The risk of reoffending was a factor in the High Court judgment, writes CAROL COULTER, Legal Affairs Editor
IN COMING down on the side of freedom of expression as against an individual’s right to privacy, Ms Justice Mary Irvine took into account Michael Murray’s individual circumstances and the fact that the court had little in terms of “cogent or proper evidence” to suggest he was unlikely to reoffend.
He had failed to provide documentary evidence about his efforts at rehabilitation while in prison or to show he engaged with the probation service since his release. Nor had he produced any medical evidence to suggest he is unlikely to be a risk in the community he lives in, she said.
She also found he had not proved that the behaviour of the newspapers supported his claim of a real risk to his life. He had not suggested, to date, any actual threat had been made to his life.
On the other hand, the publication of the information contributed to public debate on the release of sex offenders and allowed members of the public to adjust their behaviour in the light of their knowledge of his whereabouts, she said.
She contrasted this with a Northern Ireland case in January last year in which Independent Newspapers were prevented from publishing photographs of a man convicted of a sex-related murder of a young woman immediately before his supervised release.
In the High Court in Belfast, Mr Justice Stephens ruled that the publication of unpixelated photographs of Kenneth Callaghan, about to be released after serving 21 years of a life sentence, would disrupt his supervision and support regime and would increase the risk to the public by increasing his risk of reoffending.
Callaghan was 18 when he broke into the home of Carol Jane Gouldie (21) and killed her with a hammer, following the break-up of a lengthy relationship with another young woman, placing a cushion over her head to hide the fact she was not his ex-girlfriend.
The chief psychologist of the Northern Ireland Prison Service gave evidence that successful integration of offenders into the community and the consequent reduction of risk of harm to the public depended heavily on stable accommodation and employment for the offender. Mr Justice Stephens also considered the substantial work that had been done with Callaghan to reduce his risk of reoffending.
As Ms Justice Irvine pointed out, none of this arose in Murray’s case. In addition, Callaghan had committed one, albeit very serious, offence and had no previous history of violence.
Murray committed a number of very serious sexual offences both here and in the UK, and had not produced any evidence of efforts at rehabilitation.
These may emerge when the case comes to a full hearing, but for now the court has ruled the public’s right to know his whereabouts trumps his right to privacy.