New light has been shed on the Arms Crisis by the release of State papers from 1970.
Top-secret military intelligence documents made available under the 30-year rule officially confirm for the first time that the government had a contingency plan to cope with a so-called Doomsday situation in Northern Ireland in which nationalists were in imminent danger of being massacred.
The documents show that 500 rifles and 80,000 rounds of ammunition were moved to the Border in case such a situation arose.
The documents are the first official public acknowledgement that a directive was issued to the Defence Forces to prepare for an incursion across the Border in an emergency.
Details are also given of a hitherto unpublicised meeting between the Chief-of-Staff, Lieut-Gen Sean McKeown, and the minister for defence, Mr James Gibbons, where the Army sought clarification of the circumstances where an incursion might be necessary.
The papers also indicate that the Government did not intend to make diplomatic representations to the British prior to such an incursion; that Northern delegations seeking assistance from Dublin had not been informed of the directive; and that the Chief-of-Staff was told to be prepared to discuss estimates for his requirements with the minister for finance, Mr Charles Haughey.
The most revealing of the documents is a military intelligence brief for the Chief-of-Staff, an McKeown, dated June 5th, 1970, and prepared under the director of intelligence, Col Patrick J. Delaney. The paper laments the lack of clear-cut Government instructions on defence policy which, it continues, "has created a considerable degree of uncertainty and frustration within the Defence Forces".
It is clear from this document that the Army, already in a low state of combat readiness, was ill-prepared for the outbreak of violence in the North. "The events since August 1969 have only served to confirm the lack of combat effectivity . . . when it became necessary to form adhoc groups hastily drawn together and made up of personnel from administrative, technical and training staffs to provide sufficient numbers to protect and support the refugee centres and field hospitals." This refers to the facilities made available to nationalists fleeing across the Border from loyalist pogroms.
Despite this lack of readiness, the document reveals that on February 6th, 1970, Mr Gibbons conveyed a Cabinet instruction "to prepare and train the Army for incursions into Northern Ireland if and when such a course became necessary and to have respirators and arms and ammunition made ready in the event that it would be necessary for the minority to protect themselves".
When the Chief-of-Staff informed the Minister of critical deficiencies in "manpower; armoured fighting vehicles; transport", the document continues: "The Minister instructed the Chief-of-Staff to hold himself in readiness to discuss estimates with Mr Haughey on his release from hospital." At this time the finance minister was recovering from injuries reported to have been sustained in a fall from a horse.
Significantly, the papers reveal that "a military study of the directive" was undertaken and the Chief-of-Staff sought a meeting with the minister for defence a week later, on February 13th, to seek clarification on various aspects.
These are documented in the June 5th military intelligence briefing, along with the minister's responses, and they include the following:
Query: "The military assume that incursions would only be mounted in circumstances where there would be a complete breakdown in law and order in N. Ireland and where the security forces were unable or unwilling to protect the minority."
Response: "The Minister confirmed that such a situation was what was envisaged."
Query: "The military assume that the sole object of incursions would be the protection of the lives and property of the minority."
Response: "The Minister confirmed that such was envisaged."
Query: "The military requested information regarding the Government's intention to make diplomatic representations before incursions would be mounted."
Response (marked N.B. in the document): "The Minister did not consider that such representations would be made."
Query: "With regard to the arms, ammunition and respirators (a) How many are to be made available? (b) To whom and in what circumstances are they to be handed over?"
Response: "The Minister had no idea but agreed that stockpiles were to be held in Dublin and Athlone."
Mr Gibbons indicated that a state of emergency would be declared in a Doomsday situation but gave no reply to a question about the possibility of compulsory military service. He also indicated that Northern delegations, which had been seeking arms and other forms of support from the Government since the previous August, had not been informed of the Doomsday directive.
The scope of the Government's response was indicated in his response to a query about whether the Panhard armoured cars would be withdrawn from service with Irish UN troops in Cyprus. "The Government does not approve of their withdrawal." But he added that the minister for finance was "likely" to sanction an increase in the permitted strength of the Permanent Defence Forces beyond 7,500.
Four days later, the following items were assembled in Dublin and Athlone: 500 rifles, 200 Gustaf machine-guns, 3,000 respirators, 80,000 rounds of .303 ammunition and 99,000 rounds of 9 mm ammunition.
The June 5th military intelligence document continues that on April 2nd, the minister phoned the Chief-of-Staff from Naas, Co Kildare. "He indicated that he had received information from Mr [Neil] Blaney that attacks on the minority were planned and that British security forces would be withdrawn and accordingly would not afford protection for the minority. The Minister felt that material stored in Dublin should be moved forward." The Blaney phone call clearly referred to disturbances taking place in the Ballymurphy district of Belfast at the time.
That night, 500 rifles, 3,000 respirators and 80,000 rounds of ammunition were stored in Dundalk military barracks. However, the document continues: "Military Intelligence subsequently ascertained that the information given to the Minister regarding reported attacks on the minority and the withdrawal of British security forces were without foundation."
On April 3rd, the British army announced that 500 extra troops were being brought into the North. On April 4th, the document states that 350 rifles were returned to Dublin "because of storage problems in Dundalk". The document concludes: "Following Intelligence reports of the possibility of a raid by a subversive organisation on Dundalk military barracks, the balance of 150 rifles and 80,000 rounds of ammunition stored in Dundalk were returned to stores in Dublin on Friday, May 1st, 1970." [The request from Mr Gibbons to move the arms and ammunition to Dundalk had been countermanded by the Taoiseach, Mr Lynch.]
The release of the documents comes as a surprise to some observers given the frank nature of some of the revelations. An undated Military Intelligence commentary on the material has also been released which appears to have been compiled as advisory material at the time of the Arms Trials. It states: "It should never be revealed that incursions were to be made into Northern Ireland in defiance of the UNITED NATIONS Charter, in contravention of international codes of behaviour, and without having at first notified the friendly power and having gone through the normal diplomatic procedure to be expected from a nation with a good and respected role in peace keeping throughout the world."