"Promixity" model used in Bosnia talks

WASHINGTON was briefed last week about the Dublin suggestion of a conference in Belfast, and could become involved in the proposed…

WASHINGTON was briefed last week about the Dublin suggestion of a conference in Belfast, and could become involved in the proposed forum if requested by the two governments.

"We would consider a request if and when we received one to participate," a White House spokesman said yesterday.

Asked for the US administration's reaction, he said: "We believe all proposals for getting to all party talks should be seriously discussed and considered".

The Tanaiste is expected to seek backing for the idea from President Clinton and his deputy assistant for National Security Affairs, Ms Nancy Soderberg, when they meet in the White House today.

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Mr Anthony Lake, Mr Clinton's National Security Adviser, who is in charge of the administration's Northern Ireland policy is in South Korea.

The principle of "proximity talks" in the same building, as suggested by Mr Spring, was successfully used at Dayton where the Bosnia peace talks were conducted, and involved three leaders who refused to sit down together. Presidents Franjo Tudiman of Croatia, Alija Izetbegovic of Bosnia Herzagovina and Slobodan Milosevic of Serbia, occupied separate buildings.

There the comparison ends, however. The Bosnia peace conference was called by the US, whereas Washington expects any conference in Belfast to be convened by the two governments. It was also aimed at ending the civil war and reaching a settlement, not just at getting over a difficulty in the peace process.

US envoy Mr Richard Holbrooke led a team of American negotiators which shuttled from one delegation to another until they were near agreement.

The talks began on November 1st, 1995, with a deadline for agreement of November 20th, which came and went. Some frantic last minute interventions by Mr Holbrooke and US Secretary of State, Mr Warren Christopher, secured a breakthrough.

The parties then met together in one room on November 21st to sign a peace accord which none could have agreed to unilaterally.

Mr Izetbegovic had to give up the dream of maintaining an undivided, multi ethnic state. Mr Milosevic had to commit the Bosnia Serbs to forgo their goal of uniting their territory with Serbia, and Mr Tudjman had to undertake not to annex Croat dominated territory.