The People's Democracy march from Belfast to Derry and the furious assault on it by loyalists at Burntollet on January 4th, 1969, shattered all prospects of an early resolution of Northern Ireland's problems.
The immediate reaction of the unionist government was to place the blame on the marchers. The North's Prime Minister, Capt Terence O'Neill, described them as "mere hooligans" in a confused and ill-considered broadcast on Sunday, January 5th, 1969.
At the Stormont cabinet meeting the following day, ministers were in a gung-ho mood, eager to apply traditional remedies, including "more stringent penalties, clearer powers to deal with counter-demonstrations, and effective sanctions against those who participated in banned processions".
The RUC "would have to be further supplemented both by the mobilisation of Special Constables [part-time policemen recruited from unionist backgrounds and seen as a paramilitary Protestant force] and by a more extensive use of non-mobilised Specials on a patrol basis."
Basil Kelly, the attorney general, was alone in reminding his colleagues that the marchers were not the sole offenders and he "considered it unfortunate that summonses had not been issued at the earliest opportunity against those who, in impeding the march, had clearly been guilty of unlawful assembly and probably of other offences also".
It was not long, however, before O'Neill took a wider view of the situation. He became convinced that his government would have to take decisive action to prevent the complete alienation of the Catholic minority. Most of his colleagues felt an internal inquiry into the immediate causes of recent disorders would be adequate and put their faith in tough security measures. O'Neill set out to convince them otherwise.
He had received a letter from leading Protestant clergy in the Irish Council of Churches asking him "to institute a judicial public inquiry into all the events and decisions which surround the present controversy".
This was the lever he needed. On January 14th, O'Neill prepared a memorandum to his cabinet colleagues:
"I do not think we should delude ourselves that so-called `firm government' through the exercise of police power will provide any satisfactory answer to the problem," he began, and argued strenuously for an independent and wide-ranging public inquiry.
"What have we to lose by such an inquiry? As things stand it is all too widely accepted throughout the United Kingdom that a sectarian government, directing a partisan police force, is confronting a movement of idealists."
He pleaded for acceptance of universal suffrage in local government. "As I see it, stubborn political resistance to a change which is in any case inevitable is causing Northern Ireland immense damage."
Then follows a passionate appeal to his colleagues:
"But our loss of prestige, authority and standing since October 5th has already been catastrophic, and in my view the most cold-blooded appraisal of the situation shows that in resisting this molehill of reform we are allowing a mountain to fall upon us."
His memorandum was the main agenda item at the cabinet meeting on January 15th. Brian Faulkner, minister of commerce, vigorously resisted O'Neill's proposals. This step, in his view, "would be regarded as an abdication by the government of responsibilities which were properly its own . . . A commission could too easily develop into a fundamental far-reaching and potentially highly-embarrassing inquest into every aspect of Northern Ireland's affairs".
Faulkner was supported by William Morgan, the minister of health and social services, but O'Neill got a majority decision for his commission under the chairmanship of Lord Cameron, a Scottish judge.
Thwarted, Faulkner and Morgan resigned nine days later and on February 3th, 12 unionist MPs met at Portadown to call for O'Neill's resignation. Appealing over the heads of his critics, O'Neill called a general election for February 24th. Of the 39 unionist MPs elected, 27 were pro-O'Neill but he won neither an overwhelming mandate for his reform programme nor clear evidence of widespread Catholic support.
As Northern Ireland became more destabilised by demonstrations, counter-demonstrations, riots and explosions, O'Neill's position became ever more untenable. On April 28th he resigned and was replaced by his cousin, Maj James Chichester-Clark, a surprise compromise candidate.
The new prime minister bought himself some time by announcing an amnesty on May 6th. Soon after, however, there was intense rioting in Hooker Street and trouble spread as the marching season approached. On July 12th and after there was protracted rioting along sensitive frontier zones in Derry, Dungiven and particularly in Belfast. The RUC, then numbering only 3,200 for the whole region, was at full stretch.
As early as August 3rd, the Northern Ireland government approached the London government about the use of regular troops.
Chichester-Clark submitted notes to his colleagues on phone calls he had with James Callaghan, the British home secretary. Callaghan did not hesitate to warn him that putting soldiers on the streets for any length of time would mean the suspension of Stormont and the imposition of direct rule, a warning certainly not made public at the time.
Harold Black also submitted his notes to the cabinet on his conversations with Sir Philip Allen and other senior civil servants in London between August 3rd and 6th. He was also warned that a decision to send in the troops would "be committing the United Kingdom to take over the government of Northern Ireland".
Black responded: "To all this I felt it necessary to express my astonishment that such penal consequences would be in contemplation . . . There would first of all be a frightening reaction by the Protestant community which would make anything that had happened up to now seem like child's play; a provisional government might be set up with extreme elements at its head and it was highly probable that wholesale sectarian strife would break out not only in the streets but in the factories . . . the suspension of a democratically-elected government would lead to a major constitutional convulsion and the repercussions in terms of violence and civil strife would be very grave indeed."
The North's cabinet agreed on August 13th "that no contingency planning on a basis of surrender of law and order would be acceptable in political terms". The threat of direct rule receded for the time being but much of the previous warmth between Belfast and London had dissipated.
Faulkner had rejoined the government in May as minister of development but there was nothing he could do now to halt the juggernaut of the Cameron Commission. The report in September, which described the Stormont government as "hidebound" and "complacent", was greeted with resignation rather than anger in cabinet. Ministers were much more alarmed by the advent of the Hunt report on policing.
When the draft report was made available to the cabinet on October 6th, Faulkner led the charge. "The minister of development reserved judgment on acceptance of any proposal for `disbanding' the Ulster Special Constabulary [B Specials] as this might involve a breach of faith." Lord Hunt was persuaded to drop the word "disband" but Callaghan refused to agree to other changes proposed by the Northern Ireland government.
The cabinet actually met three times in one day, October 7th, in a vain attempt to get the home secretary to accept alterations.
Certainly for activists on the Shankill Road the publication of the Hunt report on October 10th was too much. The following evening about 3,000 loyalists advanced towards Unity Flats and fired on police attempting to halt them, mortally wounding Const Victor Arbuckle. The 3rd Battalion of the Light Infantry moved in and killed two rioters.
Meanwhile, the cabinet was unaware that as 1969 was drawing to a close a far more formidable opponent, the Provisional IRA, was in the process of formation. For those joining the new republican movement the Hunt report was a mere tinkering and its activists would do much to ensure that "serious unrest and disturbances" would become a long war.
Dr Jonathan Bardon is the author of A History of Ulster
A longer version of this article can be found on The Irish Times website at www.ireland.com