Was it true, the journalist asked Tony Blair, that he had received a standing ovation from his fellow summiteers at Portschach in Austria after his speech on the Union's external security?
Mr Blair's perpetual smile widened. "Far be it from me," he laughed, "not to claim every standing ovation that I do get." But he drew the line at claiming those which hadn't happened. Nevertheless, his speech, he insisted, had been very well received.
Why? "Because people want to see Britain engaged with Europe," he said revealingly.
Not, please note, because they thought what he had to say was wonderful. Perhaps they did, but Mr Blair's preoccupation was clearly with a message that said Britain does believe in European integration and has a contribution to make to it.
Yet the origins of the Big Defence Idea apart, what Mr Blair had to say does mark a very significant shift in British strategic thinking and raises interesting possibilities that may expose Ireland's neutrality to serious scrutiny once again.
Britain's resolute opposition at Amsterdam to the further development of a European defence dimension, seen as a threat to the transatlantic relationship, provided important cover for the neutrals' opposition to full integration of the Western European Union into the EU.
Mr Blair, who had been asked by the Austrians to launch a debate at the summit on the future of the Union's external security, started by insisting that Europe must develop the capability to stand on its own two feet militarily when the US is reluctant to act.
Kosovo had shown the EU up as "dithering and disunited," he told fellow leaders.
A new defence role for the Union would have to be consistent with NATO's role as the central pillar of European defence and could not involve a European standing army - but, that said, Europe could and should develop its capacity to act on its own, he said.
Although he did not develop the Big Defence Idea, recent leaks suggest the favoured British institutional option to put it into practice would involve the abolition of the cumbersome WEU and the transfer of its political role to the EU in a new fourth pillar, while its operational role would go to NATO.
The idea raises many questions, not least of which is whether the US military will take kindly to the evolving of NATO structures that are not under its direct control.
The Taoiseach, Mr Ahern, pointed out plaintively that the Amsterdam Treaty had yet to be ratified. Was it not better to wait until its provisions were tested before launching another project?
Yet Mr Blair's point stands. Even when the Amsterdam provisions are in place, and without extending the scope for common action beyond peacekeeping/ peace-enforcement, the EU's ability to intervene in conflicts on its doorstep like Kosovo is still limited by the need to borrow US assets and to work through the cumbersome structures of the WEU.
Where Amsterdam should indeed make a difference is through the provisions of the clause on "constructive abstention" under which member-states can register their unwillingness to participate in an operation without pressing the "nuclear" button of the veto.
In the Kosovo case, arguably, a rerun under the new rules could have allowed the EU to play the lead role in threatening President Slobodan Milosevic if Greece and others had been willing not to obstruct a majority.
Meanwhile, the capitulation of Mr Milosevic ahead of military action has spared Ireland the embarrassment of having to explain its position on whether specific sanction from the UN Security Council for military action was required.
With explicit sanction ruled out because of the inevitability of a Russian or Chinese veto, the credibility of the threat to the Serbs depended on the belief that NATO would go ahead without it.
That was a bitter pill for some NATO members, notably the Greens in the new German coalition, to swallow, but they did.
Ireland's position was to move from a categorical statement by the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr Andrews, that UN sanction was required to what might be termed "constructive ambiguity" in the final days of the Holbrooke demarche, specifically after resolution 1199 was passed by the Security Council.
Although this resolution made reference to chapter seven of the UN Charter under which the council can authorise military action in the face of a "threat to peace" or "an act of aggression", it did not use the key phrase about "using all necessary means".
No one in Belgrade, understandably, was particularly concerned about Ireland's view of the meaning of 1199, and this State's diplomatic silence on the issue could well be seen to imply tacit consent to credible threats to Mr Milosevic.
Indeed, the latter impression has been reinforced by the decision to send up to 50 Irish soldiers as monitors to Kosovo with no UN security guarantees about the right to use force to protect them.
The lads need not worry, however, NATO will make it clear to Belgrade that it will protect them, and that's fine by us.
But the issue raises important questions about the coherence of Ireland's view of international collective security in the face of the obvious impotence of the Security Council and the willingness of others - rightly, many would say - to step into the vacuum and take the law into their own hands in the interests of preventing a humanitarian disaster.
So what, you may say. We are not really a player in these big boys' games. Indeed? Then why are we seeking a place on the UN Security Council?
And what will we do when we get there?
