On July 10th, 1998 the Taliban army started its long-expected second attempt to advance into northern Afghanistan and to conquer the remaining one-third of the country which was under the control of the United Front (Northern Alliance), an alliance of mainly Tajik, Hazara and Uzbek ethnic groups.
What happened next has important lessons for the tactics that the US and its allies could now use to isolate the Taliban.
The Taliban's previous attempt in the spring of 1997 had been disastrous - it suffered heavy casualties. Gen Dostum, leader of the Uzbeks, had repelled an earlier attack in the Faryab area of north- west Afghanistan in late December 1997.
By July 12th, the Taliban had taken Maimama, the provincial capital, but were meeting strong resistance and its advance was halted.
Senior UN personnel were briefed on defensive plans of the United Front and convinced that all was under control and that Taliban forces would be repelled.
Back in Islamabad there was almost disbelief when over the next two weeks the Taliban, with relative ease, pushed its way right through the north, occupying all the major towns.
By mid-August, only the north- east province of Badakshan, the Panjshir Valley, 30 miles from Kabul and the Central Highlands of Bamiyan (where the Great Buddha stood) were not under their control.
How was this achieved and why were all UN and other NGO agencies taken by surprise?
It soon became clear that, as in the past, the Taliban had "bought" as much as "fought" their way into the north.
This was a time-honoured way of gaining control in Afghanistan, going back to the British Empire. To exercise control in the North- West Frontier province of modern Pakistan and Afghanistan, retainers and subsidies were paid in return for loyalty.
This could be the way forward in isolating the Taliban. Pakistan created it in 1994. The objective was to have a puppet government in Kabul which would provide Islamic defence against India and allow it to train fundamentalist fighters for the jihad in Kashmir.
It would also give them transit passage for their goods to Central Asia.
It is understood that Saudi money was provided to persuade independent mujahideen commanders to give up fighting and surrender their arms.
The United Front did not have the resources necessary, neither in terms of money or supplies, to compete with the Taliban in that way.
Because the Taliban did reduce the anarchy prevailing after the fall of the Najibullah government in 1992 and provided some security, it was accepted initially.
However, the majority of Afghans are fed up with the Taliban. As a Pakistani-created movement, it has not been elected; half of its fighters are Pakistani or Arab.
Osama bin Laden's faction has undue influence with the leadership and provides training not only for international terrorists but also for Pakistani-supported mujahideen in Kashmir. They are largely Pashtuns/Pathans.
No one ethnic group has succeeded in ruling Afghanistan. Last week, in a message from their former king, Zahar Shah, in exile in Rome, Afghans were urged to rise up and rid themselves of them.
Other leaders of ethnic groups are active in guerilla campaigns in Taliban-occupied territory. They need more support. But many Taliban commanders could be bought, thus reducing the amount of bloodshed.
The aim of the UN's Special Mission to Afghanistan (UNSMA) is to seek peace in Afghanistan, to stop the war and hold peace talks aimed at establishing a broad-based ethnically representative government.
A high level group - the Six plus Two, representing the six countries surrounding Afghanistan which have political, cultural, trade and security concerns, together with the US and Russia - was established to address this aim.
Privately within the UN it was believed "that until the big boys", meaning the US or Russia, became seriously involved there was little real hope of a solution as the Six distrusted each other and one of them, Pakistan, supported the Taliban.
The US is now at last seriously involved, as is Russia, with the US in the driving seat.
It now has an opportunity to put right what it allowed go wrong when it walked away from Afghanistan after the Soviet withdrawal.
By supporting the United Front financially and militarily through the use of air support to its ground troops it would be in a position to limit casualties and confine them to the battlefield.
The Taliban's line of battle consists of between 35,000 and 40,000 fighters plus 3,000 Arabs of bin Laden's brigade.
They have about 200 Soviet- vintage T-54/T-62 tanks, as well as heavy artillery and BM21 heavy rocket-launchers.
The air force consists of around 30 helicopters, a small quantity of Antonov transports and a dozen MiG 21s.
This would pose no problem to the US's superior air power, as there are no serious Taliban anti-air defences to worry them, as was the case in the conflict in the Balkans.
However, it is essential that the US administration ceases its "Wild West" rhetoric of recent days, and there are signs that may be happening.
It needs to address the Afghan people and assure them if they support the US in ridding Afghanistan of the Taliban and terrorism the US will, in concert with the UN, support the reconstruction of their country and the setting up of a broad-based ethnically representative government.
Capt Peadar McElhinney retired from the Naval Service in September, 1999 after 40 years' service. He served as Senior Military Advisor to the UN Special Mission to Afghanistan from October 1997 to October 1998.