Clausewitz put it simply. War is nothing but the continuation of politics by other means. But the political objectives must be clear before you let loose the dogs or, in the case of the current war in Afghanistan, launch the aircraft and start the bombing.
Get bin Laden was the primary objective. Since the Taliban refused to surrender him they would bring a war on their heads and so the US attacked. But was/is there a coherent strategy?
The commencement of air strikes three weeks ago followed a standard US formula as a prelude to ground operations:
Suppress the enemy's air defences. Take out his air force and degrade his airfields. Hit his training, communications and logistics bases. Destroy his military and industrial support. Attack his supply lines and harass his ground troops.
However, considering the low level of technology and almost non-existent infrastructure, this was a relatively easy task. It was reported at the end of the first week of air strikes that there were few worthwhile targets left to strike. So what was happening?
At the outset it appeared that the Northern Alliance were to be key players in this war and that they were to supply the ground troops which, along with US air support, would defeat the Taliban.
The taking of the two key cities of Mazar-i-Sharif in the north and the capital Kabul would signal a turning of the tide. It would cause sufficient defections to the perceived likely victors that the Taliban would find their position untenable. So they would sue for peace and negotiate a place in a broad-based ethnically representative government. The terrorists, if not bin Laden himself, would then be rooted out.
Both of these objectives would have required close air-to-ground support to Northern Alliance ground troops. This is time-critical as the tide of battle ebbs and flows. It requires a response in minutes as opposed to hours and can only happen if air support is based locally, i.e. in southern Uzbekistan to support attacks against Mazar, and in Pakistan to support attacks against Taliban forces north of Kabul. In the event, the only aircraft available were carrier-based strike aircraft from naval battle groups in the Arabian Sea and long-range land-based bombers. These are not suited to supporting ground troops directly.
The second week of the bombing marked a shift in policy. The United Nations Mission To Afghanistan knows from long experience that outside interference was/is the main obstacle to a peace solution and that Pakistan holds the key to any settlement in Afghanistan.
Pakistan, the Taliban's main sponsor, not surprisingly is reported to be adamant that the Russian, Iranian and Indian supported Northern Alliance will not replace the Taliban in Kabul and has demanded that it not be assisted in taking the capital in exchange for its continued co-operation.
Thus the US shift in policy to an aggressive air campaign against the Taliban is an apparent attempt to break their will to resist and thus defeat them without the need for their own ground troops nor those of the Northern Alliance. The Alliance will undoubtedly benefit from this as a result, but has expressed its dissatisfaction through its foreign minister Dr Abdullah Abdullah with the lack of direct air-to-ground support. Although it might help to defeat the Taliban, it may feel less than partners in the conflict. The use of bombing against well dug-in light infantry, such as the Taliban army, has never been effective.
It didn't work in Vietnam against a similarly structured army and society. Bombing them in urban areas where they have taken cover is only bringing more hardship, misery and indeed casualties on the civilian population and is counter productive. It will alienate the Afghans against the US.
The Taliban cannot survive without Pakistan. There is credible evidence that it has supplied it with equipment, arms and technical back-up as well as permitting thousands of Taliban from its thousands of Madrassas (religious schools) to cross into Afghanistan and fill the ranks of the Taliban. army.
This is unlikely to stop in spite of the limited assistance that Pakistan is forced to give the US. It must be remembered that General Musharraf and the Federal Government's control is weak, if almost non-existent, in the tribal areas of the N W Frontier Province and Baluchistan. Many unlicensed weapons and ammunition factories exist in the province.
This area is where the Taliban get their main support and, as in the war against the Soviet Union, it was this area that nourished and supported the mujahideen. With covert support and finance from fundamentalist groups throughout the Islamic world, the Taliban could remain a force to be reckoned with for some time to come.
The US was aware, as is evident from annual State Department reports - "Patterns of Global Terrorism" - that international terrorism was/is based in Afghanistan with Pakistan's quiescent if not passive support. It was prepared to live with this as a major irritant until September 11th.
It then had to act but it may have to go further than it first intended. That may mean directly confronting Pakistan.
It is a prospect not to be welcomed, as apart from its paranoia about India and its nuclear capability, it could widen the conflict to the rest of the Islamic world. Exactly what Bin Laden would like.
Capt Peadar McElhinney retired from the naval service in 1999 after 40 years service. He served as senior military adviser to the UN Special Mission to Afghanistan in 1997-98