close harmony and consultation with the representatives of the northern nationalist community at all times and it was accepted that in the context of an IRA cessation, through a peace process of consultation and dialogue, we would collectively seek to advance these common positions in any negotiations so as to build a solid and democratic basis for a negotiated peace settlement.
We also agreed on tee need to address a number of areas of immediate and practical concerns of northern nationalists. These would include:
. Equality of opportunity in employment.
. Equality of treatment of Irish culture and identity.
. Equality of treatment of elected representatives.
. Proper security provision for all citizens according to their need.
. Equality in the provision of education, particularly through the medium of Irish.
. Equality of treatment in economic development.
The consensus position was that there could be no return to unionist domination and that there must be parity of esteem, equality of opportunity and equality of treatment for the aspirations, values and identities of both communities, not only at an abstract level but in real immediate and practical terms. These principles would have to apply across the political, cultural, economic, social, legal and security spectrum.
In short, therefore, there was a commitment in the context of a real negotiation to present the British government and the unionists with an agreed Irish democratic agenda. As I have outlined publicly, Sinn Fe in characterised this agenda as:
a) Constitutional change - new political arrangements and structures which would be acceptable to and accommodate all the Irish people.
b) Democratic rights - issues of equality and justice which continue to affect the nationalists in the north.
c) Demilitarisation - involving the removal of the apparatus of war and the release of prisoners, north and south.
A determined approach to these three areas by the breadth of Irish nationalist political opinion, would, it is argued, represent a viable and effective approach to conflict resolution on the Irish side.
Against the background of intensive private dialogue, the British and Irish governments agreed to the text of the Downing Street Declaration. Despite our profound reservations about the overall content of this document and our publicly stated disagreement with many elements of it, the declaration did contain a clear commitment by the British and Irish governments to initiate inclusive dialogue as a means to a new political settlement among the Irish people and furthermore, the British government also gave a commitment that it would encourage, facilitate and enable this agreement. These commitments were repeated frequently over the ensuing nine months.
In May 1994 John Major told a press conference, "There is an opportunity for him (Gerry Adams) to give up violence and then in a short while enter the constitutional talks".
The British government claimed that any response by it to an end of violence would be "imaginative" and "generous" and "flexible". The public commitment by both governments to commence the negotiations which, without preconditions, vetoes or any attempt to predetermine the outcome, would address all relevant issues represented the second element in an overall political package. In the context of a good faith engagement, this contained, in our view, the potential to resolve the conflict on the basis of justice and democracy.
With a clear commitment by all the major political players to pro actively pursue a new, negotiated and democratic political arrangement, and a publicly given commitment by the British government to convene with the Irish government the necessary peace talks to achieve agreement, the Sinn Fein leadership gave an assessment to the IRA leadership of the prospects for a lasting political settlement.
It was on this basis of clearly stated commitments and agreements that the IRA announced a complete cessation of military operations on August 31st, 1994.
The reality, however, of the British response to the IRA's historic decision was very different. In the 18 months following the IRA cessation political movement was glacial. The British attitude was best summed up as minimalist and begrudging.
At the heart of Britain's refusal to engage with the peace process was a fear of constitutional and political change, as well as a resistance to the necessary improvements in democratic rights and the eradication of discrimination and inequality. The peace process contained that potential.
The British government, frightened of fundamental change and wedded to the failed policies of the past, avoided change by not engaging in the process.
The imperative of British policy became the erection of obstacles and the slowing down of the peace process to the point that it was fatally undermined. Patrick Mayhew, in an unguarded moment, admitted John Major was treating the peace process like a bicycle, merely keeping it upright without falling off. Crucial to this British approach was the continued exclusion of Sinn Fein and our electorate. Sinn Fein was to be, and continues to be, treated as a second class party and our electorate as second class citizens.
It was, in fact, December 9th, 1994, over three months after the IRA announcement, before the first meeting took place between Sinn Fein and British officials.
The Sinn Fein delegation welcomed the reopening of bilateral discussions with the British and urged speedy progress into inclusive all party negotiations, without preconditions. Over five meetings we presented the officials with three written papers and raised such confidence building matters as the release of prisoners and the need for a comprehensive demilitarisation.
At the end of that time the British government was still refusing to bring a British government minister into the meeting.
The British then created a bogus argument around the word "demilitarisation", refusing to accept it on agenda for discussions.
This was despite "demilitarisation" having been raised in two of the three papers Sinn Fein presented at the Stormont talks; it was discussed at all of the five meetings and was an item on the agenda of the January 16th meeting.
Then in March Patrick Mayhew introduced as a new precondition to all party talks his government's demand for an IRA surrender of weapons. The prevarication on ministerial meetings continued through March and most of April. The British announced the commencement of ministerial bilateral meetings with all of the parties excerpt Sinn Fein. Meetings with Sinn Fein were kept to officials.
The British government was widely criticised for introducing what was effectively a two tier political process which discriminated against Sinn Fein. It was not until May 10th, more than eight months into the IRA cessation, that the British government agreed to allow a government Minister to meet Sinn Fein.
