THE British government's response to the collapse of the IRA ceasefire remains east in confusion and disarray.
The sense of shock and disbelief was palpable throughout Whitehall on Friday night as news broke of the Docklands bomb attack which miraculously claimed only two lives. Ministers and officials doggedly hoped for the best while fearing the worst. There was a conspicuous, and wholly proper, reluctance to make early judgments.
The IRA statement had not been authenticated at that stage. The bombing might have been the work of a breakaway faction. The implications for Mr Gerry Adams's leadership were not immediately clear. And his request for urgent talks was under consideration.
Contrary to widespread media reports, that remained the official position yesterday as ministers and their security and intelligence advisers met last night to consider the awful reality - that the IRA has resumed the "war" and that the Sinn Fein leadership was either complicitous in that decision, or, alternatively, rendered redundant by it.
Just as Sir Patrick Mayhew had ruled nothing out on Friday night, so the Prime Minister, Mr Major, left the door slightly ajar with his second statement on Saturday afternoon. Vowing that the IRA would not be allowed to prevail, Mr Major declared: "The IRA and Sinn Fein must say now that their campaign of violence has stopped, and they will never resume it."
In the first sign of co ordination between the two deeply divided governments, Mr Major's words were echoed by the Taoiseach after a five hour Cabinet meeting in Dublin.
But it was Mr Bruton who provided the clarity. Where Mr Major had failed to specifically rule out any further meetings with Sinn Fein, Mr Bruton angrily slammed the door shut.
His Government would not be in a position to grant Sinn Fein's request without a prior cessation of violence.
Sinn Fein leaders like Mr Mitchel McLaughlin made it clear yesterday that they would not be obliging Mr Bruton; demanding instead the reconstruction of the "nationalist consensus" which appears now confined to Mr Adams and Mr John Hume.
The SDLP leader is expected to see Mr Major at Downing Street later today. But his rehearsal of the mantra demanding all party talks will cut still less ice with the Prime Minister. And Mr Major is unlikely to rescue Sinn Fein from the isolation already imposed by the Irish Government.
If that position had not been clarified inside No 10 yesterday, it was transparently obvious to the Conservative MP, Mr Nick Budgen. "I don't see how we can continue to deal with Sinn Fein," he declared.
"Because we've partially given up our exclusive responsibility for Northern Ireland and we've made the Irish Republic's Government a partner in this matter, if the Republic is not prepared to deal with Sinn Fein, I don't see how we can."
That opinion was shared by Mr David Wilshire MP, vice chairman of the Conservative backbench Northern Ireland Committee.
With customary directness he spelt out the view likely to be widespread on the Commons benches this afternoon: "There are now no ifs and no buts, the IRA did it. We must now know if Mr Adams is or is not a spokesman for the IRA.
"If he didn't know about it, he is washed up. If he is wanting to discuss with the government what the IRA is intending, we are back to dealing with terrorists.
This is potentially perilous ground for Mr Major at the start of an already hazardous week. One effect of his relationship with Sir James "Molyneaux, the former Ulster Unionist leader, was to defuse potential rebellion in Tory ranks over Northern Ireland.
But Sir James's successor, Mr David Trimble, will not hesitate to exploit latent Conservative fears about the direction of Mr Major's policy.
And there could be a troubling coincidence of two unrelated issues, should Tory MPs deem Mr Major to "botch" his response to the Scott report on the "arms for Iraq" scandal to be published on Thursday.
For the moment, only a few "Thatcherite" commentators seem disposed to criticise Mr Major's handling of the peace process, or to place the issue in the context of continuing grumblings about his leadership.
However, the political climate is highly volatile. And Mr Major is unlikely to take any course which would provoke unease on his back benches or among the Ulster Unionists, whose general support may yet, prove crucial as the government's Commons majority continues to erode.
The indications to date, most notably from Sir Patrick, are that the government will want to press the case for an elected body or elective process in the North.
But the scale of London Dublin disagreement about that was laid bare yesterday, "when the Taoiseach said it "would amount to pouring petrol on the flames. Moreover, the original argument in its favour - that it was the only way to enable all parties, including Sinn Fein, to gather round the same table - now looks highly questionable.
Even before Friday's bomb, Mr Trimble had refused to commit himself to direct progression from elections to substantive negotiations. On Saturday, admittedly with a certain lack of clarity, he invoked the concept of a local government type of declaration of nonviolence.
And there can be little doubt that, citing Friday's events as justification, the unionists would first require Sinn Fein's endorsement of the Mitchell report's "six principles" and firm commitments in terms of the principle, process and timing of "decommissioning".
Indeed, far from anticipating talks with the republican leadership, Mr Trimble departed for Washington contemplating Sinn Fein's restoration to "pariah status".
If doubt, confusion and apprehension have marked the initial response of the British government, it is little wonder. Mr Trimble now competes with Mr Hume in the language of moderation and reasonableness - but the North's two principal parties each appear as determined as ever only to settle on their own terms.
The Anglo Irish inter governmental relationship should be the engine to drive at least the "constitutional" parties forward in the search for a new dispensation.
That, indeed, would seem to be the imperative, if the IRA is to be persuaded that its return to violence can only be self defeating. But, at this writing, neither Mr Major nor Mr Bruton appears ready to hold an emergency summit meeting. However real the differences and intractable the problems, they can not afford to delay much longer.