ANALYSIS: Night-vision equipment is certain to play a crucial role if American and British forces invade Iraq, writes Tom Clonan.
As President Bush and Tony Blair continue to rally support for a war in Iraq, military planners are painfully aware of the passage of time.
The optimum opportunity for an assault on Iraq lies in March. To delay an invasion into April or May would expose troops and equipment to daytime temperatures of up to 40 degrees. In the heat and dust of summer in Iraq, the combat performance of both soldiers and armour would degrade rapidly.
The burden of fighting in such temperatures is underlined by the enormous quantity of equipment carried into battle by US troops. In addition to the standard issue kevlar helmet and personal weapon, each soldier is equipped with heavy body armour, ammunition, radios, a nuclear, chemical and biological warfare suit (NBC suit) and gas mask or respirator.
All of this kit is carried on the person in what is termed the modular lightweight load-bearing equipment (Molle) system. Using the Molle system, US troops will carry anything from 20 kg to 50 kg of equipment into battle.
Given the crucial role that infantry will play in any likely invasion, US military commanders are conscious of the likely complicating factors of heat exhaustion, heat stroke and dehydration.
A solution to this problem would be to conduct combat operations at night. With temperatures falling to about 20 degrees, US and British troops would be able to engage in urban warfare in more favourable conditions.
The conduct of night operations would also have a profound psychological effect on the Iraqi military who are ill-equipped to fight in darkness. The US military in particular have made significant investments in recent years into the equipment and training necessary for night-fighting.
Each US marine deployed to the Gulf is equipped with state-of- the-art night vision goggles. Costing $4,500 each, these sophisticated hands-free goggles provide the soldier with a three dimensional field of vision in total darkness. The standard-issue AN/PVS 14 goggles provide up to 30 hours of high quality night sight with acuity approaching 20/20 vision.
In addition, standard US infantry weapons including the M16 rifle, M249 machine gun and M60 machine gun are fitted with AN/PAQ night sights. With intensive training and the acquisition of such technology, the US military is currently the only army capable of large-scale and integrated ground combat at night.
Saddam's military, currently deployed in cities and preparing for urban combat, will rely on low-tech and outdated illumination rounds and flares for night vision. In short, their ability to defend at night would be negligible.
US and British tactics evolved for night-fighting in an urban environment involve an aggressive and high-tempo advance to contact posture. The initiative in such offensives is achieved and maintained through the maximum use of force and the maximum exploitation of fire-power.
Infantry, supported by tanks and helicopters carry out a concentrated wave of attacks designed to clear buildings of enemy troops and secure strong points to support the advance.
Buildings are cleared of enemy using grenades, rockets and intensive small arms fire. Often, the leading elements of the attack or point units will carry out "reconnaissance by fire". This would involve probing the cellars, rooms and rooftops of buildings with automatic gunfire and grenades to suppress or neutralise potential enemy positions.
Following a period of intense aerial bombardment, these vigorous shock tactics are designed to traumatise enemy troops and rob them of the motivation to fight. In such a scenario, given the likelihood that Saddam will not permit the evacuation of civilians from cities such as Basra or Baghdad, the scale and potential for casualties is difficult to contemplate.
In such a conflict, despite the advantages enjoyed by the US and British in terms of air support, firepower and technology, the decisive factor in battle will be the performance of infantry on the ground.
In such a scenario, Saddam may be tempted to deploy chemical or biological weapons in the close confines of cities. This would bring with it the prospect of US troops being forced to don NBC suits and to fight against a backdrop of an unfolding humanitarian disaster.
Whatever the tactics employed on either side, the decisive phase of a potential war in the Gulf may well prove a difficult and costly exercise in the cities such as Basra and Baghdad.
Tom Clonan is a retired Army officer with experience in the Middle East and former Yugoslavia. He is a fellow of the US-based Inter University Seminar on Armed Forces and Society. He currently lectures in the school of media at DIT.