Two weeks later, on May 24th, the British Secretary of State, Patrick Mayhew, was elbowed, with evident reluctance, into a meeting with me at President Clinton's Economic Conference in Washington. The reluctance of the British to concede this meeting was reflected in the content of this and subsequent meetings, with the British refusing to enter into serious discussions.
On his return from the United States in June, I wrote to Mr Mayhew seeking another meeting. He refused, insisting that there could be "no substantive political talks" unless the IRA surrendered its weapons. The British constantly argued that it was impractical to set a date for all party talks if the unionists wouldn't turn up. The unionist position, reinforced by British backing, was a useful mechanism for the British to hide behind.
Having already stalled the beginning of all party talks for over ten months, the British government had now erected an absolute precondition to further movement in the peace process - the demand for decommissioning.
It is important to remember that the surrender of IRA weapons as a precondition to negotiations was never mentioned by the British government before the IRA cessation. Albert Reynolds, speaking on this issue in August 1995, wrote "This new precondition they (the British) have introduced was not part of the Downing Street Declaration ... This was not a precondition and there is no point in trying to say now that it was. It certainly was not."
While stalling on negotiations, the British approach on other fronts was similarly negative and provocative. The summer of 1995 saw the release of Private Lee Clegg, who served just two years for the murder of a 17 year old girl. Following his release he was not only welcomed back into the British army, but was also promoted. British troop levels remained at their 1994 levels, repressive legislation remained in place and the RUC forced a series of provocative Orange marches through Catholic areas and conditions for Irish political prisoners in England seriously deteriorated.
Sinn Fein warned of the danger to the peace process because of the British government's stalling, tactics. I wrote that "the urgency of the current situation demands that everyone with influence persuade the British government to face up to its responsibility." We were accused of making threats.
With the peace process on the point of collapse, the imminent visit of President Clinton provided the necessary impetus for London and Dublin to agree a twin track approach which would tackle the issue of weapons and prepare the ground for all party talks at the end of February.
Although Sinn Fein had serious reservations about John Major's commitment to this twin track process the party, in meetings with the International Body and with the two governments, engaged in the twin track positively.
On January 16th the Mitchell Report was published. I welcomed it, saying "it provides a basis for moving forward so that all matters can be settled to the satisfaction of all sides as part of the process. . . In other words the Mitchell Report points to a possible avenue into all party talks."
Within hours, John Major had unilaterally dumped the Mitchell Report and had retained the old decommissioning precondition which the report had come down against. He also added a new precondition, that of elections. The date for the commencement of all party talks, promised for the end of February, was abandoned and movement was again stalled by the actions of the British government.
Throughout the 15 months in which John Bruton, as Taoiseach, played a major part in the peace process, his management of the process was at times flawed and at key points his miscalculations allowed the British to seize control of the process and to steadily run it into the sand. On entering office, John Bruton's efforts to appease unionism caused him to declare that there was no nationalist consensus, seriously undermining the basis on which the IRA cessation had been built.
The Taoiseach appeared to see his role as a neutral facilitator or arbiter when the process (and the agreements and commitments made by his predecessor Albert Reynolds) required that he play a leading role.
The desire to be a neutral referee was clearly seen in October of last year when John Bruton refused to meet with John Hume and myself together, saying that a joint meeting at that time could have caused offence to unionists. ,The result of this was to cause much concern to nationalists and republicans and to send out the wrong signals in relation to his position on the peace process.
In the face of an ever present British strategy which attempted to divide Irish nationalist opinion the situation required that Dublin take a firm stand and act in unison. Instead we had a coalition with no coherent strategy and often contradictory stances in relation to the peace process.
In the spring of last year John Bruton was responsible for breathing life into one of the main obstacles created by the British government. Instead of holding the British government to its commitment to begin inclusive all party talks, Mr Bruton called for a gesture on decommissioning, giving much needed credibility to the new British precondition to all party talks. This precondition alone wasted over 14 months of the IRA cessation.
Similarly when Proinsias De Rossa on a visit to Belfast said that elections could play a part in moving the situation forward, the British government once again used Dublin's own words to replace the decommissioning precondition with the election precondition. Despite the united opposition of nationalist opinion, this unionist proposal was subsequently included in the November Communique from both governments, and was finally conceded in the February Communique.
The unfortunate reality is that the failure of the Irish Government to take a leading, planned and coherent approach to the peace process allowed the British government, working blatantly to a unionist agenda, to dominate, control and manipulate the entire process. The result was that the process failed to deliver in terms of nationalist aspirations and therefore suffered a fatal loss of credibility.
The breaking of the commitment to negotiations by the British government undermined one of the two key elements of the peace process which had led to the cessation. The second element, the commitment on the Irish side to a consensus approach to addressing the causes of conflict, was significantly weakened as a result of the collapse of the Reynolds led government and the failure of its successor led by John Bruton to uphold this commitment. Once the basis of the cessation had been removed, through the breaking of nationalist consensus and the reneging on negotiations by the British, the collapse of the peace process became inevitable. No diplomatic offensive emerged and the Dublin Government was perceived to be divided in its approach.
