An absence of policy and firm political direction on Northern Ireland in 1969 facilitated the cabinet divisions which eventually led to the sacking of Mr Charles Haughey and Mr Neil Blaney from government and the arms trial.
State papers on government policy on partition between September 1968 and December 1969, released belatedly under the 30-year rule, threw little light on these divisions but showed how utterly unprepared the government was for the convulsions which shook the North.
Relations with the British government were then cool and Northern Ireland was regarded as "an internal UK matter".
When the Taoiseach, Mr Jack Lynch, advised the British prime minister, Mr Harold Wilson, at a meeting in London in November 1968 that partition was the root cause of the growing unrest, he was told that "banging the drum" would only make conditions worse and would do little to help Catholics whose problems he (Mr Wilson) recognised.
In May 1969 Mr Edward Heath, then leader of the Conservative Party, told the minister for external affairs, Dr Patrick Hillery, "in a hectoring tone" at a function in London, that making representations to the UN about the situation in Northern Ireland was unwarranted. The Conservative Party would form the next British government, he said, and this initiative was placing relations between "Eire" and the British government in jeopardy.
He said interfering in the UK's internal affairs could "damage Anglo-Irish relations in the economic sphere". And in a clearly intended threat, he said Conservatives were already unhappy about aspects of the Anglo-Irish Free Trade Agreement.
As tensions built in the North, Dr Hillery returned to London on August 1st to warn the British government about the prospects for further violence. He was particularly concerned about the Apprentice Boys parade in Derry on August 12th as extreme unionists had stepped up the scale of the demonstration.
He described Derry as "a powder keg" and asked that the parade by banned or rerouted. He also recommended that the B Specials not be allowed to participate in the arrangements.
He was advised coldly that the parade was "a question for the judgment of the Northern Ireland government".
When violence convulsed the North after the parade, the cabinet held two emergency meetings on August 13th. It directed that the British government be contacted to ensure "an immediate end to attacks on the people of Derry". The British government was also requested to seek the urgent dispatch of a UN peacekeeping force to the North. Irish Army field hospitals were also set up along the Border to deal with casualties and refugees.
At the same time, the seeds of the "arms trial" were sown when the minister for finance, Mr Haughey, was authorised to establish a fund to deal with the relief of distress and the consequences of violence in the North. Money from this fund, which was to have been largely channelled through the Red Cross, figured in the plot to import arms in April 1970.
A decision not formally recorded in the cabinet minutes involved the establishment of a sub-committee on the North. Members were Mr Haughey, Mr Blaney, Mr Padraig Faulkner and Mr Joe Brennan. They were "to consult together with a view to selecting one or more persons to endeavour to promote a united, cohesive force of anti-unionist and anti-partition in the Six Counties".
A cabinet memo by the Tanaiste, Mr Erskine Childers, dated August 26th, reflected concern at the lack of political direction and preparation. He wrote that, going back to the 1930s, "all parties in the South subscribe to a policy envisaging an all-Ireland parliament, plus a local parliament in the North without discrimination, as an initial solution.
"If the [Irish] government was to `revive nationalism in the North' it was absolutely essential to have a 32-county economic and financial policy." And if a publicity campaign was to succeed "we must have a policy for ending partition - a method of approach, a policy of implementation. We have none at the moment.
"How do we revamp the former programme:
(a) all-Ireland parliament?
(b) local parliament with end to discrimination?
(c) Constitutional changes required to safeguard minority Northern interests? Awkward problems like divorce.
(d) One problem not of our devising - the Ne Temere decree - but we can do nothing about this.
"We cannot negotiate solely with the British. The original need remains to get consent, even grudging consent, from the unionist majority . . .
"There is a case for considering a new form of policy . . . Everything I have said presumes a tough control of the new IRA. Their incursion will spell disaster. The IRA can only destroy any reputation we have and discourage unity in the Six Counties.
"I have no sovereign remedy in an appallingly difficult situation. But I do agree with members of the government who, months ago, asked for a rethinking of our unity policy," the memo said.
On September 4th Mr Childers referred to a "new unity programme" which could go ahead on the basis that civil rights had been granted in the North. It was a "no force" policy and would involve a diplomatic and publicity campaign lasting 10-15 years. Recognition of a Northern government would have to be examined in the context of the Constitution.
Also in September, Mr Haughey wrote to Mr Lynch suggesting the secretaries of all government departments should be asked to compile dossiers of the practical problems which would have to be solved to evolve a new relationship between North and South.
The studies should be paralleled by an examination of the possibilities for a new constitutional relationship. He suggested such work would best be carried out by the attorney general.
Later, in the context of improving relations between North and South, Mr Lynch opened a public campaign to remove Article 44, which reflected the special position of the Catholic Church, from the Constitution.
An External Affairs memo dealing with the prospects for radical change in relation to Northern Ireland, and dated November 1969, stated:
"There will be no `Irish problem' at Westminster unless there is trouble of some sort in the Six Counties or unless there is direct rule from Westminster. There will be no pressure on the British government unless they have an `Irish problem' to face at home, because of a revulsion of public opinion at the attitudes or actions of the Stormont government or because of serious strife in the Six Counties.
"With a Labour government in office at Westminster, there is no short-term reason for the government in Dublin to take any action to prevent a collapse of the Stormont government . . . although the public line should be against direct rule," it said.
In December 1969 Mr Blaney made a speech identifying the ending of partition as the greatest priority. He said force could not be ruled out in all circumstances.
When the British authorities formally raised the issue with Dr Hillery, he replied that Mr Blaney had not reflected government policy, which favoured co-operation and a peaceful resolution of problems.