Sinn Fein has approached the proposals in the February Joint Communique positively, as we have done with all other phases of the search for a lasting peace. We are prepared therefore to participate in the consultative talks. I am disappointed, and it is a matter of concern, that this process, which was to be jointly sponsored by the two governments, is excluding Sinn Fein's electorate.
We are being punished, while those who have refused to engage and are boycotting these consultations are being rewarded with their elections. How can anyone have confidence in a process which discriminates against a party which secures 35-40 per, cent of the nationalist vote in the north? How can anyone suggest that this is an inclusive process when we are quite blatantly excluded?
Sinn Fein has many legitimate concerns regarding the process proposed by the two governments in their Joint Communique of February 27th. We had wished to outline these concerns to the two governments so that the peace process could be restored. The two governments have, however, reverted to the failed policies of isolation and discrimination. These did not work in the past, they will not work now.
Inclusive dialogue led by both governments is the only effective conflict resolution approach. The two governments need to show that there is a real and viable peace process in place. Both governments need to engage pro actively in the peace process, and the British government, in particular, needs to provide convincing evidence that they are now prepared to engage, in good faith.
In the aftermath of the February Summit the British have again seized, and have been allowed to retain, control of the process - to set the agenda and to prescribe the terms of the engagement.
The start of all party talks has again been delayed from February, as was promised, to June; the proximity talks proposed by the Irish Government have been reduced to a charade; the precondition of an election has been built into the process despite universal opposition from nationalist opinion; only those elements, of the Mitchell Report which suit the British and unionist positions have been retained while suggestions regarding prisoners, licensed weapons, policing, repressive legislation and plastic bullets have all been dumped.
The Irish government has been excluded from decisions on the elections and on the internal affairs of the Six County state when the peace process was clearly, based on the commitment of the two governments to jointly lead a process to address all issues.
The British government has effectively created a six month vacuum in which it is possible that no substantive negotiations can take place. June marks the beginning of the Orange marching season and the summer recess of the British parliament will follow soon after. By stalling, delaying and attempting to micro manage the peace process John Major has succeeded in downgrading it and in turning the clock back to the old narrow talks about talks process. In doing so he has strangled the hope created in 1993 by the Irish peace process.
Eighteen months ago the IRA acted in good faith to enhance the potential that Irish nationalist opinion had collectively worked to create at that time. The good faith approach by the IRA and their willingness to take risks for peace was misread by the British as a sign of weakness and they used it as an opportunity to destroy the republican struggle.
On the Irish side, some elements of the coalition Government which had inherited the peace process and therefore had not been part of building it, failed to measure up to the new situation. They showed themselves unable to break free from their traditional anti republican mind set and incapable of standing up to the British government in pursuit of a just and lasting settlement.
What is required now to rebuild the peace process is a political package which has the ability to address and resolve the issues which have led to recurring conflict in the past. This involves the honouring of the agreements and commitments which brought about the IRA cessation in 1924. Broad commitments to negotiations, already repeatedly given and in turn repeatedly broken, are clearly not now enough.
What is required are specific, public and unconditional guarantees of:
A firm date for the commencement of all party talks at the earliest possible time; no preconditions to these talks; a fixed time scale for the commencement and conduct of the negotiations; an open agenda with no attempt to predetermine or preclude any outcome; both governments leading the negotiations process; an effective conflict resolution approach to the negotiations on the Irish side and, as part of this, a pro active and evident international and diplomatic strategy to advance these positions supplementary to the negotiations.
In other words, there should be no demands that cannot be delivered, such as decommissioning, no commitment to political formulas which are elevated to political principles before negotiations have even begun, as happened in the Forum on the issue of the unionist veto, and no further false trails into negotiations which have the effect of providing potential or actual stalls and diversions.
The absence of democratic negotiations, despite the commitments given by the two governments prior to the IRA cessation, and since, most notably in the November Communique, led to the collapse of the peace process. The British government must bear the primary responsibility for this but if we are to avoid the mistakes of the past, the Irish Government, which was to have been an equal partner in the search for a lasting settlement, must accept its responsibility for the failure also.
The demand for inclusive negotiations as the means to an agreed peace settlement is hardly an unreasonable one. It is a demand which is shared by the vast majority of people on this island and by the majority of the British people also. The refusal to respond to the democratic imperative of negotiations and the rejection of the popular demand for talks to begin was the rock on which the IRA cessation finally broke.
The basis therefore for rebuilding the IRA cessation and the peace process itself must be the honouring of the commitments which led to the IRA decision 18 months ago. All party talks should now be convened without preconditions, with an open agenda and with an agreed time frame and, in the context of negotiations, an agreed and democratic Irish consensus approach to these negotiations, to ensure that the causes of the conflict are effectively dealt with, needs to be applied.